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 Abstract 
 
This thesis is concerned with educational policy discontinuity in Peru. Since the early 
nineties, investment in education has increased leading to wave after wave of 
(truncated) policies and reforms. Results, however, have not matched expectations. 
Partly due to political instabilities, but, more generally, as the result of discontinuities 
in educational policy– changes in teams, processes and discourses. The problem 
seems to be one of an endemic incapacity on the part of the state, to bring about 
desired social changes: a radical form of discontinuity that raises critical questions 
about the role of public education in national development.  
The present study aims to investigate these problems. It focuses on the issue of 
education policy discontinuity, and attempts to cast some light as to the origins of the 
problem and its radical nature. This opens the way towards considerations about the 
Peruvian state, the role of public education and prevailing conceptions about policy 
making.  
The study has been carried out mainly through interviews with policy makers and 
other policy actors who have participated in the reform processes that have taken 
place since the early nineties. Theoretical explorations follow these actors’ 
explanations about policy discontinuity, as well as their discourses about the policy 
process. The interview data has been complemented with documentary data as to 
achieve a more complete view of policy events in the period under study.  
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PART I – THE PROBLEM OF EDUCATION POLICY 
DISCONTINUITY 
 
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
In the past decades, Peruvian education has been on the spotlight of political and 
policy discourse in the country. At least since the 1970’s, when the military 
government of Juan Velasco Alvarado proposed a thorough reform of the education 
system, improving public education has been one of the leitmotifs of political 
campaigns. This notwithstanding, Peruvian education, particularly, although not 
exclusively, public education, has steadily declined. Quality indicators coming, 
among other sources, from national and international assessments, are well below 
desired standards. This is alarming for the country’s possibilities of economic and 
social development, and it raises serious questions of equity; as the limitations faced 
in public education contribute to the reproduction of existing inequalities. 
Since the early nineties, investment in education has been on the rise, especially due 
to the constant influx of international loans, and also through some increase in the 
percentage of the country’s GDP that goes to education. Wave after wave of 
(truncated) policies and reforms have swept the public education system to address 
its weaknesses. Results, however, have not met expectations. Partly due to political 
instabilities, but, more generally, as the product of constant discontinuities – changes 
in policy teams, policies, discourses, etc. –   the worrying situation of Peruvian 
education has remained much the same. Beyond specific changes, the problem 
seems to be one of an endemic incapacity on the part of the state, to bring about 
desired social changes due to a radical form of policy discontinuity that raises critical 
questions about the role of public education in national development.  
The present study aims to investigate these problems. It focuses on the issue of 
education policy discontinuity, and attempts to cast some light as to the origins of the 
problem and its radical nature. This opens the way towards considerations about the 
Peruvian state, the role of public education and prevailing conceptions about policy 
making.  
The study has been carried out mainly through interviews with policy makers and 
other policy actors who have participated in the reform processes that have taken 
place since the early nineties. Theoretical explorations follow these actors’ 
explanations about policy discontinuity, as well as their discourses about the policy 
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process. The interview data has been complemented with documentary data as to 
achieve a more complete view of policy events in the period under study.  
Details about the research design are provided in the methodology chapters. For 
now, I want to turn towards the focus of the study: the issue of policy discontinuity.  
 
*** 
 
Many times, when I have tried to explain the topic of my research, I have come 
across comments suggesting that policy discontinuity is something rather obvious. 
Obvious in policy making in general, and not only in the case of education, and 
especially obvious in the context of Peru and other developing countries. For a while, 
this used to make me anxious. To be honest, it was not until the late stages of my 
research that I became more comfortable with the topic and stopped wondering 
whether it had been mere stubbornness which had made me to stick to it. As this has 
been often raised, I think it might be useful to begin this introduction with some notes 
on the subject.  
About the apparent obviousness of discontinuity I cannot but agree. It is a 
constitutive element of any policy process – especially when the political (negotiable) 
nature of policy making is considered. Besides, in the case of Peru, and even more 
in the case of education, discontinuity is also seen as an obvious matter. It is a taken 
for granted issue that causes no surprise. So the point is: what is there, what can be 
found or thought in relation to such an obvious matter? If the obviousness of 
something lies in its being clear, perceptible, and therefore susceptible to being 
‘taken out of the way’ – as the etymology of the word indicates – then why dedicate a 
whole research project to studying it? Why put it in the way of our considerations 
about education policy making? 
Before going into the obviousness (or lack of it) of education policy discontinuity in 
Peru, let me just take a brief detour into the more general meaning and possibilities 
that the obvious raises. The taken-for-grantedness of the obvious tends to imply that 
little consideration is given to it. This involves considerable dangers, as much of what 
we take for granted as being natural and obvious is indeed the product of not so 
necessary or evident dynamics. In this way, social practices whose existence 
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appears to be entirely evident can be shown to be the outcome of often arbitrary 
criteria that involve the concealment of other possible states or situations1. 
Contemporary philosophy has shown that even the most accepted – the most 
obvious -- of our interpretations, do not follow a necessary or univocal logic. They 
can always be opened up to a play of signifiers that lead in new, sometimes more 
illuminative or empowering ways. So we might want to reconsider the idea that the 
obvious requires no further explanation and can therefore be taken out of the way. 
This implies taking some distance from what appears to occur naturally, and making 
the obvious strange, puzzling, in need of questions. Such a move creates the 
possibility of re-examining a phenomenon in spite of its obviousness, to try to 
understand the processes that have led it to become natural.    
In the social sciences in particular, where the possibility of discovery is somewhat 
more limited than in the natural sciences, much of the possibility for development 
seems to lie in the capacity of recasting social problems in new ways, as to make the 
obvious problematic. By re-framing or re-symbolising social reality through new 
theories and interpretations new possibilities of thinking and acting upon it open up. It 
has indeed been suggested that much of the contribution that can be made by the 
social sciences consists precisely in making social problems visible. And this, as we 
have seen, is not only a matter of identifying new problems but also of re-casting the 
obvious in new ways.   
Now, going back to education policy discontinuity, the obviousness of this problem 
comes through in many ways. On one hand, discontinuity appears to be a constant, 
necessary and even desirable element in policy making. It suggests change, which is 
fundamental for adapting policies to new situations and demands. So it is obvious for 
policy in general. On the other hand, discontinuity, particularly when it manifests in 
the radical ways in which I suggest it does in the case of Peru, seems to be a trait of 
incipient state apparatuses like those of developing countries. It could be argued that 
state institutions in such countries are weak, as are the mechanisms that would 
guarantee the delivery of policies. So discontinuity is present in any policy sector, not 
only in education, and it is a constitutive element of policy making in countries like 
Peru.  
The obviousness of discontinuity, however, opens up a series of questions when 
considered in more depth. Changes in governments and policy making teams hinder 
                                                
1 This is the kind of analysis in which Michel Foucault engaged, thus showing that taken for granted 
practices such as those of the modern prison, or the definition of mental illness, were the outcome of 
rather contingent processes led by not so overt power dynamics.  
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the application and development of policies and programmes over time, producing a 
kind of zero sum game that leads to inaction in spite of the permanent action that is 
involved in the constant redefinition of what needs to be done in Peruvian education. 
This is another aspect of the obviousness of discontinuity. If what we have is indeed 
the prevalence of obsolete educational practices (both at the level of teaching and of 
the system’s administration) then it would seem that continuity and not discontinuity 
is the central problem. However, if we take this view on its own – rather than as the 
flipside of discontinuity – we run the risk of leaving some fundamental problems 
unconsidered. The reading I propose is, rather, that under the guise of permanent 
change in policies, the reality of Peruvian education remains the same, untouched 
over time, and reproducing existing social inequalities. But this, rather than lead to a 
dismissal of discontinuity, calls for more detailed attention of the problem.  
Beyond the factual changes in policy discourses and teams, discontinuity points 
towards a more fundamental problem: the state’s incapacity to come up with a 
direction in which to steer a sector like education.  Education policies are caught in a 
kind of permanent metonymy, whereby any signifier (any policy) immediately slips 
into another, thus impeding the minimal fixation of policy discourses that is 
necessary to guide concrete actions.   
Although, as will be shown, discontinuity in Peruvian education policies is highlighted 
as a problem in the discourse of various policy actors, it remains largely under 
theorised. Here lies the contribution of this study.  
The focus on discontinuity opens the way for various levels of considerations. 
Through the research three complementary readings of the problem have been 
developed. A first reading is based on considerations of the characteristics of the 
Peruvian state that show the problems at the level of the institutions of policy making. 
Here the problem links education policy discontinuity with more widespread problems 
in the state apparatus, which has not developed the capacities to steer social 
changes – this, largely due to a lack of social integration that weakens the legitimacy 
of the state.  
Another reading considers the ‘cultures’ of policy making that arise in such a context, 
and which, it is argued, help reproduce the weakness of the state in relation to the 
education system. From this perspective discontinuity is linked with more 
idiosyncratic dynamics, in which policy makers – only loosely constrained by 
institutional mechanisms that might otherwise require them to give reasons for their 
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actions – strive to imprint their own mark on education policies rather than implement 
changes within a framework of continuity or directionality.  
These two readings are framed by a broader one that links considerations on the 
development of the Peruvian state with the development of the public education 
system. Discontinuity, from this perspective, is linked to the lack of articulation of 
public education to a project of national development, a problem that, on its turn, 
leads back to the inequalities that have prevailed in Peruvian society throughout the 
development of its state.  
Through these readings policy discontinuity is reframed, redefined. In the end, 
discontinuity speaks of the existence of certain fundamental problems in dominant 
conceptions and practices of policy making, and some even more fundamental 
problems in the operation of the state apparatus.  
The latter idea helps situate the study of discontinuity. The problem opens the inquiry 
into the processes rather than the content of education policies. In this sense, the 
ideas advanced through the study can be relevant beyond the realm of education. 
With this in mind, however, it will also become apparent throughout the following 
chapters, that the problem of discontinuity has particular connotations in the case of 
education. This relates to what was said above, that is, to the role that public 
education, or education more broadly, has played in Peruvian development.  
The study of discontinuity aims to contribute in the direction of a more complex 
theorisation of education policy (Ozga in Vidovich 2001), seeking to understand the 
difficulties that emerge during the definition of policy problems. In this sense, the 
present study stands within a tradition inaugurated by Stephen Ball, which seeks ‘to 
capture the messy realities of influence, pressure, dogma, expediency, conflict, 
compromise, intransigence, resistance, error, opposition and pragmatism in the 
policy process’ (Ball 1990:9). This constitutes a move away from the tendency to 
provide ‘tidy generalities’ when accounting for education policies.  
 
*** 
 
The work has been organised into five parts, each consisting of a series of chapters. 
The first part has an introductory character. It aims to situate the problem both in 
terms of my interest in it – the origins of the research – and in terms of the relevant 
literature. It also aims to give the reader some background on Peru, its social and 
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economic characteristics, and on the characteristics of the Peruvian education 
system. At this stage the aim is merely to situate the reader in relation to the problem 
and its context – a more detailed discussion of some of the issues presented at this 
early stage, especially of the policy events that have characterised the period under 
study, will be found in later chapters. 
The second part provides a detailed discussion of the research methodology. It 
begins with an attempt to present the epistemological considerations that have 
guided the research process, and then goes into a discussion of the process itself, 
the research design and the choices that have been made throughout.  
The third part presents the theoretical underpinnings of the research. This is not 
merely a review of relevant theoretical literature, but the outcome of the research 
itself. That is, the theoretical underpinnings of the proposed analysis have been 
developed together with the analysis. Here, a first reading of discontinuity is 
proposed. It stems from the discussion of the Peruvian state and the role of the 
education system therein.   
Having set the theoretical background, the fourth part presents the analysis of the 
empirical data. It consists of three different sections: the first discusses education 
policy events during the period under study and sets the background for the next two 
sections; the second presents one reading of discontinuity that focuses on the 
institutions of policy making; while the third presents a reading in terms of the 
cultures of policy making that prevail in the country.  
The fifth part serves as conclusion to the study and aims to put together the readings 
and theories of discontinuity. The discussion of the meaning of discontinuity moves 
onto considerations of policy making as a deliberative process and of democratic 
politics more broadly.  
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CHAPTER 2 - BEGINNINGS: ON MY INTEREST AND MOTIVATIONS TO 
STUDY EDUCATION POLICY DISCONTINUITY 
 
‘all knowledge is marked by its origins (…) [T]o deny this 
marking is to make false claims to universally applicable 
knowledge which subjugates other knowledges and their 
procedures’ (Rose 1997:307) 
 
My motivation in focusing on the issue of policy discontinuity can be traced back to 
my years working in the Ministry of Education of Peru. As a young philosophy 
graduate being part of a ‘strategic planning office’ that was in charge of developing 
major changes in the education system seemed like one of the best possible 
opportunities. The excitement of my first year in the Ministry at the possibility of 
participating in such a reform process was soon to experience a disappointment, as I 
faced the difficulties of working in one of the country’s largest bureaucratic 
organisations. Internal organisational dynamics, political processes and external 
demands considerably limited the development of ideas and policies. On the other 
hand, what I now understand as a technicist and largely undemocratic attitude on the 
part of many ministry officials2, seemed to lead to the dismissal of more open 
discussion of policies and reforms, especially with other members of the education 
establishment like the teachers. And this seemed to weaken the development and 
sustainability of policies.   
During my last year in the Ministry of Education, and after a rather stable ministerial 
period, a new minister took over. The change in ideology – and consequently in the 
culture of policy making - was radical. It gave way to an internal battle between those 
who wanted to defend reforms and those who, not for any apparent ‘educational’ or 
‘policy’ reasons, but rather for reasons that had to do with electoral and personal 
gains, wanted to introduce changes in policies. Soon the new minister began to 
change heads of office and leaders of some of the major reform programmes. This 
took place with very little coordination between incoming and outgoing officials, and 
therefore had important effects on the development of policies, as conceptions 
started to change, sometimes abruptly and sometimes more slowly. Observing and 
participating in this process sprung a series of mixed feelings and ideas which at the 
moment I found very hard to account for.  
                                                
2 The reasons why should become clear in the course of the thesis.  
 7
I left the Ministry at this time. It was a period in which morale was low. It was 1999, a 
time when the government’s corruption was becoming more widespread and less 
covert; the time when president Fujimori came out with the concept of the ‘authentic 
interpretation of the law’ that allowed him to run for a third election, although the 
constitution stated that presidents could only govern for two consecutive periods; the 
time when much of the media – later found to have literally sold their editorial lines to 
the government – were supporting Fujimori’s government and colluding with it to hide 
corruption acts and human rights violations.  
In my case, disappointment soon gave way to questioning. How is it that something 
like this can happen? Why does the country tolerate the prevalence of such 
antidemocratic practices not only at the macro level but also at the level of decisions 
making in a sector like education? To what extent were the people in the Ministry, 
myself included, responsible for this? How did the Ministry as an organisation 
contribute to the possibility of changing policies and programmes by not promoting 
and engaging in discussions of alternatives? How does one control the abuse of 
power by policymakers who have no willingness to account or give reasons for their 
choices? How does one change this? Is it possible to change it? 
I think these questions, such feelings of frustration and demotivation, and the 
problems that lay behind them, gave rise to this study. This was a moment when, to 
use Clark’s (2003) expression, the play of language, of my own personal experience, 
opened up to ‘the play of the world’, to the intricacies of education policy making. I 
was faced with the problem of discontinuity, although at the moment it was still a very 
fuzzy and ill defined problem.  
My questions initially led me to focus on the interplay of psychological and 
organisational elements that I thought were at the root of many problems. 
Organisations, I had come to realise, can be dysfunctional, and individuals working in 
such contexts can often become dysfunctional themselves, sometimes working more 
to preserve positions and sustain petty-powers, but more generally just loosing sight 
of what they are meant to be doing – which in this case was the development of 
education policies. Conflicts between policymakers often seem to guide the course of 
actions, and individuals appear to cling to their ideologies making deliberations and 
negotiations over alternatives almost impossible. 
I explored these issues during my Master’s studies in psychoanalysis, which had a 
particular focus on groups and organisational processes. Here I considered the 
nature of the tasks that the education sector has to accomplish, and began to 
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develop the idea that the lack of articulation of public education to national 
development had a lot to do with what I later came to call ‘policy discontinuity’. At this 
point it became clear that the problem – a problem that I knew of, or rather sensed 
was there, but couldn’t yet describe in precise terms – required a more sociologically 
minded analysis. Understanding what was going on in the field of education policy 
implied understanding the socio-political system that frames education policymaking 
- that is, the set of institutions that regulate policy making as well as the role of 
education in relation to the Peruvian state.  
Before starting the PhD I went back to Peru and worked as a research assistant for a 
year. In one of the projects I was involved in, which was a comparative study of 
curricular practices in Latin America, I came across various comments and 
indications that suggested that the way in which policies are made – in this case the 
discontinuities in policy making - affects the possibilities of achieving desired 
changes. The constant redefinition of curricular matters, for instance, bred inaction. 
People that were interviewed for this project often mentioned ‘the way in which things 
are handled’ by policy making authorities as a major problem, but it was a kind of 
‘taken for granted’ issue that nobody stopped to consider in-depth – the kind of 
issues that we tend to take for granted in developing countries, like corruption, for 
instance. Similar problems were mentioned in other countries in the region, but, 
again, as I have shown in the previous chapter, were not being addressed by 
existing research, which tended to focus on the content or discourse of education 
policies, rather than on the policy process itself, and mentioned problems in policy 
making as a kind of background description to the analysis of substantive policy 
issues. Here, once again, I was faced with the problem of discontinuity and the need 
to study it.  
This is the path that led the way to my PhD research. What exactly was I looking at I 
did not yet know, and it was only later that I would come to use the term discontinuity 
to refer to the research problem.  
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CHAPTER 3 - DISCONTINUITY AND CURRENT EDUCATIONAL 
RESEARCH TRENDS IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
In the following pages I will attempt to situate the present study within the existing 
body of educational research in the Latin American region.  
Two of the most comprehensive reviews of educational research trends in Latin 
America (García Huidobro et al. 1989; Rivero 1994) are based on what is probably 
the most fundamental source of information for educational researchers in the 
region, the Latin American Educational Information and Documentation Network 
(REDUC). The growing body of literature that is reviewed and stored by REDUC 
makes this a necessary starting point for educational researchers in the region. 
Together with the work of other institutions such as the regional office of UNESCO’s 
International Institute for Educational Planning (IIPE) and the Partnership for 
Educational Revitalisation in the Americas (PREAL), among others, it offers a 
comprehensive view of the region’s main research trends.  
It is interesting to note that in spite of the span between their work, both Rivero and 
Garcia Huidobro show a strong preoccupation with the way in which educational 
research relates to policy practices. This may be indicative of the overall applied 
character of educational research in the region, which has to do with the scarcity of 
funding in most countries for independent academic research. As Rivero notes, most 
research is carried out by research institutes – rather than academic institutions – 
which often operate in the context of broader programmes or institutions that have 
specific, and generally applied, research agendas – making independent academic 
research somewhat of a rarety.  
In the case of education policy research, more specifically, this makes a large 
number of efforts fall within what Codd (1988)  defines as analysis for policy – rather 
than analysis of policy. A search in REDUC’s extensive database for policy related 
research throws an overwhelming number of evaluative and diagnostic studies, as 
well as ‘state of the art’ studies of regional or national education policies. The applied 
character of education policy research thus accounts for the existence of more 
substantive – although largely descriptive – studies which tend to lack theorisation. 
This is particularly so in some areas of the region, with certain countries like 
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Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Mexico and to some extent Colombia dominating the 
production of more academically minded research3. 
Thus, although both Rivero and Garcia Huidobro highlight that the value of social 
research should not be found in its applicability but on its capacity for ‘making a 
problem socially visible, or for providing new categories for thinking about observed 
problems and acting upon them’ (Rivero 1994:87) this task, particularly in relation to 
the second idea, is insufficiently fulfilled by existing research. As well as being the 
consequence of the applied character of most research, this could also be explained 
by reference to the research models that appear to predominate in the region. Rivero 
(1994) suggests that research has ‘made use of theoretical models with little 
explanatory capacity, and there is a lack of interdisciplinary approaches and of 
adequate scientific instruments’ (p.84). Although he argues this on the basis of a 
study done in 1987, much of the now available body of literature is still amenable to 
the same critique, especially in what it says about the explanatory contributions of 
research. Apart from their applied nature, studies tend to be descriptive in character 
and follow approaches which do not usually lead to theoretical development - a trend 
that also reveals the prevalence of empiricist research approaches in the region. 
This, of course, is a generalisation that refers to the broader body of literature and 
does not deny the existence of some more theoretically oriented research.  
 
3.1 TRENDS IN EDUCATION POLICY RESEARCH: THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW 
RESEARCH AREA 
A closer look at the more recent education policy literature shows important efforts to 
understand (and not only describe) the nature (and not only the impact) of existing 
education policies. The larger body of literature is made of substantive research into 
specific policy areas and attempts to analyse the impact of reforms4.  
There is, however, a growing number of works focusing on education policy 
discourses (see Ball et al. 2003). This trend can be located within a more 
generalised move away from the technicist analyses of policy (which focus on 
diagnostics, implementation, evaluation, etc.), to more critical analyses that discuss 
                                                
3 Research production is considerably higher in these countries and the literature is considerably 
skewed towards analyses of the policies in them, with references to countries in the Andean region, for 
instance, being scarcer. For some examples see (Ball et al. 2003) or a recent number of the Journal of 
Education Policy (2001, vol. 16, No. 6) dedicated to the discussion of policies in the region.  
4 PREAL for instance, promotes studies in each of its work group areas (standards and assessment, 
teachers’ profesionalisation, teacher unions, decentralisation and school autonomy). 
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the implications of policy discourses and agendas5. In the case of Latin America 
such research tends to focus on the more recent ‘quality reforms’ of the nineties 
which followed the eighties period of ‘expansion’ reforms (aimed at increasing 
provision of educational services). A large part of this literature is concerned with the 
influence of international agencies such as the World Bank, the IDB, UNESCO on 
the formation of policy agendas (see Coraggio 1995; Fischman et al. 2001; Morillo 
2002; Narodowski et al. 2003; Reimers 1991; Torres 1999).  
Within the literature that discusses education policy developments there has 
emerged in recent years a body of material that is more specifically relevant for the 
present study. The latter, which can be broadly characterised by its focus on the 
politics of education policy making, highlights the need to focus on the processes 
and not only the content or discourses of policy making. In this sense, I would like to 
argue that the present study of discontinuity lies in the context of an emerging 
(although still not well consolidated) area in the region’s educational policy research 
agenda.  
The development of this new area in the literature has a common origin in reflections 
about reforms focusing on improving quality in the region, which suggest serious 
problems in the management of policy processes. With some exceptions, the political 
context in which reforms have taken place, which in many cases has been 
characterised by instability and institutional weakness, appears to have considerably 
undermined the development and sustainability of reforms. In a review of Latin 
American education policies, Martinic (2001) argues that apart from questions 
related to the content of reforms or the models that they have based on, researchers 
have called attention to the ‘processes of administration and implementation of 
reform policies’ where most countries have faced serious problems. This suggests 
that the problems discussed in the previous section in relation to the Peruvian case, 
where policy discontinuity appears as a serious hindrance to policy making attempts, 
are somewhat more widespread across the region.  
A series of publications demonstrates this new focus in education policy debates. A 
look at the opening papers in Martinic and Pardo’s (eds.) (2001) ‘Political Economy 
of Education Reforms in Latin America’, for instance, is enough to identify that the 
major concern of the book is to understand the way in which political phenomena 
impact on the possibilities of education reform and policy making more broadly. 
Grindle (2004) and Corrales (1999; 2002) – whose contribution I will analyse in more 
                                                
5 A discussion of these perspectives can be found in chapter 9 
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detail below – focus, respectively, on the paradox and on the ‘political impediments’ 
to education reform; Tedesco discusses the ‘political challenges’ to educational 
reforms; while Duarte discuses ‘particularistic trends in Latin American education’. 
The second part of the book presents the view on some of these problems of people 
who have actually been part of reform processes (one of the articles, for instance, is 
by former Argentinian education minister Susana Decibe). Most contributions explore 
aspects of the same problem: the way in which, because of political factors, policy 
making and reform processes have not achieved expected results. This idea could 
initially suggest a rather technicist approach to policy making, one where politics is 
seen as interference with what should be entirely technical decision making 
processes. Although this might be so in certain cases, I think the book in general 
points towards problems in the political process itself. That is, assuming that politics 
and policy making are intextricably linked, or that policy making is political, authors 
identify problems in the political process. In a line similar to that advanced in this 
study, Duarte’s chapter:  
‘tries to argue that there are political phenomena, which have a historical and 
structural character, that hinder the development of reforms. These 
phenomena have in common the predominance of an educational agenda 
made of particularistic rationalities about the public interest, which express 
themselves fundamentally through clientelism, populism and unionism’ (p.64) 
The reference to the historical and structural character of political phenomena – and 
public administration more generally – points in a similar line to Ruano’s (2002) 
admonition about the need to analyse the particularities of education reforms 
processes in states with pre-modern traits.  
Moving in a different direction, but starting from similar concerns, Aguerrondo’s 
(2002) work on ‘Ministries of Education’ in the region presents a series of reflections 
about the organisational structure of education ministries, and how together with 
political and institutional elements they affect the making of education policies. The 
publication is based on a seminar which discussed the new forms that Ministries of 
Education should adopt in view of the challenges of the XXIst century. It begins with 
a discussion about the lack of reflection on these issues, which led to a survey of 
ministries’ organisational structures on which the seminar’s discussions were based. 
The concern that moves this work is similar to that expressed by Zorrilla (2002), who, 
in an analysis of Mexican education reforms suggests that ‘Education policies, as 
public policies in general, acquire the peculiarities that education ministries or 
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secretaries imprint on them; that is why their organisational structure impacts on the 
results they obtain’.  
The fundamental premise in Aguerrondo’s (2002) book, consistent with this study, is 
that just as there is a need to think about substantial educational issues, it is also 
important to consider the institutional and organisational structures of the state that 
are in charge of conducting educational processes at different levels. From here it 
moves to suggest that this task takes place in a time when the role of the state is 
being rethought and reconfigured and that this raises new challenges and 
opportunities for state development. In this sense, Aguerrondo points to the lack of 
reflection about styles of policy making, which has often led to a consideration of the 
‘amount’ of government rather than the forms and quality of it when thinking about 
institutional reforms. Contributors to the book suggest the need to move from 
hierarchically structured administrative systems, to a network organisation.   
The idea of a change from hierarchical to network government fits well with current 
trends in political thought which point to a shift from government to governance. The 
latter takes the form of more decentralised and participative social coordination, and 
is related to reflections about the impact of globalisation and communication 
technologies on political practices (see Pierre et al. 2000). 
The collection of papers on the ‘Governance of Education Systems in Latin America’ 
(Tenti 2004), gathered from a seminar with the same name that was organised by 
IIPE in 2003, explores similar ideas. The focus of the seminar and the book is set on 
the transformations that educational institutions (from central administrations to 
schools) are undergoing as a consequence of global social changes. Some of the 
concerns that motivate this discussion are similar to those that motivate this study. In 
my case, however, research into policy discontinuity does not lead to advocating 
participation and decentralised decision making as the solution to existing problems. 
And, although I do not necessarily disagree with this agenda I think it is itself worthy 
of some scrutiny if we are to rethink politics and policy making6.  
Apart from the views they advocate, these publications share a common awareness 
about the need to think and research political and policy processes in education. 
There is recognition that such processes influence the possibilities of policy making 
and that there is therefore a need to understand them.  
In recent years such concerns have been matched by attempts to develop more 
substantial research about education policy processes. Merrilee Grindle (2004) has 
                                                
6 I will not go into this discussion here, but chapter 9 develops related ideas.  
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published one of the more comprehensive studies in this area. The author analyses 
education reform processes in various Latin American countries (Mexico, Bolivia, 
Minas Gerais in Brasil, Nicaragua and Ecuador) with a focus on ‘the strategies of 
winners and losers, the institutional context, and the strategies of reform proponents’ 
(p.26). Interestingly, Grindle focuses on the sustainability of reforms in these 
countries, and discusses how such sustainability has been achieved in spite of the 
contentious nature of the reforms – which elicited opposition from various groups. 
This focus on sustainability can be seen as the flipside of the focus on discontinuity, 
and therefore my analysis of a case where such sustainability has not been achieved 
can be seen as complementary to Grindle’s.  
One of the weaknesses in Grindle’s analysis, which can be explained by the author’s 
alignment to the more pluralistic tradition in policy analysis7, is the lack of discussion 
of the structural and historical processes that underlie policy making at any one time. 
Grindle’s analysis uses what can be described as a contingency approach to policy 
making (see Lindblom et al. 1993; see Rondinelli et al. 1990), where the outcome of 
policy debates or reforms is understood in terms of the interplay of various actors 
pursuing different and often contradictory aims which have to be negotiated during 
the process of policy development. Policy actors are portrayed as rational strategists 
facing different and changing pressures and demands as policies evolve. The 
problem with this is that, while it is a valuable contribution in terms of mapping the 
process of policy making, it does not tell us much about why actors, groups and 
institutions operate in these specific ways – a question that, I would argue, requires a 
broader focus on social and historical developments8.  Furthermore, it overlooks that 
in an institutionally weak context where guidance in terms of party or national policy 
frameworks is lacking, the actions of policy makers and other related groups tend to 
be loosely structured, and decisions are not always the outcome of rational 
considerations, but often the result of the more idiosyncratic imposition of personal 
views in the definition of problems and solutions9.  
A similar perspective is used by Corrales (2002), who explores the ‘Politics of 
Education Reforms in Argentina’10. The author analyses problems in the 
development of Argentinian education reforms in terms of a supply/demand model. 
Corrales questions models that portray policy makers as single preference actors, 
                                                
7 See chapter 9 for a detailed discussion of perspectives on policy making and analysis.  
8 This is what I try to do in chapter 8 where I link the idea of discontinuity to state development and the 
role of public education in it.  
9 An idea explored in chapter12 through the analysis of policy makers’ narratives.  
10 A more general definition of the author’s perspective can also be found in (Martinic and Pardo 2001), 
where he discusses the ‘Political Aspects in the Implementation of Educational Reforms’.  
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and suggests that they should be conceptualised as multi-minded actors pursuing 
multiple and often contradictory goals at the same time. This explains why the 
outcomes of reforms are often ‘incoherent, incomplete and sometimes inconsistent’. 
From this basis, the author sets to analyse the conditions that led education policy 
makers to accept a ‘relaxation of initial preferences, and he suggests that political 
and institutional obstacles constitute the main reasons for change.  
‘As the reformer confronts political opposition and pressure, he or she is 
forced to relax this primary preference. The need to seek some kind of 
agreement (always preferable to no reform) forces the reformer to consider 
compromises.’ 
Although it offers an interesting and valuable perspective, I think Corrales’ view is 
liable to similar criticisms as those made of Grindle’s work. In this case, the idea of 
policy actors as having clear initial preferences is especially questionable. An 
interesting point that emerges from comparing these two authors’ work is the need to 
develop a better account of change and continuity in policy making. Grindle (2004) 
defines policy sustainability in terms of ‘the extent to which a reform initiative 
survived approval and implementation and the extent to which it was sustained over 
time without sacrificing its original objectives’ (p.16). On the other hand, Corrales 
(2002) suggests that while the legal or external aspects of policies might be 
maintained over time, the content of policies experience considerable changes due 
to political negotiations. A better conceptualisation of normal and radical change in 
policies seems necessary as to capture the nuances of these processes. 
Contributing to this same idea is Cousinet’s (1998) study of educational assessment 
policies in a province of Argentina, which discusses how policies were dismantled by 
a new administration. Although they counted with plenty of support from various 
actors - the study thus points towards problems of discontinuity and calls for similar 
questions as the ones this study has set to investigate. Rivas’ (2004) analysis of the 
way in which different actors represent policy problems, and how such 
representations are politically influenced and express power relations in the 
government of education can be seen as a further exploration of the reasons that 
might lie behind radical policy changes in Argentina.  
One final study carried out by Haddad (1994) is worth mentioning, as the author 
presents a case analysis of the 1970’s education reform carried out by the military 
government and points to similar problems as those analysed in this research, thus 
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suggesting more historical or structural trends in policy making that lead to 
discontinuity. 
By way of summary, it can be said that existing education policy literature in the Latin 
American region is moving towards the conceptualisation of a new research area 
with a focus on the processes and not only the content or discourse of education 
policies. The dispersed and still limited work in this area calls for more substantive 
research as well as for more explicit attempts to conceptualise and explain problems 
within it. The present study of education policy discontinuity in Peru follows such a 
direction. At a more specific level, this study wants to contribute an alternative view 
to existing understandings of policy making by focusing on the socio-historical 
processes of state development that have led to existing institutional contexts for 
policy making. Moreover, it seeks to link the consequences and reproduction of such 
institutional arrangements to the existence of certain cultures of policy making – an 
idea that supports Duarte’s (in Martinic and Pardo 2001) notion of the ‘particularistic 
trends’ in Latin American education policies. Through these ideas and the focus on 
discontinuity more generally, this work should contribute to a more robust 
conceptualisation of policy change.  
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CHAPTER 4 – BACKGROUND: PERU AND ITS EDUCATION SYSTEM 
 
This chapter aims to provide some basic information on Peru and its education 
system. This initial contextualisation of the study of discontinuity will be followed, in 
later chapters, by a more detailed discussion of the education policy events that have 
characterised the period under study [1995-2004]. For now, the focus will be on 
some basic socio-economic indicators and on a portrayal of the situation of the public 
education system. 
 
4.1 PERU 
4.1.1 Basic indicators 
In 2003 Peru’s population amounted to 27,148 million. In 2002, 72.2 percent of these 
lived in urban areas, with Lima concentrating up to 30 percent of the population.  
Income data from 2003 showed a GDP per capita of 2,250 US dollars, a number 
which can be somewhat misleading as it locates Peru among the (lower) middle-
income countries but conceals the existence of strong income inequalities.  
According to official data, in 2003 54.8 percent of the population lived in poverty 
conditions, while 24.4 percent of these lived in conditions of extreme poverty. In 1998 
the country’s GINI coefficient for measuring income inequality was high at 0.50. 
Although the coefficient has experienced considerable reduction in the past decades, 
recent reductions are associated with a wider spread of poverty. Consumption 
measures also highlight the prevalence of strong inequalities: in 2003, official data 
showed that the poorest decile of the rural population in Peru consumes 22 times 
less that the richest decile in the capital city.  
The country’s employment indicators help further the image of social and economic 
inequality. According to Saavedra (1998) 50 percent of the economically active 
population is engaged in informal economic activities. The latter generate ‘bad 
quality employment, in the sense that workers do not have social benefits, have little 
working stability and low opportunities for advancement through learning (…) 
business and workers operate outside the legal framework and income and 
productivity are low ‘ (Saavedra 1998:22). The prevalence of informal economic 
activities is an indicator of the lack of opportunities for entering the formal sector. 
Moreover, such an employment structure generates important problems in terms of 
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the articulation of the education system to national socio-economic goals – an issue 
that will be further discussed in later chapters.   
The inequalities expressed in income and employment indicators, reflect some of 
major problems faced by Peruvian society. These can be understood in terms of the 
prevalence of a highly unequal social structure, where the possibilities for social and 
economic advancement are still reduced in spite of considerable social changes. As 
shown by Benavides (2002), although in recent years social mobility has increased 
considerably in the low and middle social strata, there are still strong barriers to 
mobility from the lower to the higher social strata. The picture is then one that 
combines social dynamism with social rigidity.  
Such inequalities weaken the country’s degree of social cohesion – one of the 
indicators that, together with the above, Dahl (1991) suggests should be considered 
when attempting to define a country in terms of its degree of modernity. As shown in 
the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2003) that was set up to 
investigate the acts of political violence that jeopardized the country’s stability during 
the eighties, the development of terrorist acts, and the way in which they were 
contained by the state, can be seen as a response to existing patterns of social 
exclusion. The report offers devastating figures of the number of victims of the 
terrorist political violence, who were mainly peasants in the rural highlands. But the 
most alarming – although not entirely new – facts presented by the report have to do 
with how the state did not take action until the terrorist violence spread towards the 
capital city; and with how vast sectors of the population remained largely 
unconcerned until they were more immediately affected. This offers an appalling 
picture of a country that can turn its back against a large part of its population, and 
raises questions about the notion of citizenship in Peru – where, as López (1997) 
suggests, there are ‘real and imaginary citizens’.  
As will be discussed in further chapters, these patterns of social inequality are also 
reflected in the conditions of the education system, where the public education 
sector, which caters for the majority, has often been characterized as offering an 
‘education for the poor’. The problem of discontinuity acquires special connotations 
in this context, as it can be understood as an element that contributes to the 
reproduction of existing social inequalities through the education system.  
 
4.1.2 Social and political developments 
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Up to the first half of the 20th century Peru was organized along more or less 
traditional lines, with a small oligarchy composed of big land-owners controlling 
political and economic activities that were largely agrarian based. As will be seen in 
later chapters, when discussing the development of the Peruvian state, 
independence from the colonial power of Spain did not bring about a radical 
modification of the social structure, as the local elites replaced the colonial powers11. 
Up to the 1950’s the economy was organized along the activities of big landowners, 
who kept peasants in very low working conditions. A first wave of transformation in 
the country came during the 1950’s with a generalized migration process in which 
peasants moved from rural areas into the cities. De Soto (2000) compares this with 
the processes that took place in 18th and 19th century Europe. This was also 
associated with a demographic explosion that led some urban areas, mainly Lima, to 
grow rapidly and without a planned or coherent pattern.  
The process of migration into the larger cities has continued thereafter, with a new 
wave of increased migration during the 1980’s, when terrorism, active mainly in the 
mountains and some parts of the jungle, led many to move into the capital city, 
fleeing not only from violence but also from the economic stagnation that it brought 
about. Migration and the consequent urbanization of the country were also 
stimulated by people searching for better educational opportunities and access to 
larger economic networks in the cities. The outcome has been the growth of the 
urban population, especially in the coastal cities and particularly in Lima.  
A further, more steered transformation of the country came about during the 1970’s, 
when the military dictatorship of General Juan Velazco Alvarado defined its mission 
in terms of changing the country’s social organisation. As will be later discussed in 
more detail, this came about through the application of a radical agrarian reform, and 
through the promotion of industrial investment. The promise of social change, 
however, was not fulfilled and the 1980’s began with the rise of a new democratically 
elected government together with increasing social tension. The decade was 
dominated by the rise of terrorist violence and, during the second half, by the return 
of a populist form of government that led the economy to collapse under record 
levels of hyper-inflation.   
In 1990, Alberto Fujimori, the leader of an independent political movement was 
elected president. His government, which ended amidst a major corruption scandal, 
liberalised the country’s economy through the application of structural adjustment 
                                                
11 This has led various authors to talk about the replacement of formal colonialism with forms of internal 
colonialism, where the basis of   
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reforms. Although this gave the economy an undeniable impteus, the major criticism 
of Fujimori’s and the following government, is that economic policies of a neo-liberal 
economic kind have not – and cannot – reduce existing social inequalities and, on 
the contrary, deepen them.  
The current government, which followed Fujimori’s after a brief transition period, has 
been subject to the same critiques. Although Alejandro Toledo, Peru’s current 
president, presented himself as a social-democrat, many argue that his economic 
policies are not far from those of his predecessor. This has led to the prevalence of 
social and economic inequalities, which seem to require much deeper 
transformations and a stronger degree of state action.  
In this sense, Peru follows a widespread trend, in which:  
‘Greater openness has made small parts of the developing world fully fledged 
members of the global village. But in many developing nations, globalized 
islands of prosperity are thriving along-side vast and growing expanses of 
economic stagnation and human deprivation’ (Kobrin 1999:152).  
During its Republican history, and especially during the 20th century, the politics and 
economy of Peru have oscillated along the pendular lines of state-intervention and 
laissez-faire (Gonzales de Olarte et al. 1991). Neither conservative governments nor 
the more left-winged ones, however, have managed to reduce the high degrees of 
inequality in the country. Periods of macro economic stability and growth, associated 
with the former type of government structure have not been accompanied by greater 
and fairer redistribution of wealth, which continues to be concentrated on a rather 
small minority. On the other hand, periods of state intervention and more widespread 
wellbeing have led to macroeconomic imbalances which have yielded high inflation 
and increased poverty levels (Sheahan 1999). 
 
 
4.2 PERUVIAN EDUCATION: QUALITY RELATED ISSUES  
 
Since the second half of the XXth century, Peruvian public education has 
experienced progressive expansion – from enrolment rates of only 14 percent of the 
population in 1950, by 1997 36 percent of the population was enrolled in education. 
This has meant that during that same period, the average education level of the 
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population of age 15 and over increased from 1.9 years to 8.6 years (Bing Wu 2001). 
In 2001 the enrolment rate of the population between 6-11 years in primary 
education reached 91,5percent, while that of the population between 12-16 years in 
secondary education reached 65,6percent (Bing Wu 2001). This is undeniably a 
move towards more equitable provision of opportunities for social and economic 
advancement for the population.  
The increase in access to educational services, however, has not gone hand in hand 
with growth in expenditure. Particularly during the 1980’s, expansion of educational 
opportunities came at the cost of a reduction in investment. The economic crisis 
experienced by the end of the decade implied that per student investment reached 
one of its lowest points, with only 162 dollars per student being invested in 1990 
(Saavedra et al. 2002).  
From the early nineties, expenditure in education began to rise steadily. By the end 
of the decade investment per student had risen to around 278 dollars - the point 
where it was in 1981, but still considerably lower than it was during the 1960’s 
(Saavedra and Suárez 2002:12). An interesting indicator, is that around 38 percent 
of student expenditure is provided by families that, given the state’s low level of 
investment, have been pushed to contribute to their children’s education – a 
measure that, given differences in families’ capacity to contribute to education, 
deepens inequalities (Saavedra and Suárez 2002). 
Furthermore, as the graphs below show, Peruvian investment in public education is 
still low even when compared to other countries in the region, and way below 
minimum international standards.  
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Investment per student in public schools by educational level 
(Converted dollars using PPC), 1997
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Figure 2.  International Comparison of Public Expenditure on Education
as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product
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This reduction in investment has had alarming consequences for the quality of public 
education. Teachers’ salaries, for instance, have experienced a considerable 
reduction (see graph below), thus leading to serious problems in the teaching 
profession, as less qualified professionals are attracted to it.   
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Evolution of a public school teacher's salary: 1940-1999
Real wages (1999 New Soles)
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Source: Group for the Analysis of Development (GRADE)  
 
A further problem is that most of the national education budget – 85 percent of 
current expenses - is spent on teachers’ salaries and pensions, thus leaving a very 
low margin to invest in other goods and services (such as teaching materials, 
infrastructure, teacher training, etc.) (Saavedra and Suárez 2002). 
Since the early nineties, the issue of educational quality has been on the spotlight. 
Whereas before problems of equity had been discussed in terms of access to 
educational services, the expansion of the education system has shifted the focus 
towards quality issues, especially as this expansion was in terms of service provision 
but not of the resources made available for education. The low quality of Peruvian 
education has recently become very obvious through the results of the OECD-PISA 
evaluation, where the country occupied the last place in reading comprehension and 
was also in one of the last places in math and science achievement. Latin American 
countries in general performed poorly, but Peru was lagging behind even when 
compared to the rest of the region. Peru has the largest proportion of students (80 
per cent) at Level 1 (the lowest achievement level) and below, indicating that 
students are having serious difficulties in using reading as a tool to advance and 
extend their knowledge and skills in other areas’ (UNESCO 2003). 
Although the validity of these tests is sometimes questioned, such results only 
confirmed what had already been identified in the 2001 national tests. The latter 
showed that less than 10% of students reach the expected achievement levels in 
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maths and communication (Spanish language) at the end of primary education, and 
only 21 per cent and 5 per cent of students reach such levels in maths and 
communications, respectively, in the fourth year of secondary education (Espinosa et 
al. 2001).  
Such low achievement can be partly explained by the low investment in education. 
However, as Cueto (2003) shows, investment levels alone do not explain the low 
achievement of Peruvian students. Internal inefficiencies –seen for instance in the 
high rates of repetition12, which lead to high levels of wastage of the money- or the 
poor education of teachers are also major problems. 
At the time of writing this thesis, the results from the new 2004 national tests came 
out. Most of the trends in achievement remain the same, with only 12.1 and 9.8 
percent of students reaching expected levels of achievement by the end of primary 
and secondary education respectively. The tests evidence inequitable trends which 
favour private over public schools, urban over rural areas. They also provide new 
information as to the relation between teachers’ knowledge of their field and student 
achievement and thus evidence the poor education of public school teachers. This 
problem requires immediate attention, and should lead to some changes in the 
negotiations with the Teachers’ Union for more pay rises13.  
The problems generated by the low investment in education are further deepened by 
inefficiencies in the education system. There are strong rates of desertion and 
repetition in both primary and secondary education that lead to a considerable 
wastage of money (PREAL 2003).  
Taking a more qualitative approach to the issue of educational quality, Hunt (2004) 
analyses the educational reforms of the 1990’s by focusing on changes within 
schools. The author offers a qualitative comparison of school practices in the early 
nineties and 2001 which is based on her visits to schools during these two moments. 
Her aim is to analyse the impact of programmes that were carried out as part of the 
nineties’ reform process. Hunt’s conclusions suggest that some significant changes 
were achieved through the programmes implemented during the second half of the 
                                                
12  Number of children having to do the same year twice because of academic failure. 
13 Adding to the information from national and international tests comprehensive reports about the state 
of Peruvian education, like the National Evaluation prepared in the year 2000 for UNESCO’s Education 
for All (Ministry of Education - Ministry of Education of Peru 2000) assessment, and the World Bank’s 
evaluation of the state of Peruvian education (Bing Wu 2001) provide some insight into the reasons that 
might lie behind such low achievement. Both these documents acknowledge the considerable progress 
that Peru has made in terms of extending the provision of education nationwide, but highlight that this 
has been achieved at the expense of educational quality because of the lack of the necessary 
budgetary increases.  
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nineties. She noted, for instance, considerable improvements in school 
infrastructure, and also positive changes in teachers’ practices, as there was more 
awareness about the need to involve children more actively in their learning process. 
The author, however, highlighted the still weak nature of these changes, especially of 
those related to teachers’ practices, and suggested the need to consolidate them 
through further training and support. As will be shown later, however, this has not 
been the chosen line of action taken by the current government, as most of the 
nineties reforms were aborted. New changes were introduced which questioned what 
had been previously done.   
A fundamental problem that the consolidation of these and other reforms have faced 
is policy discontinuity. As will be shown later through a discussion of education policy 
developments, the change of government at the end of the nineties led to a complete 
change of the policy lines that were followed during that decade. Although changes 
at this point might seem justified, especially when considering the anti-democratic 
nature of decision making during president Fujimori’s ten year rule, discontinuity is a 
problem that affects policy making even within governmental periods (and not only 
when governments change). As is discussed in further chapters, even during the 
time of Fujimori, discontinuity was high; and afterwards, with the change of 
government, continuous changes have kept sweeping the education policy arena.  
The problematic nature of such discontinuities has started to become part of 
educational discussions, albeit in a still incipient way. Referring to current problems 
in education, the newly formed National Council for Education included the following 
statement in a public document in which it expressed its main concerns about the 
state of Peruvian education: 
‘It is unacceptable that changes in government and even changes in ministers 
should lead to ruptures and traumatic changes in the education system, to the 
termination of ongoing programmes, to the disqualification of methods, to the 
destabilization of technical teams, to stressing teachers and disorienting 
parents. Particularly worrying are the massive changes of personnel; the 
abrupt announcement of a ‘new pedagogical model’ without the necessary 
studies and debates, and the scant information about the characteristics that 
curricular changes will have during the coming school year; the absence of a 
systematic response to the deep problems of national teachers which have 
become aggravated in recent years; the situation of hired teachers who have 
worked last year without redeeming their salaries and the possibility that this 
situation might occur again (Educación 2003).  
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 In a report on the progress of Peruvian education in the last decade, PREAL (2003), 
also includes a mention of radical discontinuity in education policies as a factor 
contributing to the slowness of much needed educational changes. The problem, 
however, has remained largely untheorised and, as discussed in the opening pages, 
it is part of the background of policy discussions. The latter normally focus on the 
content of education policies, and rarely on the ways in which policies are 
handled.This is where the main contributions of the present work lie. 
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PART II - THE RESEARCH: METHODOLOGICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
  
Critiques of neo-positivist and empiricist approaches to the social and natural 
sciences - with their claims to objectivity and universality and their assumption that 
knowledge can mirror the world transparently– have led theorists to emphasise the 
interpretive nature (or theory-ladenness) of our relation to the world. Taking on such 
criticisms has important consequences for the way in which we approach research, 
as they set limits – and also possibilities – for what we can do as researchers and 
how we can do it. I will discuss these issues in more detail throughout this chapter. 
For now, I wanted to raise them in order to show the way in which my reflections will 
move.  
For the practical purpose of writing a methodology chapter, assuming a post-
empiricist perspective has quite definite consequences. For one thing, if the way in 
which we develop our knowledge, or our research projects, is not so straight forward, 
is full of interpretation and doubt in view of a world that we can only partially know, 
should we not in some measure account for such partiality? For the limits of our 
knowledge? For the ways in which such limitations have led us to stumble across the 
way? And for how we have come to think in certain ways about our research topics? 
(see Crang 2003). Silverman (2000), for instance, argues that we might be better-off 
writing ‘the natural history’ of our research, than methodology chapters presenting a 
linear, clear cut, ‘universal, ‘objective’ account of how we have gone about doing our 
studies. We can take this recommendation not only as a warning to avoid boring the 
reader with yet another straight-forward demonstration of methodological skill, but 
more as the consequence of assuming the ethical and methodological commitments 
that a post-empiricist perspective gives rise to. Ethical in the sense that we now have 
to account for the choices we make, for the subjectivity in our research; and 
methodological because an awareness of such issues should imply that we do things 
in certain ways but not in others. 
Feminist post-empiricist thinkers have raised similar issues and now encourage 
researchers to incorporate some degree of reflexivity into the way in which they write 
and account for their research (see Rose 1997). This is the consequence of 
recognising not only that our knowledge of the world is always interpretive, but that 
interpretations are made from particular positions, contexts and situations. 
Reflexivity, then, ‘is being advocated… as a strategy for situating knowledges: that 
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is, as a means of avoiding the false neutrality and universality of so much academic 
knowledge’ (Rose 1997:306). A process of knowledge production that is situated 
through the explicit reflections of its author ‘can no longer claim universality’ (Rose 
1997:308). Reflexivity, then, is a ‘situating technology’ that helps locate the 
researcher and his/her specific and limited perspective in relation to the research 
subject.  
While I accept these suggestions – and they will be the guiding concepts for what I 
present in the following pages - I also take on the admonition, that precisely because 
our knowledge is situated, partial, contextual, etc. etc. we can never attain a perfect 
awareness about what we do, why we do it and the implications it might have (Rose 
1997). No matter how hard we reflect upon these matters. Such a pretension would 
suggest the possibility of a kind of ‘transparent reflexivity’ that ‘depends on certain 
notions of agency (as conscious) and power (as context), and assumes that both are 
knowable’ (Rose 1997:311). In the end, any pretension of clairvoyant recognition is 
amenable to the same criticisms that post-empiricist researchers have directed at 
foundationalist and universalising knowledge claims.  
Having said this I can now give way to this methodology chapter, in which, for the 
sake of rigour I will provide an account of my research design, sampling techniques, 
analytic claims and other methodological procedures, albeit in the context of a 
‘natural history’ of my research into which I have tried to incorporate some degree of 
non-transparent reflexivity.  
 
CHAPTER 5 – EPISTEMOLOGICAL STANDPOINT  
The standpoint from which I have undertaken this research derives from post-
empiricist critiques of knowledge development. I will begin to define my position by 
relating it to the way in which post-colonial critic Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
describes herself in an interview: 
‘My position is generally a reactive one. I am viewed by Marxists as too codic, 
by feminists as too male-identified, by indigenous theorists as too committed 
to Western Theory. I am uneasily pleased about this.’14  
 
                                                
14 Taken from http://www.english.emory.edu/Bahri/Spivak.html  
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Before going on to explain my sympathy for this self-description, I should say that in 
no way am I trying to compare myself or the quality of my work to that of Spivak. Her 
comment, however, does reflect how I feel in relation to declaring or assuming 
allegiance to one particular body of thought. Like Spivak I tend to feel ‘uneasily 
pleased’ by my lack of identification (more personal than public in this case) with 
particular traditions of thought. I have always found it very hard to see myself as an 
‘ist’ of any kind, be it a Marxist, a feminist, a post-colonialist, etc. etc. Maybe deep 
inside I am one of these things – that is for the reader to determine -, but I generally 
try to be consistent with my more conscious assumption that I am not. This will be 
reflected in my use of theory (theories, I should say) for the purpose of this research. 
I understand Spivak’s reactive orientation in terms of sustaining a critical attitude 
even towards the positions that one sympathises with, being sceptical about things, 
doubting. This is quite different from negating the possibility of any kind of action or 
commitment – be it political or conceptual –, or a form of judgemental relativism. In 
broad terms, this position can be understood as opposed to foundationalist 
approaches, which claim that ‘we are justified in believing those theories that are 
appropriately related to a privileged source.’ (Haig 1991:581)  
Such views tend to emerge from positivist assumptions about the world, which hold 
that: 
‘reality exists as an objective phenomenon and is driven by laws of cause and 
effect that can be discovered through empirical testing of hypotheses and 
deductive statements’ (Fischer 2003:118) 
And which are tied to notions of scientific practice understood in terms of the 
application of empirically objective, value-free, methods leading to generalisations 
that are independent of ‘social and historical context’ (Fischer 2003:118). Empiricism 
is the accompanying method to such conceptions of science, which takes 
‘observational data to be that [privileged] source’ and relies ‘almost exclusively on 
empirical adequacy as the measure of good theory’ (Haig 1991:581). 
Positivist and empiricist approaches to science have been questioned by a series of 
philosophical schools which point to the theory-ladenness of empirical observations 
(see Sayer 1992). Inaugurating the phenomenological tradition Edmund Husserl’s 
‘The Crisis of European Science’, for instance, criticised positivism and showed how 
our most fundamental everyday understandings or perceptions of the world are 
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essentially interpretive (marked by subjectivity, or intersubjective meaning making)15. 
On a different line of argument, pragmatist philosophers like Richard Rorty (1980) 
and Donald Davidson (see Le Pore 1986), have argued against the idea that 
knowledge can ‘mirror nature’, and have promoted notions of truth as coherence or 
practical adequacy that attempt to overcome the idea of truth as correspondence.  
For empiricist scientists, the possibility of ‘reflecting’ the world would come by 
eliminating subjective (interpretive) mediations when studying the world. Hence, 
empiricists, taking on the admonition to limit themselves to ‘the observable’, tend to 
reject demands for explanation in terms of underlying unobservable phenomena (e.g. 
social and historical structures); and reject attempts to answer such demands for 
explanation by postulating ‘theories’ (see Chakravartty 2004). In some cases, 
however, empiricism might take on a more instrumentalist guise, accepting the use 
of theories as long as they have predictive (rather than explanatory) value, that is, if 
they are ‘truth conductive’ (Chakravartty 2004) – where truth is understood as 
correspondence.  
Bhaskar (1979; 1997) has developed an argument against empiricism and in support 
of a ‘realist’, albeit critical, approach to the social sciences in which theorising about 
the reality of the unobservable16 appears to be a valid form of knowledge production. 
While questioning empiricist assumptions about the possibility of knowledge 
mirroring the world, Bhaskar claims that ideas, or theories, not only shape such 
knowledge, but actually have an ontological status themselves. So, while he stands 
in the post-empiricist tradition, he still claims that knowledge (which is interpretive, 
fallible, etc.) does open into the ‘world out there’.  
To understand his argument it is important to note that Bhaskar (1997) is equally 
critical of positions that attempt to reduce the world to thought (some hermeneutic 
and allegedly some post-structuralist positions), as he is of the possibilities of 
reducing the real to the observable (positivism and empiricism). If he accused the 
latter of sustaining a naïve form of realism –where only observable things are 
assumed to be real -, he accuses the former of an epistemic fallacy – of conflating 
‘the ontological issue of the reality of ideas with the epistemological or ethical issue 
of their truth’ (Bhaskar 1997:139). ‘Like naïve objectivistm, idealism collapses 
thought and its objects together, only the direction of the reduction is different’ (Sayer 
                                                
15 These philosophical ideas have been substantiated by development in the biology of cognition and 
perception (see Maturana 1988), which show that even the most elemental perceptions and thought 
acts are conceptualised, that is, theory laden (Sayer 1992). 
16 For Chakravartty (2003), here, in questions about the reality of the unobservable, lies the dispute 
between empiricist and realist approaches.  
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1992:67). At the level of epistemology, that is, of how we come to know the world, we 
can say that it is always through theory or interpretation. This leads to a fallibilistic 
notion of truth, as there is no final foundation on the basis of which to determine the 
absolute truth of our theories. However, as Sayer (1992) shows, the notion that 
knowledge is fallible  
‘supports rather than undermines realism. For it is precisely because the 
world does not yield any kind of expectation that we believe it exists 
independently of us and is not simply a figment of our imagination’ (p.67).  
This is not entirely different to the views of Davidson, who argued that, although we 
do not have a final foundation to support our knowledge about reality, for all 
purposes we act or have to act as if reality indeed possessed certain characteristics. 
In this view not any form of knowledge is equally possible, as truth statements can 
be evaluated in terms of their practical adequacy (see Sayer 1992). Bhaskar, on the 
other hand, takes the route of a transcendental argument which leads him to suggest 
that ‘to deny the [ontological] reality of ideas makes their production wholly 
mysterious and their effects impossible’ (p.143)17. Given that ideas or theories exist, 
develop, change and emerge there must be a world out there to which they connect; 
besides, given that ideas have demonstrable effects on the world – think of the 
impact of science and technology on the world in which we live – it would be absurd 
to deny that they have ‘real’ effects. Of course, this connection between ideas and 
the world is not unproblematic, that is, it does not take place in any straight forward 
‘merely mirroring’ manner, and so ideas – knowledge in general – remain fallible.  
The notion of knowledge as being fallible has led post-structuralist thinkers to 
question the possibilities of representation – i.e. of the world through concepts or 
theories. They tend to emphasise the situated and historical nature of knowledge 
claims and the problematic nature of attempts to represent the world due to 
conceptions of ontology as change. If post-empiricist theorists highlight that we only 
know the world theoretically, and emphasise the real nature of theories (rather than 
empirical data), post-structuralist philosophers problematise the idea of 
representation itself. These critiques can be seen as taking the fallibilistic 
understanding of knowledge one step further. If the post-empiricist critique replaced 
notions of truth as correspondence with notions of truth as coherence, that are linked 
to notions of conventional (or intersubjective) understandings of the world, but, 
                                                
17 Davidson does not exactly fall into this epistemic fallacy, but in his coherence theory of truth and 
knowledge he seems to suggest that judgements or theories can be assessed through coherence 
alone, while Bhaskar maintains a stronger (although non-transparent or linear) connection to ‘the world 
out there’.  
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foremost, to the practical adequacy of knowledge (see Sayer 1992), post-structuralist 
philosophers question these notions by showing the limits, the connections to power, 
and the fissures of representations. While post-empiricists questioned the positivist 
tenet that knowledge can ‘mirror’ the world, post-structuralists suggest that ‘theories 
do not just explain (or predict or describe) a reality out there, but discursively 
produce mediated accounts of reality to which we do not have unproblematic access’ 
(Kaul 2002:717).  
For the purposes of this discussion it is especially relevant to consider the relativism 
to which some of these schools of thought supposedly lead. Assuming that we come 
to know the world interpretively, or through theory, would seem to lead, according to 
some critics, to assume that there is no basis for judgement, and therefore for 
discussing or assessing knowledge claims. Everything goes then. In the end, if the 
world is always interpreted, and only partially known, doesn’t this to some extent 
imply that the world - reality, as something beyond interpretation - does not exist? 
That all we have is our subjective or at most inter-subjective (or conventional) 
understanding of things? This would obviously have serious consequences for 
science and for the contributions we attempt to offer through research – not to 
mention the consequences it would have for our everyday lives, political projects, 
etc.  
Assuming a post-empiricist perspective - and, likewise, post-structuralist 
approaches- does not, however, necessarily entail a relativisation of reality to the 
point where any kind of action or idea is as worthy as any other. From 
phenomenologists, to some pragmatist thinkers and, I would argue, also post-
structuralist philosophers, there have been different attempts to overcome relativism. 
In the work of Husserl, for instance, the idea of inter-subjectivity was developed to 
show that language offers a basis for a shared understanding of the world, a basis 
for judging between competing knowledge claims and for acting in the world. As 
Sayer (1992) highlights, however, the problem with notions of truth as convention is 
that they do not fully overcome relativism. By making truth dependent on 
conventional practices or common understandings, they overcome judgemental 
relativism at one level, but leave it open when it is a matter of judging between 
theories that belong to different conventional practices. For Sayer, this view fails to 
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acknowledge practice and the structure of the world, where certain notions or 
theories about the world are actually contradicted in practice18.  
While intersubjective understanding of the world is fundamental, it is not sufficient to 
overcome the risk of relativism that comes from questioning notions of truth as 
correspondence. For Sayer, the idea of truth could be replaced by the notion of 
practical adequacy, where ‘to be practically adequate, knowledge must generate 
expectations about the world and about the results of our actions which are actually 
realised’ and which must also ‘be intersubjectively intelligible’ (p.69). The possibility 
of realisation in the sense discussed by Sayer, supposes that the world has a certain 
structure that is theoretically intelligible to us, but which would not accept just any 
kind of explanation – even if it were conventionally accepted. Theories, or 
representations, have therefore got to be sufficiently ‘robust’ in order to be deemed 
practically adequate, as otherwise the structure of the world would reject them. 
This view is not entirely different to the one advanced by Donald Davidson (1986), 
who proposes a Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge, where although final 
confrontation – of ideas with the world – is still deemed unattainable, the possibility to 
judge between arguments – to assess their truthfulness is retained. ‘Coherence 
yields correspondence’ says Davidson, although it is ‘correspondence without 
confrontation’ (p.307). So although there is no ultimate form of confirming our 
theories about the world – and in this sense they remain fallible – we still have to, or 
actually do, live ‘as if’ the world existed:  
‘it is absurd to look for a justifying ground for the totality of beliefs, something 
outside this totality which we can use to test or compare with our beliefs. The 
answer to our problem must then be to find a reason for supposing most of 
our beliefs are true that is not a form of evidence’ (Davidson 1986:314).  
Before going any further, I will attempt to summarise what has been said up to now. 
The post-empiricist critique highlights the theory-ladenness of the world, and the 
unseparability of facts and values, and thus puts in question the possibility of un-
theorised (objectively knowable and observable) phenomena. With this, the post-
empiricist critique banishes the possibility of finding an ultimate foundation or 
guarantee for knowledge – which for empiricists lied in observable un-theorised 
phenomena – and moves towards a fallibilistic conception of knowledge. The risk 
with this move, is the possibility of idealism – i.e. that there cannot be any relation 
                                                
18 It is, of course, difficult to determine what is the source of contradictions to theory, that is, 
whether the theory itself is faulty, whether there are problems in its implementation, or 
whether contradictions arise from unexpected factors that yet need to be theorised.  
 34
between ideas and the world - or relativism – the idea that ‘all knowledge is equally 
fallible’ (Sayer 1992:68). Philosophers and social scientists in the tradition of critical 
realism have found ways of overcoming these consequences by seeking to 
demonstrate, on one hand, the ontological reality of the world (i.e. a world beyond 
ideas), and on the other hand, the possibility of judging between ideas on the basis 
of such criteria as coherence, intersubjective understanding and, more strongly, their 
practical adequacy. In these views, theories about the world are not merely the 
product of our imagination or of convention, but relate to the world and can be judged 
on the basis of their explanatory power and practical adequacy – that is, on the basis 
of whether they create expectations that are realised in practical experience. In sum, 
the world will simply not accept any kind of explanation.  
Of course, in many cases, this is easier said than done. If we have to judge between 
an argument that says that human beings can walk on water against one that says 
that they cannot, the ‘structure’ of the world will probably prove the first argument 
less robust (although maybe an expert in levitation would provide a counterexample). 
However, when we move into the realm of political or moral judgements choosing 
becomes more difficult once we problematise conceptions of empirical evidence.   
It is in this terrain, although with implications for knowledge development in general, 
that the post-structuralist critique appears to play an important role. Discussing this 
here seems important because I will make use some of such ideas at various points 
of my work, and also because they have implications for my approach to theory in 
general. Philosophers like Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida have criticised 
structuralism, by highlighting the fundamental impossibility to ‘discover’ a universal 
grammar underlying events. This is not entirely different from the fallibilistic notion of 
knowledge advanced by post-empiricist philosophers, although it can be seen as a 
further step in exploring its consequences.   
According to the post-structuralist critique, no totalising rules govern reality, thought 
or language. Although, as realist philosophers contend, it is possible to discover 
some underlying continuities, the world, and knowledge in particular, is plagued by 
discontinuities, by difference as well as repetition. Foucault (1989), for instance, 
explicitly defines his task as the exploration of such discontinuities. Derrida (see 
Critchley 1999b; Derrida 1995), on the other hand, aims to deconstruct various 
representations of the world as to show their fissures, their internal inconsistencies.   
In the case of Foucault (1989), this leads to the idea that all knowledge takes place, 
is tied to, reproduces and gives rise to discourses which are historically situated and, 
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moreover, entwined with power relations – rather than absolute and constant. Forms 
of speaking or thinking about things (of representing) are part of ‘regimes of truth’ 
which establish what normality is and how things deviate from it. Mental illness and 
government forms are now paradigmatic instances of this kind of analysis. For some 
this kind of perspective should lead to a permanent critical exercise in which 
commitment is almost impossible, as it would necessarily entail the establishment of 
new regimes of truth. As will become clear in the following chapters, the extent to 
which this is so is actually contested. 
Some similar interpretations have been made of the work of Derrida, which – rather 
unfortunately (see Critchley 2005)- is often seen as less politically relevant and more 
concerned with the analysis of text. Derrida’s critique of the possibilities of 
representation is tied to a view of ontology – of the real – as permanently fluid and 
changing due to it’s embeddedness in time. If reality itself is so elusive, then the 
possibilities of representing it through language are even more so.  
For some this leads to a kind of agonistic (combative, neverending, uncommitting, 
relativising) attitude of permanent deconstruction, where construction – of theories, 
for instance – would be impossible. A different line of reading, however, linked to an 
‘ethical turn’ in interpretations of Derrida’s work (see Critchley 1999b), suggests that 
his views are far from idealistic positions where no relation between thought and the 
real world is possible. On the contrary: 
‘Just as Derrida argues that each text opens up into the wider world of its 
intellectual or cultural ‘context’, so too does he seem to be saying that writing 
and culture in general also open into a broader context, which is to say that 
there is always a hinge, a point of contact or connection between language 
and the wider world’ (Clark 2003) 
This opens up the possibility of representation, but representation itself remains 
problematic. This is why I suggest that Derrida takes a further step in exploring the 
fallibilistic understanding of knowledge advanced by critical realists like Bhaskar or 
Sayer. However, whereas for some interpreters this entails abandoning the 
possibility of representation (or of advancing theories) for others – on whose side I 
stand - it means, to put it rather simply, to act while doubting. Deconstruction – the 
permanent unbalancing of the stability of texts, representations and actions more 
broadly -, has nothing to do with destruction (of representation or theories). Rather 
than an exercise entailing absolute relativisation it can be understood as an ‘ethical’ 
attitude, from which we act and make choices or interpretations while also 
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acknowledging the incompleteness and contestability of our knowledge claims, or of 
developing a complete representation of some aspect of the world. While not 
negating the possibility of action, interpretation or representation, the insertion of 
doubt – hesitation – in the process (through deconstruction), entails a non-dogmatic 
approach to theorising – which is what I think Spivak’s self-description points to. 
Decisions, representations, theories, are made, but pass through a moment of 
undecidability, perplexity, hesitation and deliberation19.  
‘The idea is not (as many believe!) to give up in the universe of infinite words 
and interpretations, but to carry on reflexively. (…) What this means is that 
we attend to the ways in which the coherence of beliefs is constructed or 
fashioned in specific contexts’ (Kaul 2002:722) 
It is with these ideas in mind that I have tried to approach this work. They have 
influenced not only my approach to the problem of discontinuity, but also my use of 
theory, the interpretations I make and the explanations I offer. Although the 
theoretical explanations I have developed for the problem of discontinuity constitute 
a way of representing the problem which I would contend is robust, I fully 
acknowledge their fallible and partial character. My reading of discontinuity is one 
reading that I propose, and which I have tried to substantiate, without however 
claiming that it is the best or more complete reading that could be advanced of the 
problem. It is a reading which has limitations and which invites discussion and 
contestation.  
 
 
CHAPTER 6 - THE RESEARCH PROPOSAL 
My research, as briefly mentioned in the early chapters, has been mainly based on 
interviews with policy makers and other policy actors who have been involved in 
education policy developments since the start of the nineties reforms. Just these two 
choices – the period under study and the sample - require some justification and 
reflection. 
 
                                                
19 This can be seen as a form of eclecticism, something that I do not see as problematic as 
long as it is assumed in a responsible way. This would mean that rather than simpy assuming 
any theoretical standpoint that seems useful to explain a given phenomenon, one shouldbe 
aware of theoretical incompatibilities between the stances assumed, and, if necessary, strive 
to compatibilise theoretical positions (which would amount to the development of new theory). 
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6.1 THE PERIOD UNDER STUDY 
Setting the focus of the study in the period that goes from roughly the mid-nineties to 
about 2004, when the interviews were carried out, is quite significant. The mid-
nineties mark the beginning of a series of reform attempts that were possible through 
loan agreements with international funding agencies such as the World Bank and the 
Interamerican Development Bank. These have served to fund reforms and 
programmes in areas such as curricular development, teacher training, school 
materials, rural and distance education and infrastructure, which had suffered from 
decreasing investment levels in the previous decade. As most of the budget of the 
education sector is used in current expenses (teachers’ salaries, administrative 
expenses and basic school maintenance) it was only with moneys coming from loan 
agreements that more comprehensive reform programmes could be funded. So the 
mid-nineties mark the start of a period of educational reforms that breaks with the 
stagnation of the previous decade, in which hyperinflation and terrorist violence had 
curtailed state action in education.  
The link between reforms and the presence of international agencies such as the 
World Bank and the Interamerican Development Bank also raises some interesting 
questions as to the extent to which discontinuity might be linked to certain 
conceptions of the state that are associated with the policies of such agencies. 
These issues are explored in the research.  
A question that almost immediately arises when considering the focus on this period 
is whether discontinuity is a recent problem, or whether it has been present in 
Peruvian education policies for longer. The latter, as will become clear in further 
chapters, appears to be the case. Some of the existing literature suggests this. 
Haddad’s (1994) case study of the Peruvian education reforms of the 1970’s, for 
instance, points to similar problems as the ones I attempt to explain in this research. 
Some of the people I interviewed also suggest that discontinuity has pervaded policy 
making in previous decades.  
Methodologically speaking, the temporalisation of the problem of discontinuity makes 
sense both practically – as a more extensive historical account is beyond the scope 
of this research, which aims to provide socio-political explanations for discontinuity -, 
and for more substantive reasons such as the increase in funding for reforms 
mentioned above. However, it will become clear in the course of the following 
chapters that discontinuity has to do with more pervasive problems that relate to the 
way in which the Peruvian state has developed. Discontinuity speaks of institutional 
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weakness, as well as of the cultures of policy making that have come to exist as a 
consequence, or together with, such routes to development. Moreover, and closely 
related to the latter, discontinuity speaks about the role of public education in 
Peruvian development. So, to answer the question above, discontinuity, both as a 
theoretical concept and as a phenomenon extends beyond the period in which the 
study focuses, but this period is a particularly relevant one to approach the problem 
due to the increase in education reform discourses.   
 
6.2 THE SAMPLE 
6.2.1 Characteristics: 
The sample of interviewees comprises seventeen policy makers and other policy 
actors who have had direct or indirect participation in the reform processes that 
begun in the mid-nineties.  
The selection of interviewee’s was carried out theoretically and/or purposively 
(Silverman 2001)20. The problem of discontinuity, although with probable 
(researchable) effects at the meso and micro levels of policy making, suggested 
problems at the macro-level of policy decisions. This led to a focus on the education 
policy making elite. Although some degree of stability could be found in policy 
making in terms, for instance, of the permanence of middle and low rank officials in 
the Ministry of Education, the problem of discontinuity suggested that higher rank 
officials had the possibility of redefining policy discourses almost at will, thus creating 
conflicts with the lower administrative levels and confusion at the micro-level (i.e. 
schools). This perspective is supported by existing literature. Grindle (2004), for 
instance, in a study of education policy making in the Latin American region shows 
that: 
‘presidents and other high-level officials largely controlled when and 
how education reform was raised in political circles. They also played 
a major role in determining why the issue of education was important 
to pursue. Thus, specific education reform initiatives could largely be 
understood as elite projects that emerged from centres of decision-
making power’ (p.55). 
                                                
20 Silverman (2001) suggests that theoretical and purposive sampling procedures are more or less 
interchangeable and/or complementary: theoretical considerations serve as initial selection criteria 
which are then complemented by practical considerations. 
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As will be shown later when discussing the characteristics of the Peruvian state and 
the administrative apparatus, such a situation has to do with the high concentration 
of power in the central government and with the way in which institutions – the ‘rules 
of the game’ for policy making  – have evolved in the country.  
Before going into how these considerations guided practical sampling decisions, it 
should be noted that the education policy elites do not necessarily correspond to the 
country’s socio-economic elites. The term elite here is specifically used to refer to 
‘the powerful in education’ (Walford 1994). As will be discussed later, education 
policy making can be understood as a social field in itself (Ladwig 1994), which gives 
rise to specific relations of power (to decide, to change, etc.) in relation to 
educational matters, and which although related to or influenced by the power of 
other elites (i.e. socio-economic ones), has a dynamic of its own.  
Such theoretical criteria for the selection of interviewees were complemented – or 
instantiated -  through more practical considerations like: the positions held by 
interviewees in the policy process during the 1995-2004 period; their direct 
participation in policy making through positions in the Ministry of Education of Peru; 
their membership in influential institutions like the National Council for Education, 
Congress, Foro Educativo (an organisation that gathers influential figures in the 
national field of education); and their role as communicators (i.e. in national media).  
The selection was largely helped by the possibility of locating individuals within 
organisational structures – such as in the case of the Ministry of Education. In the 
course of the fieldwork, the initial sample was extended through ‘snowballing’ 
(Goldfinch 2000; Merkens 2004), which helped identify other important interviewees.  
Party-political considerations were not especially influential for identifying possible 
respondents. This, which in some cases can play an important role in the 
identification of relevant interviewees (see Fitz et al. 1994), is a rather weak criterion 
in a political context in which strong political parties have almost disappeared from 
the political scene, giving way to the prevalence of independent movements and 
electoral coalitions (Bardalez et al. 1999). Party allegiances are therefore rather 
weak and do not necessarily indicate the prevalence of specific ideological views21.   
Seven ministerial administrations can be identified in the period under study, and 
teams from each of them were the target for the final sample. The main focus was 
                                                
21 The crisis of political parties became especially evident in 1990, when Alberto Fujimori, the leader of 
an independent movement, beat traditional parties. The trend has dominated politics thereafter, as can 
be seen in the 1995 and 2001 electoral processes. The coalition through which president Toledo won 
the 2001 elections, for instance, grouped individuals of both left and right winged positions, who in some 
cases did not maintain their allegiance to the government after elections.   
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set on ministers, their close circle of advisors and heads of planning and 
programming offices. Some mid-rank officials were also interviewed as to see how 
the problem of discontinuity was perceived at other levels.  
The final sample includes four of the five ministers who were in office during the 
1995-2005 period, as well as officials from the time they were in office and members 
of the organisations mentioned above (National Council for Education, etc.). One 
minister from the period under study was deceased and one refused to be 
interviewed.   
 
6.2.2 Access and ethical issue 
Some researchers who have carried out interviews with education policy elites warn 
of the difficulties in gaining access to them and point to the need to identify 
gatekeepers who will sift requests for interviewing ‘the powerful’ (Fitz and Halpin 
1994).  
In my case, I experienced very few problems in terms of accessing the interviewees 
and getting them to agree on being interviewed. This was partly helped because of 
my previous knowledge of the education policy networks – through my work in the 
Ministry of Education and in a well known research institute. This allowed me to 
identify a few gatekeepers who then facilitated my access to interviewees. Here I 
must also thank GRADE (the Group for the Analysis of Development) for giving me 
their institutional support, which allowed me to approach interviewees as a member 
of a well known organisation rather than as a mere PhD student22.  
Although my knowledge of people within the field of education policy making 
facilitated access, I also had to be careful as to the way in which my position in 
relation to certain individuals or organisations in the field would place me in the view 
of interviewees. I thus tried to understand not only the ‘who’s who’ of education 
policy, but also existing conflicts between people or organisations that might have led 
to difficulties in access and in the rapport with interviewees. In general I tried to be 
aware of the sensitivities that might arise, especially as I was researching a politically 
charged area.  
Practical issues aside, I have to say I was quite impressed at the ease with which 
access was granted by interviewees and by the openness some of them showed 
during the interviews. I have come to think that this relates not only to my position 
                                                
22 I worked as a research assistant in GRADE before starting the PhD.  
 41
within the field of education policy – my relation to a well known organisation like 
GRADE -, but also to some kind of need on the part of policy makers to talk about 
their experience in the field. I believe interviewees must have soon noted that the 
aim of the interviews was not to gather specific information that could then be used 
to question their positions – as in the case of media interviews, for instance – but 
rather to engage them in a dialogue about their experiences in policy making. 
Although I cannot fully confirm this, the interview material suggests that in some 
cases the interview became an opportunity to talk.  
Each interviewee was given a brief description of the research aims and each was 
told that the interview data would only be used for the research purposes. They all 
agreed to this and no one raised any question about confidentiality. This might have 
been because the interviewees, most of whom are public figures, are used to being 
interviewed by the press, and therefore might have taken these interviews as being 
similar. The lack of concern with confidentiality issues might also relate, however, to 
the lack of a strong research tradition in the country, which makes concerns with 
ethical issues somewhat rarer. This is also reflected in the fact that no interviewee 
asked for any of their comments to be considered as ‘off the record’. In spite of this, I 
have chosen to keep the identities of the interviewees as confidential, providing only 
referential information to the positions they occupied when interviewee’s are quoted 
in the analysis section.  
 
6.3 THE INTERVIEW PROCESS 
6.3.1 Active interviewing 
If critiques of empiricist approaches to the social sciences have consequences for 
the writing of a methodology chapter, or a thesis, they also have important 
consequences for the way in which the process of data collection, in this case, 
through in-depth interviews, is approached. Reflecting on such consequences, 
Holstein and Gubrium (2004) developed the idea of interviews being an active 
process, rather than a more straight forward encounter in which the interviewer 
appears to be a neutral elicitor of responses from the interviewee. The authors are 
cautious to note that talking about ‘active interviewing’ does not denote ‘a distinctive 
type of interview’ method, but is rather the acknowledgement – and a step towards 
the enhancement – of what already goes on in any interview process.  
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Following the acknowledgement of the interpretive nature of out knowledge of the 
world, leads to the recognition that interviews themselves are an interpretive process 
in which ‘data’ is actively constructed in the encounter between interviewer and 
interviewee. Rather than information being already there in the mind of the 
interviewee, waiting to be elicited by the interviewer’s neutral questions, information 
about real events as well as about the more subjective experiences of the 
interviewee is interpretively constructed during the interview process. As Holstein 
and Gubrium (2004) put it: 
‘… interviewing provides a way of generating empirical data about the social 
world by asking people to talk about their lives. In this respect, interviews are 
special forms of conversation. While these conversations may vary from 
highly structured… to free-flowing informational exchanges, all interviewees 
are interactional’ (pp.140-141). 
Although viewing interviews as an active, interpretive, interactional process does not 
entail a change in method – as interviews are always necessarily like this, fully 
acknowledging this can lead to some change in the focus of the interview. 
Awareness about interviewing as an interactive and interpretive process can lead the 
interviewer to place less emphasis on trying to obtain ‘correct’ or ‘truthful’ answers 
about facts or events, and more emphasis on the interviewee’s experiences and 
views in relation to the research topics. As will be further discussed later, such a 
perspective on interviewing can lead to a focus on the interview as a narrative in 
which individuals talk or tell a story about their experiences. The extent of the 
emphasis on eliciting specific information or narratives – which would lead to the use 
of more or less structured interviewing techniques - will depend largely on the 
purposes of the research project and the definition of the research problem. 
In the case of this study, the interviews combined semi-structured and open interview 
methods. The former were geared to elicit responses about specific issues that the 
initial theorisation of the problem of discontinuity had signalled as relevant, and 
which had to do with issues such as the elements of the policy process (e.g. 
transference and coordination between incoming and outgoing teams, formal and 
informal limitations on decision making), the institutional framework of policy making, 
the interaction between different policy actors and organisations; the influence of 
international agencies; the characteristics of the education bureaucracy, etc. Rather 
than a specific set of questions, the interview schedule included a set of themes 
about which interviewees were asked to reflect. Different emphasis was given to the 
themes according to the interviewee’s expertise. This, however, was only one 
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element of the whole interview, which involved individual preparation as to focus on 
those areas on which the interviewee would be more knowledgeable. As policy-
makers are ‘public’ figures, I could “read-up” on the respondents in advance, and so 
each interview could fulfil ‘a specific and a general purpose’ (Ball 1994b). 
The more open sections of the interviews focused on the experience of policy 
makers, either through their direct involvement in the policy process, as stake 
holders or as members of influential organisations. The aim here was to get 
interviewees to articulate their views about policy making on the basis of reflections 
about their own personal experiences in the policy process. The outcome of this are 
a series of narratives which are particularly illustrative of the different cultures of 
policy making that arise in the context of existing institutional arrangements. 
Differences notwithstanding, the narratives suggest some underlying patterns in the 
approach to policy making in that in most cases there is a complete appropriation by 
individual policy makers of the space for definition of policy alternatives and ways of 
doing policy. This is closely related to the problem of discontinuity, which points 
precisely to the permanent redefinition of policy discourses.  
 
6.3.2 Caveats of interviewing the powerful 
Researchers who have studied education policies through interviews with ‘policy 
elites’ warn of a series of problems that might arise in the context of the latter (see 
Halpin et al. 1994; see Walford 1994). Apart from already mentioned difficulties in 
access, authors point to more substantial problems in eliciting responses and 
interpreting the material.  
 
6.3.2.1 Interpretive strategies 
Ball (1994b) warns about how interviewees will ‘present themselves in a good light’ 
will try ‘not to be indiscreet’ and will attempt to ‘convey a particular interpretation of 
events, to get arguments and points of view across, to deride or displace other 
interpretations and points of view’ (p.98). Although much of this can be said of any 
interview – where, interviewees will perform or more explicitly convey desired, 
expected or politically correct views of things (see Langellier 2001)– interviews with 
policy makers seem to increase problems given the interviewees public image and 
their experience articulating political public discourses. 
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Certain suggestions emerge from these considerations. Authors generally encourage 
researchers to go beyond the ‘face value’ of what is being told in the interview, and 
to attempt interpreting the discourses that are being constructed and performed by 
the interviewees (Ball 1994b; Fitz and Halpin 1994), or, what is similar, to be ‘critical’ 
of what we are told (Ozga et al. 1994). Researchers are warned not to uncritically 
accept ‘elite narratives as the authentic, valid account of how policy was formulated 
and why’ (Fitz and Halpin 1994:48), especially because ‘the powerful’ are in a 
position to more directly influence or reproduce dominant discourses. 
Some of this can be taken as a general warning in qualitative research, especially if 
we take on post-empiricist critiques which highlight the interpretive character of 
knowledge. In this sense, Ball’s (1994b) suggestion that we go beyond ‘simple 
realism’, that is, beyond naturalistic views of interviews (or knowledge more 
generally) as ‘mirroring’ the world out there (i.e. unproblematically, without 
interpretation) should really be applicable to any kind of interview material – as Ball 
himself suggests (see also Miller et al. 2004). This kind of perspective entails 
analysing the discourses, truth regimes or assumptive frameworks from which the 
interviewees speak.  
Rather than simply assuming that interviewees are portraying how things ‘really’ 
happened, we should attempt to understand the way in which they frame what they 
tell us as to convey a certain image of how things should be done. In my interviews 
this comes through at various moments – for instance when interviewees comment 
on the quality of different ministerial administrations and compare them to their own, 
or when they are asked to comment on criticisms (from the media or other public 
authorities) of their administrations or on controversial issues and events. 
Acknowledging this does not entail negating that interviewees will also tell us ‘facts’, 
that is, it does not mean that the interview is an invention – as some radical 
constructionists hold (see Miller and Glassner 2004)- , but rather, that the facts and 
information that we get through the interview are framed by certain assumptions that 
influence the way in which those facts are spoken about. To emphasise Ball’s idea, 
interviews are realistic accounts, but since reality is always interpretively known and 
constructed, we should be critical about the way in which interpretations mediate the 
accounts we get.   
This is the viewpoint I have taken when analysing and presenting the interview data. 
The use of a narrative perspective – discussed below – has been especially useful to 
analyse the discourses that frame the interview data. However, the approach I have 
used generally incorporates warnings about ‘simple realism’. This has guided also 
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the first part of the analysis, where interview extracts have been used to open up the 
discussion of certain issues related to the institutional framework of policy making in 
education. Here, I should highlight, the data presented is not in any way taken to 
unproblematically reflect the state of certain affairs (see Miller and Glassner 2004). 
Interviewees’ comments are taken as possible openings towards, traces of real 
problems in policy making, rather than as transparent definitions of existing 
problems. These openings or traces are then theoretically explored as to gain an 
understanding of the problem of discontinuity. In this sense, I take the position that 
‘information about social worlds is achievable through in-depth interviewing’ while not 
taking a positivist view ‘of the possibility of untouched data available through 
standardised interviewing, nor… a romanticized view of seamless authenticity 
emerging from narrative accounts’ (Miller and Glassner 2004:125,126). 
Going back to the possible problems that interviewing ‘elites’ might raise, I think that 
some of these are actually less so in the case of my research. Due to the emphasis 
of the study on the processes of policy making and on interviewees views and 
experiences therein, the interviews aimed at gauging opinions rather than eliciting 
facts about policies. Although there is a definite interest in how things happened, the 
central point of the interviews was from the start to understand how problems were 
experienced by different policy makers, how this reflected their approach to policy 
and how such approaches could help explain the problem of discontinuity. Through 
this process however, the interviews also produced information about some of the 
central problems that affect policy making in education. This information, as 
mentioned above, was taken as being interpretive and non-transparent.   
 
6.3.2.2 Interviewing strategies 
As well as these interpretive strategies when dealing with elite interviews, there are 
some more practical issues related to the handling of the interview process. 
In terms of preparing the interviews, for instance, the public character of interviewees 
and their relation to public problems in education policy allows one to ‘read-up’ on 
the interviewees beforehand (see Ball 1994b). Apart from helping to get the interview 
going, this is useful when trying to talk to the interviewees at a more personal and 
specific – rather than general – level, as one can refer to specific events or issues on 
which they have participated.  
The process of ‘reading up’ was not limited to individual issues, but was rather part of 
a strategy of ‘immersion in the culture and community of policy influence and policy 
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struggle’ (Ball 1994b:98). This allowed me to better prepare for the interviews, and 
also to reassure interviewees that ‘I was informed enough’ about general aspects of 
the policy process. The importance of this was not only as a way of dealing with the 
interviewee’s power to control the interview (see Fitz and Halpin 1994), but also as to 
avoid turning the interview into a process of ‘information giving’ rather than an 
account of personal views.  
In this context, ‘reading up’ and ‘immersing’ in the culture and community of policy, 
involved such things as following debates on the national media, reading bulletins 
and other publications on educational issues23, and also holding more informal talks 
with some of the ‘gatekeepers’ who provided me with information about various 
issues.   
Also in relation to the practicalities of interviewing policy elites, Fitz and Halpin (1994) 
mention how interviewees are often ‘used to either being deferred and listened to, or 
“just talking” to their own agenda’ (p.26). In the case of their own interviewing 
strategy, the authors found the use of semi-structured interviews to be particularly 
useful to maintain the interviewer’s agenda. This however, can be seen as going 
against more ethnographic practices of interviewing where control of the content of 
talk during the interview is handed over to respondents (Ball 1994b). The active 
interviewing perspective that I take, however, allows for a combination of strategies, 
as the focus on who ‘controls’ the interview is somewhat diluted by acknowledging 
that the interview is constructed or controlled by both interviewer and respondents24. 
In this sense, the non-positivistic or ‘active’ approach to interviewing taken here 
‘recognises’ and ‘builds’ on the ‘interactive components’ of interviews, ‘rather than 
trying to control and reduce them’ (Miller and Glassner 2004:126). This, of course, 
does not rule out problems of ‘agenda setting’ during the interview, but the latter, can 
be understood as a matter of balancing the focus on what the interviewer is 
interested in with what the respondent wants to bring into the interview, rather than 
as keeping control over the interview.  
The initial framing of the interview, in which respondents are told about the subject of 
the research and the ‘aims’ of the interview, is a rather obvious strategy in this 
sense.  In this study, the preparation of an interview schedule allowed for coverage 
                                                
23 The informational bulletins of the National Council for Education, which I receive as part of an interest 
group, were particularly useful for this, as they present information on debates, discussions, reports, 
etc.  
24 Silverman (2001) locates the more ethnographic approaches to interviewing within the ‘emotionalist’ 
trend in qualitative research, which pursues ‘natural’ and unmediated accounts of individual experience 
and is therefore amenable to similar criticisms as positivism. While positivism seeks objectivity through 
‘scientific’ procedures, emotionalist perspectives seek objective personal accounts by reducing 
mediation – the interviewer’s influence in this case (see also Miller and Glassner 2004).  
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of certain general themes that could then allow for some degree of comparability and 
cross-checking between the interviews, which was especially useful during the 
thematic analysis of the data – not so much for the narrative analysis. This, rather 
than a way of achieving more ‘adequate’ views, is a way of granting better 
explanatory power through the development of more complex theories25. The framing 
and schedule were flexible enough as to allow new topics to enter the research 
agenda, and strong enough as to avoid loosing the focus on the research problem.   
As a way of eliciting information on personal positions and views, the respondents 
were often asked to comment on specific controversial issues or criticisms of their 
administrations and their decisions – which I had learned about through public 
discussions. Confronting the interviewee with specific issues served as a strategy to 
overcome generality in their discourse and compel them to talk about their positions 
more specifically.  
Ball’s (1994b) comment that interviews are ‘a confrontation and a joint construction’ 
(p.97) is especially relevant here. The confrontation in this case, was not at all at a 
personal level, and the reference to ‘public’ criticisms and debates was useful to 
avoid giving respondents the impression that I –the interviewer- was criticising them 
personally. My questions were thus phrased in terms of: “x and y have criticised your 
administration for xyz, how would you respond to these criticisms?’, or “your decision 
about x was questioned, how do you justify it?”.  Individual preparation of the 
interviews and my immersion in and ‘reading up’ of issues of the world of education 
policy making previous to the fieldwork was fundamental for this. Moreover, as the 
interviews progressed I gathered new information that could be used for this purpose 
– being careful, of course, of not breaching the confidentiality of what respondents 
had told me.  
 
6.4 ANALYSING THE DATA 
‘analysis is not just holding up a mirror to give a ‘true picture’, but a 
practical action of describing and relating things to answer specific 
needs and questions’ (Crang 2003:133) 
 
6.4.1 Transcription, translation and summarising 
Once I had collected the interview data I set on the arduous process of transcribing 
and translating - since the interviews were carried out in Spanish.  
                                                
25 See below the discussion on ‘triangulation’.  
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The process of transcribing interview data is often taken for granted as 
unproblematic (Lapadat et al. 1999). As Riessman (1993) highlights, however, 
transcription is a fundamental stage in analysis, especially as it entails framing and 
representing the interview data in particular ways. Choices about how to transcribe 
usually reflect the researchers’ conceptions about the interview data and language 
more broadly. Lack of reflexivity in relation to this issue often suggests a perspective 
in which language is taken as a transparent means for communicating meanings, 
rather than an interpretive medium (Riessman 1993).  
In my case, the usual choices that are made when transcribing data and 
representing it in particular ways (which can include, for instance, attention to non-
verbal elements like pauses, or to the nuances of talk, like highs and lows in 
intonation), were further complicated by the fact that I had to translate most of the 
interviews for the final analysis. As initially I was not sure about what elements to 
select for translation I decided first to transcribe all the interviews in Spanish, with 
some focus on elements of the talk like intonation, laughter, pauses, etc. This first 
stage, though lengthy and time consuming, proved to be a fundamental building 
block for the analysis, as it allowed me to gain familiarity with each interview.  
Translation was a second stage in which the data was represented in a particular 
way, as rather than translating the whole interviews I decided to make selections in 
order to save some time. I actually ended up translating most of the material, as at 
that stage I found it difficult to make choices as to what was relevant or not. The 
choices I made as to what to select were theoretically guided: I based them on some 
of the initial definitions of the problem and on the new ideas that emerged during the 
fieldwork and transcription. At this point, I did not yet know that I would be doing 
narrative analysis, for instance, but still I chose to translate parts of the interviews 
that, although not so obviously relevant for the thematic analysis, seemed important, 
as they conveyed central elements of the interviewees’ perspectives. As the analysis 
progressed I sometimes went back to the original transcription to search for new 
elements to include in the translation. 
When I concluded transcribing and translating, I embarked on a third state of 
summarising some of the interviews. Initially I was moved to do this as to be able to 
discuss the interviews with my supervisor before moving on into a more explicit stage 
of analysis26, but looking back, this process proved to be a valuable building block in 
the process of interpretation, as it allowed me to further familiarise myself with the 
                                                
26 More explicit because these first stages were already part of the analysis process.  
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interviews and the main issues that arose from them. Such efforts to develop a ‘thick 
presentation’ of cases’ (Bhöm 2004) can be seen as an additional stage in the 
process of interpretation27. 
 
6.4.2 Coding and some initial shortcomings  
I must confess that the often tedious process of transcribing and translating provided 
some shelter from the imminent need to actually interpret the interviews in 
connection to the problem of discontinuity. From my own experience and discussions 
with fellow beginner researchers, I think we are often so keen to go out into the field 
and collect data that will help our projects materialise, that we often overlook the fact 
that the data itself, once collected, will not on its own tell us very much. This is 
especially so in qualitative research, where analysis is fundamentally a process of 
interpretation28. Once we have our interviews, documents or whatever form of data 
we have collected we not only have ‘reduce’ it (Marshall 2002) or ‘discipline’ it (Crang 
2003) into a manageable form (i.e. through transcription, translation and coding), but 
we have actually got to make sense of it all. So the sense of accomplishment we 
might feel when coming back from the ‘field’ can soon turn into boredom and then 
often extreme confusion and anxiety at the overwhelming task of producing a 
coherent interpretations. Crang (2003) describes the frequent ‘pleasure that often 
occurs… when we complete fieldwork’ as ‘the lull before the storm’ (p.126).  
The work of interpretation – although it actually begins during the fieldwork, and goes 
on during transcription - is usually grounded on the equally laborious process of 
coding our data. When describing such a process, Marshall (2002) uses words such 
as ‘ambivalence’ (a ‘love-hate relationship with qualitative data’), ‘mental chaos’, 
‘frustration’, ‘hope’ and ‘despair’. And I must say I experienced them all. 
I began coding the interviews guided by my previous theoretical knowledge of the 
topic – gained through my own experience, the review of literature and the 
knowledge gained during the fieldwork. In this process I moved from more or less 
open coding to more structured development of analytical categories (Bhöm 2004; 
Miles et al. 1994)29. This was done with the help of qualitative data analysis software 
                                                
27 Charmaz (quoted in Bhöm 2004:275) has suggested that this should be one of the stages in 
grounded theory.  
28 Although interpretation also plays a central role in quantitative research.  
29 The path I followed is somewhat similar to Grounded Theory procedures (see Bhöm 2004), but less 
inductive. I began coding with a set of flexible categories which were pre-defined on the basis of the 
initial problem definition. As the analysis evolved, new categories emerged and some of the initial ones 
were abandoned altogether.  In this I adhere to some reformulations of Grounded Theory in terms of 
abduction, which show the impossibility of carrying out analysis in a merely inductive way – since, as 
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(NVivo), which considerably facilitated the organisation of the data and the move 
from open to more structured coding. 
Initially, the coding process was very helpful to put some order on the sometimes 
overwhelming nature of the material, which seemed to open up in many directions. 
The data was being effectively ‘reduced’ and patterns were emerging from it. But I 
soon reached a stage in which I began to feel ‘trapped’ by the coding process. Not 
only did it feel quite mechanical, but this ‘reduction’ of the data seemed to leave out 
what I thought were crucial issues that the interviews were pointing to. The coding 
seemed to fragment the data into manageable bits that could lead to the 
identification of more or less transversal themes running across the interviews. But it 
was not capturing the richness of some of the interviews, which, in my view, lied in 
the use of language, in the extensive stories that were being told by the interviewees 
and which were not all that ‘codable’.  
Not really knowing how to make sense of my feelings of frustration, I embarked on 
the task of trying to put together what I had up to that point. I ended up writing a 
paper in which I discussed various issues related to the institutional context of policy 
making, which was what the coding was leading me to capture. This proved to be an 
extremely valuable process, not only because it helped me make some sense out of 
my data, but because when I actually finished writing the paper, the reasons for my 
initial discomfort at only using coding as a means of interpretation became clearer. It 
was obvious that such a procedure was not capturing elements of the interview data, 
which by then I knew were essential for the interpretation of discontinuity that I was 
developing. This process reflects Crang’s (2003) idea that ‘analysis is not simply an 
issue of developing an idea and writing it up. Rather, it is thinking by writing that 
tends to reveal the flaws, the contradictions in our ideas, forcing us to look, to 
analyse in different ways and rethink’ (p.130). 
In search for a better way of interpreting the interviews I came across with 
Riessman’s (1993) Narrative Analysis. I experienced a kind of ‘epiphany’ mixed with 
relief when I read about her own experience of frustration at the result of applying 
traditional coding procedures which ‘often fracture… texts in the service of 
interpretation and generalization by taking bits and pieces, snippets of a response 
edited out of context’ (p.3). Soon after I started learning about narrative analysis and 
applying it to my own data, I had the fortune of participating in a narrative reading 
group organised by the University of Bristol which was conducted by Riessman 
                                                                                                                                        
has already been discussed, the process of analysing or categorising data is always already theory-
laden (Haig 1995; Sayer 1992), 
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herself, and which only led me to confirm the usefulness of the approach for my own 
research. And although I had not intended to use narrative analysis when I first set 
out on the endeavour of collecting the data, my approach to interviewing, with a 
combination of open and semi-structured elements, had facilitated the production of 
extensive narratives.  
Moreover, although I take on Riessman’s points about the need to analyse the 
‘whole interview’ rather than fragmenting it for the sake of finding transversal themes 
– a perspective that in some cases can be associated with ‘empiricist’ assumptions 
about the validity and generalisability of qualitative analysis (see Silverman 2001; 
see Steinke 2004) -, my own data required a combination of narrative analysis with a 
more conventional approach to coding. As Riessman herself suggests, not all 
interview data, nor the totality of a single interview, are amenable to narrative 
analysis. Some elements might be better captured by coding and searching for 
themes, while others will be better analysed as narratives. This was precisely the 
case with my interview data.  
With these ideas in mind, the analysis was refined through the identification not only 
of codable themes, but also whole narratives. Once the data had been divided in this 
way I proceeded to the interpretation and organisation of themes and narratives. 
Here I moved into a stage of ‘selective coding’  (Bhöm 2004): as the pattern of 
interpretation became clearer I was able to select certain themes that were relevant 
for the final analysis, while other less important areas were left out. The process of 
coding was theoretically driven. Initial readings of the interview data that called led to 
the formulation of initial explanatory theories or hypotheses that were later explored 
and refined or abandoned during the analysis. The coding and analysis hence 
describe a process of abductive hypothesis development and elaboration.  
The selected themes, as will be shown later, pointed towards the institutional 
framework in which education policy making takes place. The definition of codes and 
later identification of some central themes was theoretically guided by the literature 
and initial definitions of the problem of discontinuity. Meanwhile, the narratives 
suggested the existence of policy making cultures that emerge from that context but 
also help to reproduce or even deepen existing institutional problems.  
Before going on to provide some further explanation of the narrative approach used 
in the analysis it might be interesting to further consider the impact that different 
interviewing techniques have on the production and analysis of the data. In this case, 
semi-structured sections of the interviews led to the identification of codable themes. 
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Most of the themes correspond to some of the original definitions that were made of 
the problem of discontinuity, while some other themes emerged through the coding 
process. On the other hand, more open sections led to the presence of narrative or 
stories in which the interviewees made sense of their experiences in policy making. 
Had I only used a semi-structured approach the narratives might not have been 
developed and I would probably have come with a different interpretation of the 
problem of discontinuity.   
 
6.5 NARRATIVE ANALYSIS 
My use of the narrative analysis method is largely based on Riessman’s (1993) 
ideas, which suggest that the aim of this approach is ‘to see how respondents in 
interviews impose order on the flow of experience to make sense of events and 
actions in their lives’ (Riessman 1993: 2). In this particular case, I am using narrative 
analysis to understand how interviewees make sense of their experiences as 
education policy makers and how they explain their actions and construct policy 
discourses. Used in conjunction with an analysis of the institutional elements that 
underlie and give rise to discontinuity, the narrative approach is useful to see how 
policy makers exert their agency in a context framed by such social and institutional 
arrangements. This perspective is coherent with my understanding of education 
policy making as a field in itself, with its own rules and characteristics, which are 
influenced but not fully explicable by reference to structural issues (Ladwig 1994). I 
believe that a focus on policy narratives offers a way to understand the actions and 
beliefs of individuals within the field, and that this is central to understand the issue of 
discontinuity. 
As a research methodology, narrative analysis developed as part of the ‘interpretive 
turn’ in the social sciences, which shifted the focus of analysis towards meaning 
making processes. The focus of this perspective is thus set on representations, that 
is, on the particular ways in which people frame and represent the realities of their 
lived experiences in meaningful ways. Through the analysis of such representations, 
it is suggested, we can have a better grasp of the meanings that arise from human 
experiences and which give rise to specific social developments. ‘Not merely 
information storage devices, narratives structure perceptual experience, organize 
memory, “segment and purpose-build the very events of a life”’ (Riessman 1993: 3).  
There are different perspectives as to what kinds of data are suitable for narrative 
analysis. Labov (in: Riessman 1993), for instance, suggests that narratives should 
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have a traditional plot (beginning, middle and end), should include clauses and verbs 
in the past tense. Others (Riessman 1993), however, suggest that some forms of talk 
that do not conform to such patterns are still amenable to narrative analysis. 
Czarniawska (2002), for instance, uses Todorov’s less conventional conception, in 
which the ‘an “ideal” narrative begins with a stable situation, which is disturbed by 
some power or force’ (p.735). What is important is to bear in mind that different 
definitions of what constitutes a narrative lead to different methodological 
approaches for the analysis (2004).  
In the present study, the concept of ‘narrative’ is used in the broader sense. This is 
because although in some parts the interviews follow other types of structure (e.g. 
questions and answers), the interviews themselves were structured as to elicit 
narrative accounts. Respondents were asked to talk about their experiences in policy 
making. Initial open questions about the context in which they participated in policy 
making (beginning), were followed by questions about the problems they faced 
during this time (middle), to end with the interviewees overall balance of their role in 
policy making (end). The interview itself, then, had a narrative structure, which in 
some cases was combined by a more focused discussion of issues related to the 
institutional matrix of policy making. The parts that have been selected for analysis 
are those that, although they might not have an explicitly narrative character, are 
central in the narrative as a whole.  
 
6.5.1 Relevance for this study 
I believe that the combination of a focus on narratives with a focus on themes offers 
a more complete understanding of the issues under study. As discussed before, in 
this particular study, the need to analyse interviewees’ narratives became pressing 
during the first stages of the analysis process, in which a focus on the coding of 
specific issues seemed to overlook the richness of much of the data, which lay in the 
‘stories’ that interviewees were telling, and which accompanied and gave sense to 
the more focused discussion of specific issues. This opened up the need to focus on 
each interview at a deeper level, analysing their narrative structures, which are 
fundamental to understanding the interactions between agents (policy makers) and 
the institutional arrangements in which education policy making takes place. This 
perspective is particularly relevant precisely due to the country’s and the education 
sector’s institutional characteristics, which leave considerable space for individual 
discretion. Individual elite policy makers can thus determine and change the direction 
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of policies, and without a more organised process machinery to sustain and support 
policies, it sometimes seems that policy makers are or embody the policies they 
propose. An understanding of individual perspectives on policy making is therefore 
fundamental.   
Furthermore, the narrative approach appears particularly relevant in view of the 
limitations inherent in interviewing policy elites that were discussed above. Through 
the stories they tell, interviewees (and people in general) are continuously 
‘performing’ their identities in ways that convey how they want to be seen, and what 
they consider good, desirable, etc. (cfr. Langellier 2001; Riessman 1993). As my own 
experience and that of others researching education policy (Halpin and Troyna 1994) 
has shown, in the case of policy makers, the interviewee’s ‘narrative performance of 
identity’ (Langellier 2001) is highly politicised. Interviewee’s want to portray 
themselves, and are particularly skilled at doing so, in ways that are politically 
convenient, and for this purpose ‘events are often naturalized’ (Czarniawska 
2002:746). This, as Ball (1994a) suggests, makes it especially inadequate to simply 
take what is said at face value, and requires reflecting on the context and possible 
aims of what is being said. The narrative approach seems particularly relevant for 
achieving this purpose, as it sets the focus of analysis on the identities being 
performed by interviewees and on what these tell us about their values, positions, 
motivations and political aims.   
Focusing on interviewee’s narratives has been fundamental in understanding the 
ways in which policy makers view the policy process, and this is a centrepiece in the 
analysis of discontinuity. Portrayals of themselves, of competing teams, their views 
on specific policies and their understanding of what policy making is about, are as 
much at the basis of the characteristics of education policy making, as are features 
of the bureaucracy and the institutions that set the rules for policy making activities. 
In fact, they are mutually constitutive: that is, the institutional and structural 
characteristics of education and policy making therein, give rise to particular forms of 
action, which in turn are constitutive of, and help reproduce the structures in which 
education policy making is embedded (Giddens 1984)30. The narrative perspective, 
rather than a mere focus on individual beliefs, can reveal much about social life, as 
‘Narrators speak in terms that seem natural, but we can analyze how culturally and 
historically contingent these terms are...’ (Riessman 1993: 5).  
                                                
30 This view is consistent with Giddens’ theory of structuration which ‘while acknowledging that society 
is not the creation of individual subjects, ... is distant from any conception of structural sociology’ 
(Giddens 1984: xxi) 
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One final point: the relevance of analysing personal narratives in the context of this 
study appears to be stronger in view of some of the theoretical developments 
presented in the following chapters. As will be shown, reflections on the chronology 
of education policies in the 1995-2004 period, based Majone’s (1989) ideas on policy 
making suggest that a discursive core has not been formed in Peruvian education 
policies. This allows each group of policy makers that gets into the Ministry of 
Education (MED) to act according to their own narrative, which, in turn, does not find 
a core to articulate with –neither in terms of a set of basic assumptions, nor in terms 
of a set of policies. This, I would like to suggest, together with the loose institutional 
arrangements in which policy making is embedded, and more broadly, with the 
structural role of education in national development, renders personal narratives 
even more important in the determination of policy actions. Without much institutional 
(bureaucratic and legal) and theoretical (a core of policy ideas) constraints, the 
definition of new policy lines according to the personal views of policy makers is 
much more feasible. Narratives, then, are a major resource in the explanation of 
discontinuity.   
 
6.5.6 Perspective on narrative analysis 
In recent years, the narrative approach has been used and adapted to the field of 
policy analysis (Roe 1994) and organisational analysis (Czarniawska 2002). Roe 
(1994), for instance, has developed a narrative approach for the study of policy 
controversies which has been successfully applied and extended by other policy 
analysts (cfr. Bridgman et al. 2002).  
My approach differs from Roe’s to the extent that it takes a focus on narratives to be 
much more broadly applicable than for the exclusive analysis of policy controversies. 
To some extent, it could be said that all policy issues are controversial, as there will 
rarely, if ever, by univocal and uncontested problem representations in policy 
making. The narrative approach is therefore relevant for the analysis of problem 
representations in general, as it helps develop an understanding of the standpoints 
that ground different representations. Embracing this broad view of narrative 
analysis, rather than Roe’s more limited definition, is particularly relevant for this 
study, which focuses on policy making practices rather than on specific policy 
controversies. Narrative analysis, in this case, is central to understand those 
practices as they are explained, defined and enacted by policy makers.  
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The narratives will initially be presented in detail and will lead to an analysis that will 
be guided by a series of questions that have been deemed theoretically relevant and 
which focus on the standpoints from which the narratives are articulated (more 
details on this below) – and that can be seen as elements of the interviewees 
‘practical consciousness’ (Giddens 1984), which ground their disposition to particular 
ways of policy making (i.e. deliberative, authoritative, etc.). The idea is to understand 
the extent to which these elements influence the characteristics of education policy 
making in Peru and how they influence discontinuity.  
Four narratives have been selected for detailed analysis. The choice of narratives 
was based on the extent to which interviews appeared to represent particular 
perspectives on policy making that were dominant during the 1995-2004 period.  
 
6.7 NOTES ON THE VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE PROPOSED 
INTERPRETATIONS 
I have already discussed the standpoint from which I have carried out this study and 
along the previous pages I have developed many ideas in relation to how this has 
affected the methodological choices I have had to make. I will therefore only dedicate 
briefly to discuss some issues related to the claims I make in the following chapters.  
Although I would not in any way attempt to tell the reader how to assess the quality 
of what I say, I do think it is important to discuss the kind of quality criteria I have 
tried to satisfy. This seems particularly important given the variety of positions that 
exist in relation to how to assess qualitative research. Many discussions in relation to 
this issue have pointed to the insufficiency of criteria of validity and reliability 
imported from quantitative research practices (Silverman 2001; Steinke 2004). The 
idea of validity in particular, which is normally understood as ‘the extent to which an 
account  accurately represents the social phenomena to which it refers’ 
(Hammersley in: Silverman 2001:232) has often been the target of post-empiricist 
critiques. If we remember the initial discussion of these matters, the idea of 
‘accurately representing’ rather than merely ‘mirroring’ would partly seem to solve the 
issue. However, the term ‘accurately’ remains problematic. What is an accurate 
representation of things?  
Writing from a post-empiricist perspective, Silverman (2001), for instance, highlights 
the importance of maintaining credibility in qualitative research, although the latter 
should not be understood in terms of correspondence. He discusses some of the 
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risks in which qualitative researchers can incur, particularly the risk of annecdotalism, 
in which data are accommodated by the researcher to fit one particular account, 
leaving out of it all that does not fit.  
Criteria like data triangulation and respondent validation have often been proposed 
as a strategy to increase validity of qualitative analyses. Silverman (2001), however, 
suggests they are flawed methods which assume a degree of fixation (as opposed to 
fluidity) of data and meaning that would yield similar results when looked at from 
different perspectives and that could be corrected by interviewees. Triangulation 
appears to be a method for generating more complex theoretical explanations, but it 
is insufficient to ‘prove’ the existence of the problems we are trying to explain. 
Likewise, respondent validation can be used to identify new paths for exploration 
rather than for ‘correcting’ interpretations. Both methods are ‘yet another source of 
data’ (Silverman 2001:177) rather than means for verification.   
For Silverman (2001), validity, which he closely relates to avoiding the risk of 
annecdotalism or un-credible accommodation of data, can be achieved through a 
combination of strategies such as explicit attempts to refute or falsify theories, 
constant comparison, comprehensive (rather than merely selective) data treatment, 
deviant case analysis and use of appropriate tabulation. Reliability, on the other 
hand, could be attained by making our thought processes and methodological 
decisions evident, and also by providing access to our data so that others can see 
whether our analyses offer plausible explanations.  
In an attempt to develop specific quality criteria for qualitative research by 
incorporating several perspective on the issue, Steinke (2004) proposes the 
following: inter-subjective comprehensibility, rather than inter-subjective verificability 
of accounts (as is used in quantitative research with, for instance, inter-coder 
reliability), and which can be likened to criteria of plausibility; indication of the 
research process; empirical foundation (or groundedness in data) of theories and 
hypotheses – this is a characteristic of empirical qualitative research; making the 
limits of interpretations explicit; coherence of the accounts offered; relevance of the 
accounts; and reflected subjectivity, as discussed in the opening pages (see Rose 
1997). 
I see Silverman’s and Steinke’s criteria as complementary and sometimes 
overlapping. While Silverman focuses more on the procedures through which we can 
make our analyses credible, Steinke focuses more on the overall comprehensibility, 
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coherence and plausibility of our accounts, and also on the more pragmatic criteria of 
usefulness of explanations.  
In various ways which I have more or less already discussed throughout this chapter 
I have tried to satisfy some or most of these criteria. I expect in general that the 
overall account I have presented of the problem of discontinuity, both in relation to 
existing literature and as part of a theoretical perspective will appear not only 
credible and plausible, but also useful when thinking about the problems that 
education policy making faces in Peru, and possibly beyond there, in other countries 
in the region and in the developing world. The same goes for the explanations I offer.  
Throughout this chapter I have tried to satisfy the demand for reflexivity in relation to 
the methodological choices I have made along the research process. Moreover, 
being conscious of the need to provide the reader with the possibility of judging 
whether my interpretations seem plausible, coherent and credible, I am including 
some interview transcripts as annexes and would make all of them available on 
demand.  
The risk of annecdotalism is something I am still unsure of having adequately 
overcome and I think that in the last instance the reader will have to determine 
whether my accounts are prey to it. As much as I have actually carried out a 
comprehensive, rather than merely selective, analysis of the data, I cannot see how 
to avoid some of this risk when presenting the analysis in a final written form in which 
much of my actual thinking process has been flattened for the sake of coherence. I 
have tried to minimise this risk partly by providing access to the data itself, by 
supporting the presentation of the data through theoretical considerations, and by 
exploring different perspectives – such as through the combination of thematic and 
narrative analysis. But, as I already said, it is in the eyes of the reader where it will 
become evident whether I have achieved to do this sufficiently or not. A few final 
notes on the research process as such, and the ways in which I have developed the 
account I propose in the following chapters might actually help this.  
 
6.8 ON RESEARCH AS AN ABDUCTIVE PROCESS 
The study I have carried out has been largely exploratory and the methods and 
results are closely related to this. As shown in the opening chapters, the issue of 
education policy discontinuity was largely untheorised, to the point where its 
existence as a (researchable) problem was still unclear. The literature suggested it in 
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various ways, but in such a fuzzy manner that the main task of the research can be 
said to have been the definition of the problem as to allow for the development of 
explanations and of further research in the area. In this sense, the process I have 
followed seems to match the idea that: 
‘because our most important research problems will be decidedly ill-
structured, we can say that the basic task of scientific inquiry is to better 
structure our research problems, by building in the various required 
constraints [that define the problem] as our research proceeds’ (Haig 1995) 
Throughout this study the problem of education policy discontinuity has moved from 
being fuzzy and ill-structured to a more well-structured definition. This, I believe, is 
the main contribution of the study. Achieving a better definition of the problem has 
been intimately linked to the development of theoretical explanations. The latter have 
been formed largely through a process of abduction or retroduction (Génova 1996; 
Haig 1995; Reichertz 2004; Wirth 1999), where looking at the problem from various 
perspectives led to the definition of certain hypotheses which were then further 
explored and in some cases abandoned or refined.  
The initial research proposal was based on the idea that discontinuity could or should 
be researched through a focus on a specific policy area. I had thus proposed 
focusing on secondary education curriculum policies, but as the research developed 
I abandoned this idea in favour of a concentration on cultures and perspectives on 
policy making, which seemed fitter to explore and explain discontinuity. During the 
process of analysis, the move from a thematic analysis to a combination of this with 
a focus on policy making narratives was also a crucial stage of redefinition. Here, 
some of the initial thematic lines of analysis were abandoned in favour of a focus 
only on issues related to the institutional framework of policy making, as, together 
with the analysis of narratives they seemed to offer a good picture of the problem of 
discontinuity. These choices have not been at all unproblematic, and have involved 
leaving out things that could have led to a more complex or better analysis, all for the 
sake of a more coherent theoretical approach to the problem of discontinuity. 
At each stage of the development of the theorisation I present here, the process I 
followed described an abductive form of reasoning. Initially, a series of seemingly 
interrelated issues in education policy making suggested the existence of an 
underlying problem which I termed discontinuity. I tentatively hypothesised that 
discontinuity was a problem and followed this lead to see whether it could serve as 
an explanation for certain aspects of education policy making. When this lead 
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seemed to yield results I started exploring further, trying to identify the possible 
causes of the problem of discontinuity. The focus on institutional elements, on the 
rules of the game of education policy making seemed to be an obvious lead, which I 
explored through the data and a combination of theoretical ideas (on the state and 
education, policy making etc.). But at some point in the analysis this lead appeared 
to be insufficient, and a related but at the same time new form of analysis was 
developed which links the institutional framework to the existence of cultures of 
policy making that not only emerge from those institutional arrangements, but also 
help to reproduce them and the problem of discontinuity in education policies.  
The ideas I present in the following chapters are the outcome of this process of 
coming and going, of permanent redefinition, and in which various emerging 
hypotheses have been explored, some abandoned and some refined. It is a process 
that resembles depictions of scientific procedure in terms of abduction that is, as a 
process of reasoning in which plausible theories have been developed and explored 
as to offer a better definition of the research problem. In this process, new 
explanations did not ‘emerge’ from the data alone, nor were they deducted from a 
particular theory. They were actually abducted, drawn, advanced, by looking at the 
data, negotiating previous theories and hypothesising about the meaning of what I 
was looking at. Rather than beginning with a hypothesis, I ended up with one, that is, 
with an explanation of things of which I initially knew very little as to have clear-cut 
questions and which I could then explore and refine. Like any explanation, mine, of 
course, are also temporary, contestable, and at most probable.  
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PART III - THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
 
The following chapters aim to provide the theoretical grounding for the analysis of 
discontinuity. The chapters offer a critical review of relevant literature and provide 
indications about the theoretical views taken for the analysis of discontinuity. 
Although most of the discussion is theoretical, some of the chapters blend into the 
discussion what could be considered ‘background’ issues, in which available theories 
are used to analyse particular developments in Peru. Presenting these issues as part 
of the theoretical discussion helps ground theoretical explanations in the more 
specific developments that are the focus of the research.  
The discussion is organised into two main sections: one which focuses on the 
relations between the state and education, and another which looks more specifically 
at issues of policy making and analysis. The first section opens up with a chapter on 
theories of the state, in which a review of various perspectives on the state is 
presented. This discussion closes with a series of reflections about state autonomy 
and legitimacy, which aim to offer an understanding of power issues in the 
organisation of societies and states. These first chapters pave the way for a 
presentation of the paths to state development in Peru, which is fundamental for 
understanding the role of education in state development and consequently the 
problem of discontinuity in education policy making.  
The initial chapters constitute a fundamental building block to then move onto more 
specific considerations about education and state relations. Here, a strategy similar 
to that offered in the initial chapters is followed. A broad review of perspectives for 
analysing state and education relations leads to a series of more specific 
considerations of the role of education in the development of the Peruvian state, and 
the implications this has for the making of education policies.  
The chapters that make part of this first section aim to define the fundamental 
theoretical grounds on which the analysis of discontinuity will move. Considerations 
about state development and the role of education therein set the focus on some of 
the structural socio-political issues in which the problem of discontinuity is 
embedded.  
The second section moves into a discussion of perspectives on policy making and 
analysis. A series of approaches is considered: beginning with the more classical 
technicist approaches, going through those that view policy making as a largely 
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political process and arriving at the more critical perspectives that have been 
influenced by post-empiricist and post-structuralist ideas. This leads to the 
presentation of an approach to policy making as a deliberative process, which is 
closely linked to notions of democratic politics as tied to giving reasons and inviting 
questions in relations to one’s actions.  
 
CHAPTER 7 – UNDERSTANDING THE STATE 
The distribution and access to power in society is one of the central issues on which 
state theories are grounded. Variations in perspective, which give rise to all the 
range of theories, from Marxism to Liberalism, stem from different conceptions about 
the way in which power is distributed within specific societal systems. Problems 
faced in the governance of education systems – such as discontinuity - are closely 
related to state characteristics, which explain the particular ways in which policies 
are conducted. Analysing the effects that different state configurations have on policy 
making is a permanent feature of ‘education policy sociology’ (Hatcher et al. 
1994:83), largely because theories about decision and policy making need to be 
reinterpreted or adapted ‘in terms of different formal political structures’ (Hall in Ball 
et al. 1994:47) in order to explain specific policy problems. The present section aims 
at offering such an adaptation of state theories for an understanding of the Peruvian 
state so as to explain the problem of discontinuity in education policies.  
State theories like those of Marxism and liberalism (and their ‘neo’ versions) have 
been developed on the basis of considerations about fully capitalist nations. 
Analyses of power distribution have therefore been based on considerations about 
class societies and on the possibilities they offer for equal access to power and 
resources. Such theories can be described as ‘society centred’, as the understanding 
they offer of the state stems from the way in which they understand social relations 
(Evans et al. 1985). More recently, social theorists have advocated the need to adapt 
state theories to different contexts, taking into account the different paths that the 
development of state systems has followed in different social formations, and which 
seem to determine the degrees of autonomy and legitimacy of state action (Evans et 
al. 1985). This view is based on a critical appraisal of the generalising pretensions of 
such grand theories as Marxism and Liberalism, which tend to overlook variations in 
different states’ characteristics and forms of involvement in national development. It 
underscores the fact that the elements that determine a state’s strength and 
capacities might vary greatly from one country to another, and tend to be the 
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outcome of specific combinations of cultural, historical, social, economic and 
geographical variables, which have to be incorporated in theoretical explanations.  
Apart from this focus on power, a different approach to the analysis of state action 
stems from Weber’s ideas, which focus on the institutional and organisational 
characteristics of the state apparatus. The suggestion that such grand theories need 
to be adapted to account for variations in specific state formations applies in this 
case too, as the organisational capacities, weaknesses and strengths of the state are 
also contingent on historical developments. This criticism, as will be shown below, is 
especially relevant for this study, given the particularities of the Peruvian state 
system, especially as compared to states in fully capitalist nations.  
The following pages will deal with these approaches in more detail. This will be the 
basis for a more contextualised account of the Peruvian state which will open the 
way for considerations about the role played by public education in its development 
and about policy making in education.  
 
 
7.1 THE STATE AND SOCIETY 
Society-centred views of the state, in which the form of the latter is derived from 
assumptions about the organisation and spread of power in society have 
predominated in political theory until fairly recently (Evans et al. 1985). What follows 
is a discussion of two contrasting society-centred views of the state, Marxism and 
Liberalism/Pluralism, which have defined some of the main issues that should be 
considered when thinking about the relations between state characteristics, 
education and policy making.  
 
7.1.1 Marxism and the state 
 
By establishing links between the state and the economy Marxist theory greatly 
contributed to our way of thinking about the state (Jessop 1990). Marxist historical 
analyses of modern states, show how the ‘emancipation of private property from the 
community’ leads the state to become ‘the guarantor of private property and legal 
contract’ (Green 1990:83), and thus of the interests of capital owners. ‘The state may 
appear to be independent, to stand above particular interests and treat all subjects 
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as equal before the law, but this neutrality only serves to mask the reproduction of 
substantive social inequalities which the state underwrites through its protection of 
private property’ (Green 1990:82). In this view,  
‘the material conditions of society [appear] as the basis of its social structure 
and of human consciousness. The form of the State… emerges from the 
relations of production, not from the general development of the human 
minds or from collective men’s wills’31 (Carnoy 1984:46).  
This association between the state and the economy is, according to many critics, a 
strong limitation of Marxist theory. It often amounts to a form of economic 
reductionism that ignores the ‘complexity of the relations between the economy, 
class and political representation in model social formations’ (Carnoy 1984:85) and 
sees the state in purely instrumental terms as serving the interests of capital. It also 
leads the classical version of Marxism to exclude considerations about other forms of 
oppression, such as those based on ethnic and gender differences (cfr. Burris 1987). 
The Gramscian concept of ‘hegemony’ seems better at grasping such complex 
relations (Carnoy 1984; Green 1990). In Gramsci’s view, the state, rather than 
directly and exclusively representing the interest of capital owners, performs a series 
of ‘complex processes of mediation and alliance which are irreducible to particular 
economic contradictions’ (Green 1990:92). Hegemony refers to ‘the ideological 
predominance of bourgeois values and norms over the subordinate classes’ (Carnoy 
1984:66). It ‘represents a form of class power that is maintained not only by coercive 
means but also by the winning of consent for it in civil society’ (Green 1990:94). The 
gaining of consent through hegemony seems to account for the collusion of classes 
with regimes that do not seem to protect their interests. Rather than being directly 
subordinated to the interests of the bourgeoisie, the state appears subordinated to 
the capitalist order, on which its own existence depends and which, therefore, it has 
to maintain.   
In this view, as in the original Marxist formulations, state autonomy appears to be 
very restricted. The state is seen either as an instrument of the bourgeoisie or as the 
guardian of the capitalist order (Evans et al. 1985). As Evans and others (1985) have 
shown, such society- centred assumptions – in which states seem ‘inherently shaped 
by class struggles and function to preserve and expand modes of production’ (p.5) – 
prevail even in the more recent ideas of Neo-Marxist thinkers, who often fail to 
account for variations in state autonomy and for instances in which states can 
                                                
31 The latter view being associated with the Hegelian and the Lockean conceptions of the state.  
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effectively intervene in society for the pursuit of common social objectives – this point 
will be further discussed below. The criticism is aimed at the negative view of the 
state that stems from these conceptions. In the Marxist view, the state seems unable 
to introduce social change through policy making because its major commitment is to 
favour capital owners by maintaining existing social divisions.  
A further limitation of Marxist conceptions of the state – which is perhaps more 
relevant for the present research – is the almost exclusive focus on ‘the capitalist 
state’, which has led to the assumption that the ‘features and functions’ of such 
states are ‘shared by all states’ (Evans et al. 1985:5). This limitation stems mainly 
from the lack of comparative analysis, and often leads to generalisations which are 
not necessarily applicable to non-Western states (Evans et al. 1985). 
 
7.1.2 Liberal and pluralist views on the state 
 
Contrary to the Marxist view of the state, liberal theory, and ‘its outgrowth, pluralism’  
can be defined as ‘the official ideology of capitalist democracies’ (Carnoy 1984:33, 
10). The main difference between liberal and Marxist state theories lies in their view 
of the relations between the state and the economy. Whereas in the Marxist 
perspective the state appears to have a meagre degree of autonomy from the 
pressures of capital, in the liberal view the state is – or can/should be –  a more or 
less neutral arbiter in charge of creating the conditions for capital accumulation. In 
this, liberals follow Adam Smith’s idea that ‘the role of the State that would best serve 
humankind was one that relied on and guaranteed the operation of a free market in 
civil society’ (Carnoy 1984:13). In this view, ‘the role of the State was at best 
peripheral to the principal social dynamic –  the “invisible hand” of the free market’ 
(Carnoy 1984:26). 
This contrasts sharply wih the neo-Marxist view, in which the capitalist system is 
inseparable from the creation of social inequalities, for liberals, particularly in Adam 
Smith’s view, the pursuit of individual wellbeing entails also the maximization of 
collective wellbeing. The state’s role is thus to facilitate individuals’ natural economic 
behaviour.  
The link between liberal state theory and pluralism (the latter referring more 
specifically to a form of government), derives from the liberal concern with the 
possible excesses of the state in relation to the economy. The liberal view holds that 
the state should not intervene in the economy beyond the creation of the legal 
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framework for the proper operation of the market. A pluralist or democratic system 
seems to provide the best way for restraining the possible excesses of the state ‘by 
giving the citizenry power to change… [government] officials at the general will’ 
(Carnoy 1984:32).   
The main problem with such a system is that there is no guarantee that particular 
interests (such as those of the working class) would not want to hinder the natural 
operation of the market. In relation to this, Schumpeter (in Carnoy 1984) posed ‘an 
alternative model’ in which the ‘deciding of issues by the electorate’ appears as 
‘secondary to the election of representatives who are to do the deciding’ (p.35). This 
guarantees that the electorate would not have excessive capacities that might allow 
it to overturn the whole system of capital accumulation. Furthermore, the election of 
representatives gives legitimacy to the state but also autonomy to the elected 
representatives in decision-making.  
Although there are some important variations – like those stemming from 
corporatism and neo-pluralism –  the policy process in the pluralist view is the more 
or less straight forward action of accountable elected representatives who channel 
citizens’ needs. 
 
7.1.3 States as organisations 
Also in contrast to the Marxist view in which states appear as ‘a mere arena in which 
social groups make demands and engage in political struggles or compromises’ 
(Evans et al. 1985:8), but also different to the pluralist perspective is the view of 
states as organisations that exert control over a territory and which are conceptually 
distinct from the economy and society. As shown by Evans et al. (1985) much 
contemporary research emphasizing the role of states is based on such ideas. The 
latter, as seen particularly in the thought of Weber, insist ‘on the institutional reality of 
the state and its continuing impact on and within civil society’ (Evans et al. 1985:7). 
In Weber’s own words, modern states are characterised for having ‘an administrative 
and legal order’ which ‘claims binding authority, not only over the members of the 
state, the citizens…, but also to a very large extent, over all action taking place in the 
area of its jurisdiction’ (Stepan 1978: xi)  
Such a view extends the notion of the state beyond government and the political 
system and points towards an organisational continuity that is related to the pursuit 
of goals that are largely independent from specific economical interests. The state 
thus consists of  
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‘the continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive systems that 
attempt not only to structure relationships between civil society and public 
authority in a polity but also to structure many crucial relationships within civil 
society as well’ (Stepan in: Evans et al. 1985:7).  
‘States conceived as organizations claiming control over territories and people may 
formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests 
of social groups, classes, or society’ (Evans et al. 1985:9). With the development of 
such organisational capacities – that are associated with the rise of capitalism –, the 
state considerably gains in autonomy with respect to political and particular social 
interests. The state is thus seen as an actor that has social control and authoritative 
decision making and policy implementation capacities and which has an inherent 
interest in expanding its scope for autonomous action.  
‘[T]he gain in autonomy and subjectivity may’, however, remain ‘fictive and 
nominal insofar as it is neutralized by countertendencies of the 
“administrative world”. (…) The inefficacy of the order and steering 
mechanisms is, next to the losses of freedom, the other frustrating basic 
experience that modern societies have of themselves’ (Offe 1996:14). 
Considering the autonomy of states from the pressures of specific groups has led 
proponents of this perspective to focus on the analysis of states’ strengths, which is 
understood in terms of their organisational capacities and their ability to ‘work their 
will efficiently’ (Evans et al. 1985:351). This is generally seen as dependent on the 
organisational characteristics of the state, which should be as close as possible to a 
‘fully rational bureaucracy’. State capacities and strength are thus assessed in terms 
of ‘specific organisational structures’, the presence of which is dependent on specific 
and historical state development paths.  
The relevance of these ideas for the present discussion is that they introduce a view 
of the state as an apparatus capable of steering society and which can not only act 
independently or autonomously from political pressures but which can structure 
economic and social relationships. The degree to which such autonomous capacities 
are effectively exercised will vary from one state to the other and can be seen as a 
measure of state strength. This view of states as organisations ‘leads us away from 
basic features common to all polities and toward consideration of the various ways in 
which state structures and actions are conditioned by historically changing 
transnational contexts’ (Evans et al. 1985:8). This is a considerable advantage in 
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comparison to Marxist ideas on the ‘capitalist state’, particularly when other state 
forms are considered.   
 
7.1.4 Contextualised and state-centred views  
Recent efforts to re-theorise the state take into account contributions and criticisms 
of both society-centred theories of the state and those that emphasise the state’s 
organisational capacities and autonomy. Such ideas are incorporated in attempts to 
offer a more complete view of states and their variations in which there is an explicit 
attempt to ‘analyze states in relation to socioeconomic and sociocultural contexts’ 
(Evans et al. 1985:20). These views attempt to explain the way in which power is 
distributed in specific societies, the degree of state autonomy and the capacity of 
different states to organise society – generally and in relation to specific policy areas. 
Proponents of this view attempt to go beyond the limitations of the Marxist focus on 
class to incorporate reflections on other sources of social inequality, such as 
geographical and cultural factors32.   
The idea of ‘bringing the state back in’ to political and policy related research does 
not necessarily imply the attribution of an exaggerate role to the state or to its 
capacities to organise society free from political influence. This perspective 
acknowledges that ‘no matter how appropriate (…) autonomous state activity might 
be, it can never really be “disinterested” in any meaningful sense. (…) autonomous 
state actions will regularly take forms that attempt to reinforce the authority, political 
longevity, and social control of the state organizations…’ (Evans et al. 1985:15).  
However, state-centred views highlight the centrality of the state for explanations 
about variations in the making and implementation of policies, even in spite of 
current national and international trends in which states seem to be losing control 
both to international policy agencies and, internally, to decentralised institutions and 
civil society organisations (Hobson et al. 2002; Pierre and Peters 2000). The main 
idea in such views is that policy outputs can also be the product of states 
themselves, rather than the product of forces within society. This has definite 
implications for research on policy making, since it shifts the focus of analysis to the 
existing capacities of states for achieving policy goals and to the impact that states 
have in the definition and implementation of policies.  
                                                
32 In this sense the view is closer to neo-Marxist developments, which as shown by Burris (1987), have 
gone considerably beyond the formulations of original Marxist theory on the prevalence of class as a 
source of explanation for social inequalities.  
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Such a change of focus has led to the development of a body of comparative 
research that casts light into different possible state configurations, and on how the 
latter can affect the capacity of states to organise society and pursue policy goals. 
Apart from confirming the view that there are considerable variations in the way 
states are configured and in their operation through policy (even among capitalist 
states), such research has also shown the existence of variations within states. 
According to this view, state strength and capacities can vary from one policy area to 
another – something that seems especially relevant for some of the issues that this 
study wants to raise, and which make discontinuity in education policies a distinct 
phenomenon.  
Advocates of ‘bringing the state back in’ suggest that different solutions are required 
for different contexts and that such solutions should take into account state 
characteristics. Policies that have been successful in East Asian countries, for 
instance, which have often been taken as examples of successful economic and 
educational development might not be suitable for other contexts, like Latin America, 
where the capacity of the state to lead economic and educational development can 
be more reduced.  
The theoretical and methodological relevance of these more contextualised and 
state-centred views for the analysis of education policy making in Peru seems 
particularly high. This perspective shows how different forms of state organisation 
can lead to different capacities in policy making. The success of education policies 
might depend on issues like state legitimacy, strength and on the state’s position in 
front of international influences. Before going deeper into a discussion of the 
characteristics of state action in Peru and its effects on education policy and the lack 
of continuity therein some of the central elements of the state that have been 
discussed earlier – and which will serve as analytical tools for understanding 
education policy making in Peru –  will be considered in more detail.  
 
7.2 STATE AUTONOMY AND LEGITIMACY  
The legitimacy of state action, which seems to be a necessary condition for the 
capacity of the state to introduce policies (if not for the existence of the state 
altogether), appears to be closely related to the existence – at least in appearance –  
of state autonomy. If states are seen to pursue actions oriented to benefit only a 
small part of society they loose strength. Legitimacy, then, seems a fundamental 
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determinant of state strength, which in this case refers, largely, to the existence of a 
necessary base of support that is required for state action to be effective.   
Although Gramsci continued in the original Marxist line of thought in which state 
autonomy was seen as being very reduced, his elaboration of the concept of 
hegemony introduced a further and much necessary degree of complexity to the way 
in which the state gains consent for its actions in civil society (legitimacy). This 
happens not only through coercion but by the spread of values related to a 
predominant way of social organisation, which then makes the state’s role in the 
preservation of the capitalist mode of production appear as entirely legitimate. In this 
more subtle way of gaining consent the state cannot take care directly of specific 
capitalist interests, because this would undermine its legitimacy, an idea further 
elaborated by Offe (1996).   
Similarly, although from a much more rigid structuralist (deterministic) position, 
Althusser introduced the concept of ‘relative autonomy’, which again, in the line of 
Gramsci, questions the direct link between capitalist interests and state action 
established in original Marxist ideas. The relative autonomy of the state (of politics 
and ideology) from the economic base suggests that the relation between the state 
and capital is much more indirect and subtle than had been initially acknowledged by 
Marx. For Althusser, however, although the state is not an instrument of particular 
economic interests, the form of the state is determined by the class structure.   
Neo-Marxist thinkers have reworked ideas on autonomy and legitimacy and have 
tried to elaborate a more complete account of capitalist states. Influenced by both 
Gramsci and Weber, Offe (in: Carnoy 1984) has argued that ‘the capitalist State is 
“independent” of any systematic capitalist-class control, either direct or structural, but 
…[it] represents capitalist’s interests anyway, because it depends on capital 
accumulation for its continued existence as a State’ (p.6). According to Offe, the 
relation between the state and capitalist interests is much more indirect than was 
suggested by Gramsci. This leaves sufficient space for the development of an 
autonomous administrative apparatus such as that described by Weber. The state 
however, is inextricably linked to the maintenance of the capitalist system; its 
existence depends on capital accumulation (for tax revenue). However, the role of 
the state in the maintenance of such a system needs to be independent from 
particular economic interests. The state has to act as a mediator between competing 
capitals in order to ensure that they do not annihilate each other, that is, that the 
basic conditions for capital accumulation are preserved. This view is opposed to both 
instrumentalist (i.e. Marx) and constraint (i.e. Althusser) theories of state action, 
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which ‘assume that the action of the state (policy-making) is externally determined’, 
thus giving ‘public policy its capitalist content’ (Carnoy 1984:132). 
Similarly, although more influenced by the structuralist work of Althusser, Poulantzas 
suggests that ‘the State in the capitalist mode of production is “determined” in 
fulfilling … [the reproduction of the class structure], not by direct control of the 
capitalist class, but rather by the class nature of the ideological and State 
apparatuses (Carnoy 1984:125). In the same line, Offe argues that the aim of the 
State is to maintain the capitalist mode of production, which thus implies that 
‘Accumulation acts as the most powerful constraint criterion (but not necessarily as 
the determinant of content) of the policy-making process’ (134).  
The pursuit of such an aim creates a strong tension at the core of the state which is 
resolved, by both Offe and Poulantzas through the concept of legitimacy. Sustained 
capital accumulation implies the continued existence of the basic social inequalities 
that lie at the core of the capitalist mode of production. This raises the question of 
how the state can gain general consent from society in order to pursue such a goal. 
Offe’s and Poulantzas’ answers go back to Gramsci’s ideas on how the state gains 
consent in civil society through the operation of ideological apparatuses. But, 
particularly in the case of Offe, this is complemented by a more Weberian view in 
which the state gains legitimacy ‘by mass participation in the selection of its 
personnel’ (i.e. democracy) (Carnoy 1984:134). The state not only needs to be 
apparently autonomous, it needs to really be so –as much as possible- through the 
maintenance of an administrative apparatus that is independent from particular 
needs. 
In order ‘to be legitimate, the capitalist State must appear to allow (unlike private 
production) equal access to power and to be responsive to all groups in society’ 
(Carnoy 1984:134). This legitimacy is not only gained through ideological means, but 
also through concrete actions related to the socialisation or redistribution of capital 
gains. The inability to do this would strongly undermine the legitimacy of the state33.  
However, since in the last stance the aim is still to promote capital accumulation 
there is a fundamental contradiction at the heart of the state system, a system that 
needs to be (‘objectively’) autonomous but cannot be so completely (see Codd et al. 
1997). ‘The capitalist State is constantly trying to reconcile and make compatible the 
need to maintain both accumulation and legitimacy with its internal structure, or 
                                                
33 This idea, which will be further explored later, has important consequences for understanding 
problems in the legitimacy of state action in very unequal societies where the state seems to be unable 
to adequately redistribute economic gains.   
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mode of operation (bureaucracy)’ (Carnoy 1984:139). “[T]he State can only function 
as a capitalist state by appealing to symbols and sources of support that conceal its 
nature as a capitalist state” (p.134). ‘‘The reality of the capitalist state can thus be 
described as the reality (and dominance) of an unrealistic attempt” (Carnoy 
1984:139/140). 
In this view, although the state, in the last stance, aims to guarantee the capitalist 
mode of production, it has to enjoy a considerable freedom (autonomy) of action 
precisely to achieve this aim. Although Jessop (1990) also recognises the 
fundamental contradiction at the core of the state, he shows that the emergence of a 
nation-state not only ‘corresponds to the need for an ‘ideal collective capitalist’’, but it  
‘also implies the existence of a national or popular interest that reflects the 
common interest of all its citizens regardless of their class membership. This 
is alleged to sustain the belief in a neutral state able to reconcile class 
antagonisms and thus to facilitate the rule of capital…’ (p.43).  
In what Carnoy (1984) calls the ‘German debate’ on the nature of the state, Hirsch 
goes further than Offe in his conception of the role of the state as a guarantor of the 
capitalist system. Hirsch’s focus is set on ‘how the nature of State intervention will 
change over time as capital changes the nature of reproduction of accumulation’ 
(Carnoy 1984:147). This offers a much more dynamic account of the changing 
nature of the role of the state in the maintenance of the capitalist system. Carnoy 
criticises the ‘German debate’ for its lack of attention to the ideological and 
repressive functions of the state, which he sees as being better developed by 
Poulantzas. Even in Offe’s view, legitimacy is seen to depend ‘solely on material 
gains by the working class’ (p.149), rather than in the maintenance of a set of cultural 
values that support the capitalist system, as Gramsci and later Poulantzas argued34. 
Although Offe’s, Poulantzas’, Hirsch’s and Jessop’s views on how the capitalist state 
works are still on the Marxist tradition and are thus critical of liberal views of the 
state, their ideas seem to explain how the state proposed by liberals and pluralists 
can sustain itself. From the pluralist perspective, however, the way in which the state 
gains legitimacy has nothing to do with hegemony or the spread of dominant values. 
On the contrary, as already mentioned, legitimacy is gained through the operation of 
a democratic system that imposes limitations on state actions by selecting 
representatives and establishing mechanisms for their accountability to the citizens 
that elected them. The contradiction identified by Offe at the heart of the capitalist 
                                                
34 Bourdieu’s (1997) analysis of cultural and social reproduction would be more in this second line of 
thought. 
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state seems to disappear in this view since there is no inherent contradiction 
between individual and collective wealth maximising behaviour.  
Although the more recent Marxist and pluralist theorists have incorporated many of 
the criticisms formulated in relation to their original theoretical frameworks and offer a 
more complex view of the way in which capitalist states function, they still incur some 
of the problems identified by Evans and others (1985). For one thing they all refer to 
capitalist states, assuming that there is a continuity of meaning in relation to what a 
capitalist state is. But for defenders of a more contextualised theorisation of the 
state, ‘the very structural potentials for autonomous state actions change over time, 
as the organizations of coercion and administration undergo transformations, both 
internally and in the relations to social groups and to representative parts of 
government’ (Evans et al. 1985:14)35. Something similar can be said about the 
development of state legitimacy, quite obviously because of its links with state 
autonomy, but also because the processes by which legitimacy can be acquired are 
diverse and are related to the social and historical processes that have accompanied 
state development36.  
This view opens the possibility (and stresses the need) to think about the variations 
in what the ‘capitalist state’ is. Rather than trying to identify stabilities in the 
functioning of such states the view focuses on the discontinuities within the more or 
less stable role of the state described by both neo-Marxist and pluralist or neo-
pluralist thinkers. The aim of such a perspective is to incorporate in the analysis of 
states elements of the socio-historical conditions that help define and explain the 
form of state action. Even within the more traditional Western capitalist states there 
are differences in the form of state action and in the way in which the state responds 
or relates to the class structure of the society in which it operates37.  Such analyses 
show that ‘the “classness” of politics also varies in relation to states, for the degree to 
which (and the forms in which) class interests are organized into national politics 
depends very much on the prevailing political culture, forms of collective action, and 
possibilities for raising and resolving broadly collective (societal or class) issues’ 
(Evans et al. 1985:25).  
                                                
35 A view that seems somewhat better represented by Hirsch.  
36 Certain manifestations of populism, for instance, seem to base their legitimacy not on the formulation 
of better and more socially relevant policies but on a particular form of relation between the leader and 
the masses which is both far from the rational processes supported by Weber and from the finely 
attuned balancing state role proposed by neo-Marxists. This will be further discussed later.  
37 Katzenstein (1985) for instance, analyses the different roles taken by the state in small European 
countries like Austria and Switzerland.  
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These considerations seem particularly relevant for the analysis of the characteristics 
of state action in Peru, especially in relation to the making and implementation of 
education policies, where state action seems to be particularly weak and prone to 
discontinuity. In the following pages the ideas on the state that have been discussed 
up to now will be used to analyse some of the characteristics of the Peruvian state 
which seem to explain some of the problems found at the level of education policy 
making.   
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7.3 THE STATE AND SOCIETY IN PERU 
Following the discussion above the present section introduces some of the central 
characteristics of the Peruvian state with a focus on the distribution of power, state 
autonomy and legitimacy, and the organisational (administrative capacities and 
institutions) characteristic of the state apparatus. This discussion, as the section’s 
title anticipates, is based on an understanding of state and society relations. As will 
be seen in the following chapter, these issues are crucial for understanding the 
problem of discontinuity, as the latter is fundamentally related to the characteristics 
of the state’s institutional matrix, and the rules of the game it sets for the actions of 
policy makers. Interpreting the way in which policy makers approach the education 
policy process, moreover, is inextricably linked to the ways in which access to power 
and public positions has been understood throughout Peru’s Republican history.    
Rather than an exhaustive account of state and society relations, which is beyond 
the scope of this work and has been carried out elsewhere (cfr. Lopez 1997), the 
presentation will be concise and will focus on those aspects that are crucial for the 
analysis of discontinuity in education policies that is the aim of this study.  
 
 
7.3.1 Brief historical account of the development of the Peruvian state 
The present characteristics of the Peruvian state and its institutions could not be 
understood without considering the particular development path it has followed since 
the country’s independence from Spanish colonial powers in 1821. The Republic had 
a turbulent start, and its first decades in the XIX century, up until the time of the 
Chilean war at the end of the century, have been described as ‘caudillismo’, a time 
when military leaders (caudillos) fought over governmental power. More important 
than the specificities of this era in terms of the political struggles, is, for the purposes 
of this study, what happened in terms of state development and the distribution of 
power after independence.  
In this sense it should be highlighted that the independence process, in Peru as well 
as in the rest of the region, was led by local white Spanish descendent elites, and 
was not the product of an indigenous movement. When independence was finally 
achieved, this led to the replacement of the colonial powers with local elites, and that 
did not entail a deep modification of the internal social and political structure. 
External colonialism, then, gave way to a period that has been characterised as one 
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of internal colonialism, where the local elites controlled the still incipient state 
apparatus (cfr. Lopez 1997). The lack of separation between public and private 
interests that was associated with this form of power distribution, meant that the first 
decades of the Republic did not achieve much in terms of the development of state 
institutions. The war with Chile (1879-1884) put an end to the era of military 
leaderships, but again without any modification of the country’s social and political 
structure. What was installed then was the ‘oligarchic state’, which would last until 
the second halve of the XXth century.  
Lopez (1997) defines the main characteristics of the oligarchic state as ‘racial and 
ethnic exclusion, patrimonialism, political mediation with local landowners and 
factionalist violence’ (p.125). It was a state that led a half-way modernisation process 
that did not ‘substantially modify relations of authority nor the stratified social 
relations’ (p.125)38 that prevailed in the country. In spite of all these characteristics, 
which distanced the Peruvian state from more modern socio-political formations, the 
oligarchic state did advance some way towards the consolidation of state institutions, 
particularly when it is compared to the first decades of the Republic in which internal 
conflicts and competition between military leaders completely hindered state 
development. The oligarchic state, which, as the name suggests, was controlled by 
small elitist political organisations, did promote some ‘centralisation of authority, 
without fully achieving it, and promoted an incipient specialization of some of its 
institutions’, accomplishing a ‘relatively institutionalised construction of order’ (Lopez 
1997:126). The state however, did not develop towards a well consolidated 
organisational body nor towards strong social and political institutions.  
As Lopez (1997) highlights, the oligarchic state was ‘the more or less centralised 
political and institutional form that the state assumed in peripheral countries during 
the capitalist phase of raw material and food exports, when the latter was in the 
hands of lordly elites’ (p.127). The form of state power that prevailed during this time 
was not based on a direct relation of authority between the state and citizens, but 
rather on an intricate patrimonial and clientelist form of relation, more similar to the 
feudal mode of socio-political organisation than to that of modern states. The 
authority of the state over citizens was mediated by local landowners (gamonales), 
with which the state exchanged loyalty for favours – i.e. the protection of the 
structure of land ownership.  
                                                
38 All translations from Lopez are my own. 
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The prevalence of the oligarchic state was, however, not without changes. The 
organisational continuity of its first decades, known as the ‘aristocratic republic’ 
(Basadre, quoted in Lopez 1997), experienced a first transformation during the 
eleven years of Leguia’s dictatorship (1919-1930), which somewhat strengthened 
state autonomy but again without a substantial social transformation. But the main 
changes were to come between 1950 and 1968, and then between 1968 and 1975. 
In the first of these periods changes were led by the middle and popular classes that 
emerged from the incipient modernization process, which demanded some basic 
socio-political transformations. The main achievements during this time, which did 
not, however, put an end to the oligarchic state, were changes in the use of violence, 
which stopped being in the hands of landowners and became the exclusive 
monopoly of the state;  
‘in the composition of the dominant oligarchic coalition, …which opened up to 
the middle classes; a partial opening of political participation due to an 
increase in literacy levels; and a political and social weakening of 
landowners, which reduced their capacity to mediate the relations between 
the state and society’ (Lopez 1997:247).  
All the changes described above were progressive and socially led. In contrast, the 
second period of change was not only more aggressive, and led to the final demise 
of the oligarchic state, but was also a state-led experience (cfr. Stepan 1978) 
promoted by the military dictatorship of General Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975). 
General Velasco came into government through a coup-d’etat to the first government 
of Fernando Belaunde, who had not managed to deliver the social and political 
changes he promised when he got in power and which were being demanded by the 
population. Velasco established a form of government that has been characterised 
as ‘organic statism’, with an inclusive ‘corporatist character’ (Stepan 1978). It came 
into power with a program of deep structural changes which aimed at changing the 
country’s social structure through the implementation of agrarian, educational and 
political reforms. In this sense, General Velasco’s government changed the patterns 
of landownership – on which much of the distribution of power and social exclusion 
were based – and attempted to create a more united social structure by carrying out 
an education reform which focused on the development of a national identity. 
Velasco’s government also aimed at changing the country’s economic structure by 
promoting industrial development; and it encouraged the formation of local 
organisations (e.g. peasant communities) that would guarantee better delivery of 
state policies at all levels.  
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The success of these reforms is relative. The military government can be credited 
with having actually changed the socio-economic structure of the country and with 
putting an end to the oligarchic state which was hindering a more thorough 
modernization process. On the other hand, however, the initial strength of the 
reformist impulse was progressively lost, especially after general Velasco was 
succeeded in government by General Morales Bermudez, who failed to 
institutionalise the reforms promoted during the first half of the decade and finally led 
the country back to democracy calling elections in 1980.  
The governmental period that followed the military dictatorship of the 1970’s saw the 
return of the president who had been overturned by Velasco’s coup, and who 
finished administering the dismantling of the reforms. In a process similar to what 
has taken place in more recent years, in the transition between the government of 
Alberto Fujimori and that of Alejandro Toledo – which are at the centre of this study -, 
the newly elected democratic government built its legitimacy partly in contraposition 
to the authoritarian characteristics of the preceding government, and therefore found 
it necessary to put an end to the reform processes the latter had begun. As Lopez 
(1997) highlights, however, this dismantling was ‘more juridical and political than 
social’ (p.280) – the social changes brought about by the military government, 
although not enhanced in the expected ways, were to be long-lasting and completely 
changed the social face of the country. Responsibility for the progressive dismantling 
of the military government’s reforms is, however, also attributable to the military 
government itself, to the strongly ideological character of the reforms, to the closed 
process through which the reforms were developed, and especially to the failure of 
the government to institutionalise the reforms promoted during its first stage39.   
The return to democratic government in the eighties was initially accompanied by a 
shift towards a market economy and form of government that replaced the organic 
statism of the military years. The government’s liberal project experienced serious 
limitations due to the difficulties in balancing internal demands for better redistributive 
policies with external demands from multilateral agencies, for debt repayment – the 
government’s discipline to repay the debt led it to commit 43percent of the fiscal 
budget (Lopez 1997:286), considerably reducing its capacity for internal investment. 
In addition to this, 1983 saw the coming of a particularly strong ‘El Niño’ 
phenomenon, with devastating floods in the North and droughts in the South of the 
                                                
39 A more detailed account of the reforms carried out by the military government and the processes that 
led to their initial success and later dismissal can be found in Stepan (1978). Haddad (1994) offers a 
detailed analysis of the education reforms promoted by the military government, with a focus on policy 
making processes that echoes and supports some of the ideas that will be presented in the next 
chapter.  
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country, which ended up weakening the national economy and any possibility of 
consolidating the political and economic changes that the government wanted to 
promote.  
The second half of the 80’s saw the return of populism, thus confirming the trend 
described by Gonzales de Olarte and Samame (1991) as the ‘Peruvian pendulum’ – 
a trend which according to the authors has characterised the Peruvian political-
economy since the early 1960’s, and in which the failure to establish liberal economic 
regimes due to the incapacity to balance internal and external demands, leads to the 
installation of populist governments that aim to respond to popular demands with 
unsustainable state investment that leads to inflation and thus, again, to the 
deployment of more orthodox corrective economic measures. In 1985, Alan Garcia 
was elected President, and in contrast to his predecessor, who had responded 
mainly to external demands, chose to focus on internal pressures for better 
redistribution – committing only 10 percent of export value to debt repayment –, not 
only through social programmes, but also through import-substitution to promote 
national industrial growth. Garcia’s project, which saw an initial boost in the 
economy, was soon to face strong limitations when the state’s subsidiary policies led 
to hyperinflation.  
The collapse of Garcia’s economic model and the deep fiscal crisis, together with the 
rise of terrorist violence, led to the increasing paralysis of the state’s functions and 
institutions. In terms of state development the 80’s were thus a ‘lost decade’ in which 
neither the liberal nor the populist model managed to modernise and strengthen the 
state apparatus, but, on the contrary, saw an almost complete disappearance of 
state institutions, while at the same time the expression of social demands on the 
state was contained due to the presence of extreme political violence (i.e. terrorism). 
This is not to say that there was a social paralysis. Quite the opposite, the eighties 
gave rise to a series of social energies – seen for instance in the rise of an informal 
economy and of popular support organisations –  through which citizens partly took 
over the state’s responsibility to respond to social needs, and which have 
consolidated during the 90’s following the installation of a Neo Liberal state.   
The collapse of President Garcia’s government not only led to deep economic crisis 
but also to a weakening of the party system, which gave way to the predominance of 
independent political leaders. Both council elections for Lima and presidential 
elections in 1990 evidenced this trend, as the traditional parties got only a small 
portion of votes, went to support independent leaders. In this context, the 
independent leader Alberto Fujimori was elected in 1990 in a second round of 
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elections in which he beat the coalition led by writer Mario Vargas Llosa. Fujimori, 
who won largely without having a coherent set of policy proposals during his 
campaign, soon pledged to the IMF’s structural reform program to stabilise the 
unbalanced economy and which involved the flexibilisation and reduction of the state 
apparatus to give way to market led mechanisms –i.e. privatisations, flexibilisation of 
labour laws and other laws to promote investment, etc.   
With hindsight it is possible to say that Fujimori’s government was largely successful 
in achieving macroeconomic stability and growth. The government also managed to 
contain and deactivate terrorist violence. Having said this, however, it is also 
important to note that stability at the macroeconomic level has not entailed better 
redistributive policies, and as seen in the indicators mentioned in the first chapter, 
inequality and poverty are still the rule in the country. On the other hand, as has 
become clear after the return of democracy – especially through the work done by 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2003) – much of the containment of 
terrorist violence was achieved at the cost of breaching human rights.  
The outcome of reforms, as well as of the previous decade of failed political and 
economic programmes, is that the ‘State’s intervention in the economy has 
diminished drastically. The functions and institutions that were in charge of regulating 
the labour, goods and services and capital markets have been deactivated.’ (Lopez 
1997:289). On the other hand, those institutions related to the sustainability of 
macroeconomic policies and market operation (i.e. the central bank, inland revenue, 
consumer protection, customs, etc.) have strengthened (Lopez 1997). The structural 
reforms have also meant that the state has relinquished much of its social role. 
Although Fujimori’s government did increase social investment (as a consequence of 
fiscal growth and the return of Peru to the international funding community) and 
carried out reforms in social services, the latter were not part of an integral state 
approach to social change, but were rather seen as compensatory actions from a 
minimal Neo Liberal state40.  
In terms of state development what went on with the practical operation of the state 
is equally or even more important as the formal reforms carried during the 90’s. 
Fujimori’s electoral victory in 1990 did not grant him a representative majority, and 
after a series of reform attempts that failed due to lack of political support, he 
decided to close and reorganise Congress in 1992, in what has been described as 
an auto-coup. Fujimori broke with the two-camera parliamentary system and installed 
                                                
40 The implications of the neoliberal state for education and particularly for the discontinuity of policies 
will be discussed in more detail in the following section.  
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a single camera one, for which elections were called. The weakened party system, 
together with Fujimori’s initial popularity and populist approach, led representatives 
from his independent movement to gain a sweeping majority. After this, the 
legislative became, in reality, a branch of the executive, passing laws that allowed 
the government to do whatever it wanted – even unconstitutional laws like that which 
in 2000 allowed Fujimori to run for a third electoral period41. 
The division of powers which is supposed to establish necessary limits on state 
action was also curtailed in other areas. As has become clear after the dismissal of 
Fujimori, the government also controlled the judiciary, mainly by corrupt means. The 
same is true of other areas such as the media, where leaked videos have shown 
how the government bribed owners of important media, as well as created its own 
series of tabloids as part of a strategy to control and influence public opinion. All 
these moves were part of a strategy, largely planned by the government’s head of 
intelligence (Vladimiro Montesinos), to control power for another decade. Needless 
to say, the outcome of Fujimori’s rule has been yet deeper weakening of the 
legitimacy of the state.  
The corruption scandal that finally led to the collapse of Fujimori’s government led to 
the installation of a transition government and later call for elections. The disbelief in 
state and political institutions that the evidence of corruption generated gave way to 
a renewed emphasis on the need to democratise political power and strengthen state 
institutions. This was the focus of Alejandro Toledo’s electoral campaign which led 
him to become president in 2001. Transparency and civil society participation in the 
public sphere to counterbalance and limit the use and abuse of state power have 
also become leitmotifs permeating all areas of policy making42. 
The extent to which the new government has strengthened state institutions is 
relative. Although the heightened awareness about the need to stop corruption has 
put some limits on state action – at least now there are more institutions willing to 
denounce corrupt activities -, the extent to which politics and policy making have 
been democratised is questionable. As this study attempts to show, at least in the 
case of education (and this seems to be the same in most policy areas), decision 
making still takes place in a highly authoritative manner, whereby policy makers have 
almost absolute power to change policies according to their personal will, thus 
breeding untenable degrees of discontinuity that lead to the failure of policies and 
                                                
41 The Peruvian constitution only allows presidents to govern for two consecutive periods.  
42 The New Education Law approved in 2003, for instance, is based on a highly participative decision 
making structure.  
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reforms. Beyond minimal democratic conditions, then, the country still appears to 
operate according to an authoritative logic, which suggests the need to focus political 
and social action not only on the strengthening of institutions, but also on the 
modification of policy making cultures, which are the heirs of a form of state in which 
political leaders have had absolute decision making powers. As Lopez (1997) 
suggests: 
‘… patrimonialism (…) permeates all the institutional body of the state, from 
the top to the bottom. By virtue of this prevalence, those people who occupy 
various public functions, from the higher to the lower ones, do not consider or 
think of themselves as real state officers, serving the general interests of 
citizens, but rather as owners of those functions or delegates of the supreme 
patron who occupies the apex of power: the president of the Republic.’ (p. 
248) 
 
The quote is particularly relevant in the context of this study, which aims to analyse 
the problems that such a form of state organisation can bring for specific areas as 
education. It opens up two central lines of analysis that will be explored in the 
following chapters, and which link discontinuity not only to the institutional 
weaknesses of the state, but also to the particular cultures of policy making that such 
state and society relations have given rise to.  
 
Similar paths to state development and modernisation have been followed in much of 
the Latin American region. Much of the modernisation process in the region has 
responded to exogenous rather than endogenous factors, meaning that the 
development of modern institutions has not been a consequence, or has not taken 
place together with social changes, but has rather taken place through the imitation 
of patterns of development taking place elsewhere, without the accompanying social 
changes (Touraine 1998). A similar view is developed by Kobrin (1977), who talks 
about a process of ‘inverted’ modernisation in the region, through which ‘modern 
industrial institutions… [have been] uprooted and superimposed upon relatively 
traditional societies’, and ‘social and cultural change is often a function of this 
transplantation’ (Kobrin 1977), rather than the consequence of an endogenous 
movement within society. 
The links between social change and the development of political systems have 
been the focus of much theoretical development (cfr. Moore 1966). In the case of 
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Peru, the result of developments based on such exogenous or inverted process of 
modernisation has often been characterised with terms like ‘hybridity’, which denote 
the social, cultural and political heterogeneity that stems from the syncretism of old 
and new forms of organisation (cfr. De Toro 2002). This has even led some to 
describe Latin America as ‘postmodern avant-la-lettre’, not because of the presence 
of a specific conceptual strategy like that which is associated with postmodern 
thought, as De Toro duly clarifies, but because of the heterogenous identity of its 
peoples and modes of organisation, which escape essentialist or unambiguous 
representations.  
The problems and limitations brought about by having followed such routes to 
modernisation have been extensively explored, especially with a focus on cultural 
and political developments. The latter focus, which is particularly relevant for this 
study, has underscored the problems that having semi-modern states together with 
very unequal societies raise for the possibility of establishing fully democratic political 
regimes. The work of Guillermo O’Donnell has been particularly influential in this 
area, as he questions the degree to which democracy has been embedded in the 
region (1994; 1998; 1999). His studies suggest that beyond some necessary but 
minimal definitions of democracy (fair elections, free press, etc.) the operation of 
democratic principles is seriously curtailed by the inoperativeness of the ‘rule of law’ 
in the Latin American region. This, as he puts it, goes hand in hand with the 
prevalence of fundamental social inequalities, and is reflected in the way in which 
citizens are differently treated by the law on the basis of their social positions. For 
him this is, by and large, the consequence of having developed political rights 
without ‘the expansion and densification of civil rights’ (O'Donnell 1998), which has 
hindered the more or less homogeneous spread of the effects of modernity in 
society. As O’Donnell (2001) suggests, then, it is important to analyse the 
possibilities and limitations of democracy in the region not only in terms of political 
regimes, but also in terms of the characteristics of the state – especially, in his view, 
in terms of the operation of the legal system, which tends to underscore social 
differences.  
A similar reading, although with a different focus, could be made of how the specific 
paths to modernisation have limited states’ capacity to promote and deliver policies. 
One direction from which to explore this has to do with the consequences of the 
exogenous modernisation process. According to Touraine (1998), this has led to a 
‘partial fusion of the state, political society and social actors’ – which contrasts with 
the separation of powers that characterises modern states –, and where ‘the spread 
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of clientelism and corruption can weaken both the actors and the state’ (p.179), as 
well as the possibility of establishing democratic forms of government. This evidently 
limits the states’ organisational and policy making capacities, as public and private 
interests become mixed criteria for state action. Just as O’Donnell showed in relation 
to the legal system, the system of policy making also seems to be permeated by 
undemocratic forms of decision-making that tend to curtail legitimacy and limit the 
effectiveness of state action.  
A different reading, which is particularly relevant for the case of education, takes the 
prevalence – and maintenance - of basic social inequalities as an indication of why 
the state has not developed a more adequate process machinery to deliver 
education policies. This aspect of the problem relates the discontinuity of policies to 
structural issues, which have to do with the extent to which the state is able to take 
on a social development role by promoting policies that might effectively reduce 
inequalities. Both lines of analysis will be further explored in the next section on the 
basis of the empirical data gathered for the study. 
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CHAPTER 8 - EDUCATION AND THE STATE 
 
The historical account offered above opens up a series of questions, especially in 
relation to Peru’s position vis a vis modern state developments and the kind of 
problems this brings about for the possibility of carrying out policies, especially in 
social areas such as education. Reflecting on the problems of the Peruvian state, 
Quijano (2000) suggests that the core of difficulties lies in the paradoxical situation of 
having ‘an independent state and a colonial society’ (p.234). Quijano (1993; 2000) 
extends the idea of coloniality beyond its usual definition to include a mode of 
organisation that is based on exclusion and domination by a few powerful elites – 
and which matches what has been shown in the above pages, particularly the 
structure of the oligarchic state. For Quijano, the mode of socio-political organisation 
that has prevailed throughout the country’s Republican history is based on what he 
describes as ‘the coloniality of power’, a form of power based on exclusion mainly on 
the basis of racial difference.  As has been shown above, ‘the independence process 
of Latin American states without the decolonisation of society could not be, and was 
not, a process towards the development of modern nation-states, but a rearticulation 
of the coloniality of power over new institutional grounds’ (Quijano 2000:236).  
This can be seen as the central contradiction at the core of the Peruvian state, 
which, as the title of Lopez’s (1997) book suggests, has ‘real and imaginary citizens’ 
(i.e. in terms of their civil rights). It leads to a situation that contradicts the 
fundamental elements of the nation-state, which is based on a sense of cohesion 
and equality of citizens vis a vis the state and the law.  Although the social structure 
of the country is changing and has acquired more flexibility in recent decades, 
especially after the military government of General Velasco, much of this critique of 
the characteristics and relations of the Peruvian state and society is still valid (see 
Benavides 2002). And as was briefly mentioned above, this opens up problems 
especially when it comes to the actions of the state in relation to social areas, which 
would demand the operation of more inclusive citizenship categories43.  
Generalising on the tendencies of similar states, Mouzelis (2000) refers to ‘the 
dissonance in semi-peripheral countries between politico-administrative institutions 
imported from the West, and the underlying power relations between indigenous [and 
non-indigenous] interest groups’ (p.746). This dissonance creates substantial 
                                                
43 O’Donnell (1998) has explored similar ideas, focusing especially on the ‘(un)rule of law’ in Latin 
America, and how it helps reproduce social differences. 
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problems for the operation of institutions, as there is a ‘discrepancy between the 
normative-virtual and the actual’ which is ‘much greater than in those Western 
democracies’ from which political institutions were imported (Mouzelis 2000:747). 
 
8.1 READING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATE AND EDUCATION 
Although the literature which links educational development to state characteristics is 
increasing, the latter is rather restricted to developments in fully capitalist nations 
(Archer 1984; Bowles et al. 1976; Dale 1989; Green 1990), from which, as should 
have become clear from the account provided above, as well as from previous 
chapters, the Peruvian state stands at a certain distance – particularly in terms of the 
‘discrepancy’ between the normative (institutional) level and the actual level of 
everyday action. And although the concern in this study is not with educational 
processes per se, and how they can be linked to specific state developments, the 
issue of discontinuity seems to be in direct relation to the institutional weakness of 
the Peruvian state, as well as to the role that public education has played in its 
development.  
Green (1990), for instance, offers a comprehensive review of attempts to link 
educational developments to different paths to state formation. The analysis offered 
above follows the same lines of his critique, which questions liberal/functionalist, 
Marxist and Weberian approaches to then advance a more state-centred and 
comparative position. Green’s most fundamental criticism tackles the reductionism of 
these approaches, as well as their lack of comparative perspective when theorising 
the state, which often leads to deterministic explanations that are untenable in view 
of the variety of education-state developments, which can only be explained through 
a more detailed and comparative account of variations in state formation.   
Green’s critique first focuses on functionalist explanations, which have attempted to 
establish a direct link between the rise of education systems – and their function 
thereafter –  and skill formation, especially after the onset of the industrial revolution. 
Green traces the origins of this line of analysis to the work of structural functionalism, 
and particularly to the work of Durkheim, for whom mass education arose to satisfy 
the needs for skilled labour and a homogeneous, governable society, brought about 
by the industrial revolution. Education, then, had not only to impart specialised 
knowledge for the acquisition of fundamental skills, but more importantly perhaps, it 
had to ‘integrate children into collective ideas – a culture générale’ (Green 1990:37). 
Durkheim’s ideas contrasted with the more individualist understanding of the role of 
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education which had been advanced by liberal theorists, who saw education as a 
liberating and democratising force. This line of thought is the basis for more 
contemporary functionalist approaches to the analysis of education, such as human 
capital theory (see Halsey et al. 1977). 
In contrast with the functionalist position, Green (1990) finds that educational 
developments have not necessarily coincided with industrial ones, especially in 
England, where the massification of public education came at a rather late stage of 
industrialisation. The author shows how other accounts, such as those built on a 
Marxist perspective, are better at capturing the intricacies of the relations between 
education, the economy and labour, as they focus on ‘how education reproduces and 
legitimates the power relations of the labour market through selection and differential 
socialization based on the class, ethnic and gender divisions of society at large’ 
(Green 1990:39). At the core of this tradition lie works like those of Bowles and Gintis 
(1976), who show how education legitimises social inequalities by fostering and 
reinforcing the belief in meritocracy . And although Green is not far from the latter 
approach, he criticises some of its exponents for offering a rather reductionist view of 
the relations between education and the economy. Green’s work is more in the lines 
of neo-Marxist thinkers (see Dale 1989; see Offe 1996), who link the role of 
education to the legitimatory functions of the state and to the maintenance of a 
dominant hegemony, rather than establishing a direct relation between education 
and the reproduction of social relations.   
Green’s approach takes on Archer’s (1984) criticisms. She offers a theorisation of 
the social origins of education systems from a Weberian perspective, which leads 
her to suggest that rather than the product of social dynamics, ‘education is 
fundamentally about what people have wanted of it and have been able to do to it’ 
(Archer 1984:1). A more contingent view than the one offered from a structuralist 
perspective. Archer not only dismisses the functionalist perspective for reasons 
similar to those given by Green, but she also criticises the Marxist account of the role 
of education, which according to her ‘also exhibits an unacceptable economic 
determinism, denying the efficacy of ideas in educational change and operating a 
crude bi-polar concept of class’ (in Green 1990:68). In contrast to this, Archer 
replaces determinism with ‘a theory which posits the centrality of group interaction, 
where this is conditioned or influenced, but not determined, by prior structural or 
social factors.’ (Green 1990:69).  
According to Green, although Archer’s account is a step forward in relation to the 
more deterministic accounts of education and state developments, it lacks a 
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systematic theorisation of the state. In contrast to this, and again, more in the line of 
the state-centred theories discussed in the previous section, Green’s analysis is 
‘premised on the notion that the development of public education systems can only 
be understood in relation to the process of state formation, where this is understood 
in a non-reductive way which gives due weight to both political forms and their 
economic and social conditions of existence. State formation refers to the process by 
which the modern state has been constructed.’ (p.77). Consistent with Marxist 
thinkers, Green advances a perspective grounded on Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, 
which links educational developments to the sustenance of specific socio-political 
relations through the spread of values and forms of conduct. In particular, he relates 
the emergence and consolidation of education systems with the rise and 
consolidation of nation-states, and the ensuing needs to normalise citizens into 
required values. Education thus plays an important role  
‘not only in furnishing industry and the state bureaucracy with the right skills 
and appropriate attitudes but also it is of inestimable value for the dominant 
social classes in establishing their hegemony over the population at large’ 
(Green 1990:80) 
 
8.1.1 The legitimising role of education 
This view of education as contributing to the establishment of a hegemony as a way 
of legitimising prevalent social structures is also explored by Dale (1989) from a 
similar neo-Marxist perspective44. Dale explores the function of education in relation 
to that of the state in advanced capitalist nations following a line of argument initiated 
by Marxist thinkers such as Gramsci and Althusser in relation to the role of 
ideological state apparatuses (like education) in the legitimation of capitalist states. 
Dale’s perspective is also highly influenced by Offe’s ideas about the role of the state 
in capitalist nations, which is seen in terms of the creation of conditions for 
continuous capital accumulation, and offers a more subtle conceptualisation of the 
way in which the state gains legitimacy and maintains social organisation.  
Contrary to original Marxist ideas in which the state was seen as directly influenced 
by the pressures of capitalist interests, in Offe’s (1996) view, as discussed above, 
the role of the state in the preservation of capitalism has to appear neutral and 
                                                
44 Others like Bourdieu and Bernstein (see Halsey et al. 1997) have explored similar ideas but focusing 
more on the way in which cultural values (‘cultural capital’) shape educational opportunity. I will not 
discuss their positions in detail as they do not focus specifically on the relations between education and 
the state, which is the core of the present analysis.  
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autonomous, since only from this position it can act as a mediator in the conflicts 
between individual capitals and between the latter and the working classes. Such 
neutrality is limited by the fact that the primary aim of state action is to preserve the 
accumulation process on which its survival depends. The modern state is – or should 
be –  autonomous from particular interests but not from capitalism as such. The 
problem faced by the state in the pursuit of this aim is one of legitimacy, which it 
cannot gain with an overt preference for the accumulation of capital, given that the 
latter is associated with the creation of fundamental inequalities. The state therefore 
needs to perform legitimising functions that include the redistribution of capital gains 
to the population.  
Legitimation is attained also through less overt means, which include the spread of 
values that help maintain the social organisation required for capital accumulation, 
for instance, through the education system45. How this is achieved is differently 
conceptualised by various authors. Views range from those that see the relation 
between education and the legitimation of capitalism as being more or less direct, to 
those, such as Dale himself, who see this relation as being more indirect. The 
hegemony of the capitalist mode of production to which the education system 
contributes is, in Dale’s view, ‘not so much about winning approval for the status quo, 
winning consent for it or even acceptance of it’, but rather about ‘the prevention of 
rejection, opposition or alternatives to the status quo through denying the use of the 
school for such purposes’ (Dale 1989:43). 
However indirect or covert this legitimising function might be, there are other 
dimensions in which the relation between education and capitalism, or between 
education and the economy – a relation that is mediated by the state (i.e. in its 
legislative capacities) –  is quite direct and needs be less covert. Such is the case of 
the relation between education and labour. Demands for different labour skills have 
direct implications for the education system, which is seen as geared to provide the 
kind of labour that employers require. As Dale shows, the functions of education 
change as the mode of production changes, both to provide the required labour and 
to form – ‘discipline’ to use Foucault’s (1991) term -  the kind of citizens that the state 
requires in each new phase of economic development. Education in this view has a 
clearly identifiable function, as does the role of the state in providing education.  
 
                                                
45 A view not so deeply explored by Offe but which can be found in Poulantzas (see Carnoy 1984). 
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8.1.2 Governmentality and Education 
The idea of ‘disciplined’ subjects shifts the focus of analysis to the underlying 
rationale of different state formations and the educational practices that they lead to. 
This is the line of analysis undertaken in recent approaches to education policy, such 
as the one offered by Olssen, Codd and O’Neil (2004), which is based on a 
Foucauldian reading of policy and looks at the kind of governmentality that different 
state forms – particularly the Neo Liberal state – entail. Although the Foucauldian 
perspective is partly developed as a critique of the economic determinism of Marxist 
approaches, it is not entirely contradictory with the latter, especially as seen in neo-
Marxist and Gramscian developments and their emphasis on legitimation and 
hegemony. These views are much more compatible with Foucault’s view of power as 
being ‘exercised rather than possessed’ (Olssen et al. 2004:23) than the more 
materialist versions of Marxism which see power in terms of domination and 
exploitation according to positions in the dominant mode of production. In Foucault’s 
case, what predominates is an analysis of the ‘control’ of the individual, rather than 
an analysis of class processes. 
The analysis offered by Olssen et al. (2004) links the prevalence of a specific form of 
socio-political organisation – the Neo Liberal state - to the establishment of a 
concomitant discourse that permeates and gives rise to a new, dominant, common 
sense. This, they argue, is reflected in new educational orthodoxies (i.e. the impact 
of globalisation and the educational reforms it ‘demands’), which can be analysed ‘in 
relation to the political philosophy of neoliberalism’ (p.13). In this view, the role of 
education is linked to the creation of hegemony through the promotion of a certain 
kind of governmentality, which helps legitimise the Neo Liberal form of state and 
society organisation. Citizens are thus disciplined into a series of values that will help 
them fulfil their role in this prevalent mode of organisation, and the state (through 
education policies, among other things), has to ‘see to it that each one of us makes a 
continuous ‘enterprise of ourselves’’ (p.137).  
The Neo Liberal state, suggest Olssen et al. entails a fundamental change in the 
techniques of government, but not in the aim of exerting control over citizens for the 
achievement of a specific mode of social organisation. The main shift is from a state 
that actively exerts control, to one that partly yields that responsibility to citizens 
themselves, who, through the acquisition of a specific set of values, develop a 
‘governmentality’ that allows them to take over ‘responsible self-management’ as 
well as entrepreneurial attitudes. At the same time, the state becomes a surveillor of 
the citizens’ self-governance, rather than a more overt enforcer of it. The move 
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towards a minimal or reduced state is therefore ‘a reduction of ‘bureaucracy’ but not 
‘control’’, as ‘the role of the state is now seen as that of the ‘mediator’ and ‘instigator’ 
of the successful operation of the market’ (Olssen et al. 2004:138). This, as the 
authors suggest, takes place through the imposition of ’policies of neoliberal 
governmentality’ (Olssen et al. 2004:13), which tend to be justified through a 
discourse on globalisation and its effects on the organisation of everyday life.  
Education, in this context, appears to play an even more fundamental role than it did 
in the past, as it is one of the central means to inculcate the values of 
entrepreneurialism and self-governance that the new mode of socio-political 
organisation requires. This might account for the current ‘epidemic of education 
policies’ (Levin 1998), that increases awareness about the need to change and 
improve education and leads to the definition of common solutions to policy problems 
as a response to perceived global changes. At the same time, however, the 
increasing emphasis on choice and individual success seems to leave out questions 
of equity and social cohesion, as those who are already in advantaged positions 
appear to be able to make better choices and use of educational opportunities 
(Halsey et al. 1997). This suggests that ‘there is an urgent need to balance 
consumer rights with a new conception of citizen rights to give voice to those 
excluded from the benefits of both social democratic and neoliberal policies’ (Whitty 
2002: 20).  
 
Although the present study is not specifically concerned with the content of policy 
developments in Peru, but rather with the process of policy making, the line of 
analysis followed up to now underscores some of the fundamental elements that 
should be considered when analysing the relations between education and the state. 
And the latter is, I think, a fundamental point for understanding the problem of policy 
discontinuity. As will be discussed in the following pages, discontinuity, or the 
impossibility of consolidating policy proposals, can be read as an expression of the 
ambiguous role that education has played in Peru’s state development – an 
ambiguity that stems from the central contradictions that have remained at the core 
of the Peruvian state throughout its attempts at modernisation. As will be further 
expanded in the following section, this ambiguity takes on a particularly complex 
character in the present stage of Neo Liberal state developments, given the 
difficulties to promote a desired form of governmentality without having previously 
achieved certain social conditions of equality of opportunity.  
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The new agenda of education policy – inspired in the political philosophy of 
neoliberalism - raises special challenges in a case like Peru, as the state needs to 
define rather than redefine its role vis a vis the education system.  Although as many 
scholars in the region contend (Narodowski and Nores 2003), the spread of Neo 
Liberal policies has been quite restricted, especially as full choice mechanisms have 
not been implemented, it is undeniable that states across the region, as elsewhere, 
have also caught the effects of the new epidemic, not only of education policies, but 
also of the adaptation of the state in relation to the forces of globalisation46 - as seen 
for instance in the application of structural adjustment programmes (Gonzales de 
Olarte 1994). And the need to redefine the role of the state vis a vis the effects of the 
new orthodoxy of globalisation – Whitty’s (2002) admonition that we balance 
consumer rights with a new conception of citizen rights (see quote above) - seems 
especially fit for contexts of high social inequality, such as Latin America.   
It is with these notions in mind that we can now go on to consider in more detail the 
problems that state and education relations face in the case of Peru - of which 
discontinuity is a major symptom.   
 
 
8.2 THE STATE AND EDUCATION IN PERU 
8.2.3 Education through the lens of state contradictions 
To understand the problems faced in Peruvian policy making it is possible to extend 
Dale’s (1989) idea that education systems describe similar contradictions to those of 
the states in which they are embedded. In the case of capitalist states, Dale argues 
that problems stem from the contradictory demands that the state has to satisfy, 
having to promote equitable policies to maintain legitimacy, while at the same time 
having to support the fundamentally inequitable process of capital accumulation on 
which its own existence depends.   
In the Peruvian case, we have seen that the lack of integration of state and social 
developments also generates a fundamental ambiguity at the core of the state, but 
                                                
46 Here Olssen, Codd et al’s (2004) distinction between the ‘political philosophy’ of neoliberalism, and its 
specific manifestations is particularly relevant. The critique that authors such as Narodowski and Nores 
(2003) make of the extent to which educational policies of neoliberal character can be found in the Latin 
America region is based on an attempt to identify specific manifestations of market oriented policies. 
But what Olssen, Codd et al. suggest is that what we need to look for is, rather than these specific 
forms, a broader and more pervasive political philosophy that relates to the conception of the role of the 
state, and which can be present even if the state does not fully relinquish its responsibilities to the 
market. It is more a matter of the lack of a political economy, than a matter of whether specific policies 
conform to certain ‘neoliberal’ standards.  
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one that is not entirely the same as the one pointed by Dale. The contradiction is 
rather one of a state that for much of its history has not seriously taken on the need 
for legitimacy, and has yielded to the demands of private interests. This has seriously 
curtailed the possibility of using the education system to support the development of 
hegemony, as state power is supported by more overtly oppressive and exclusionary 
means. The role of education in this sense is rather unclear, as it attempts to spread 
values of equality of opportunity that are contradicted by the lack of opportunities for 
advancement faced by citizens in their everyday life. This view was supported by one 
of the research interviewees, according to whom: 
 
The problem here [in Peru] is that there’s no state policy because a hegemony has 
not been developed, that is, a [representative] elite hasn’t been built, nor has a core 
that says ‘this is the way to go’. I mean, State policies are not an abstract matter. In 
order to create or make something a State policy you have to have convinced people 
that that is a State policy, if not, nothing happens…  and this has not happened. 
(Former ministerial adviser). 
  
The interviewee’s comment is particularly relevant for the issue of discontinuity, 
which suggests that problems in the relation between the state and society in Peru 
are of a very different nature to those experienced in more developed capitalist 
nations. Whereas in the latter the problem is one of maintaining hegemony while 
supporting an economic system that contradicts some of the values that make part of 
that hegemony, in the Peruvian case, the problem is one of not having a hegemony 
capable of guiding education policies in desired directions. The term ‘hegemony’ 
here appears to have more positive connotations than usual, and refers to the 
articulation of interests into a more or less shared discourse.  
The problem pointed to by the interviewee relates to the particular historical paths to 
state development that the country has followed, and to the internal contradictions 
that have prevailed all throughout – i.e. the formal attempts to modernise the state 
while maintaining a rather traditional structure of social relations and exclusion, and 
the existence of elites that have not taken on the aim of becoming more widely 
representative. 
Similar differences appear if we take on the view that the role of education is partly to 
provide a skilled labour force to support economic development. In this case the lack 
of clarity in terms of the role of education, especially of public education becomes 
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stronger. In an economy that still thrives on primary exports as the major source of 
revenue, and which bases part of its capacity to compete internationally on the 
availability of a cheap workforce, there are little incentives to improve the quality of 
education. This idea is also illustrated by the interviewee quoted above: 
 
When I tell you about how our children aren’t in public schools, I’m saying something 
about to that. I mean, OUR country can move without public schools. Public schools 
can remain as they are and nothing will happen. 
(…) 
But that’s terrible, it’s terrible, I’m absolutely against that, I think it’s terrible, I think it’s 
an extreme [form of] discrimination, it’s almost a caste policy, but that happens… that 
happens! So, you can say... look at the passion with which the issue of fiscal deficit is 
discussed...’ But educational issues.. let’s say, ‘we’ve gone down in this, or have 
gone up in that’. No. Because I think that there’s a circuit in this country in which you 
can do fairly well [as a country], and you can have a big bulk of cheap labour... 
(Former Ministerial adviser)  
 
The interviewee’s pessimistic, but probably realistic view – especially when 
considering indicators about the persistent low quality of public education, or the 
difficulties to raise the national budget assigned to education – provides a source of 
structural explanations for the discontinuity of education policies. In a context in 
which the improvement of public education does not really need to be taken 
seriously, because the country (i.e. the economy) can go on without them, the 
development of a coherent set of education policies seems unnecessary. Of course, 
I am not arguing that it is. But I think it is important to consider this view if we want to 
reach substantial explanations that might go beyond the usual political discourses. 
Policy discontinuity appears to evidence a rather different trend, which suggests that 
education is not really as important for the country’s development as it is purported to 
be.  
This view acquires particularly strong connotations in the current stage of Neo 
Liberal state developments. As has been shown in recent years, the application of 
Neo Liberal policies of reducing the state and emphasising the importance of 
consumer rights  have already deepened existing inequalities in the Latin American 
region (Veltmeyer et al. 1997), as the tendency undermines the state’s capacity to 
take on a more active role in balancing negative social and economic trends.  The 
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problem of discontinuity, which strongly contributes to the maintenance and 
deepening of educational inequalities – and therefore to the reproduction of social 
and economic ones -, seems to require changes at the level of political economy, 
and not only at the level of specific policies.  This, however, contradicts the 
fundamental ‘political philosophy’ of neoliberalism (Olssen et al. 2004) that seems to 
predominate in public policy. It is here that claims about the need to bring the state 
back in (Evans et al. 1985) acquire particularly important connotations. But rather 
than discussions focusing on the seemingly excluding options of state planning 
versus laissez-faire policies, ‘the salient debate should be about the nature, purpose 
and consequences of the form of the state action’, and not ‘about questions of 
magnitude of intervention’ (O'Neill 2004: 257). 
 
8.2.4 The operation of the institutional apparatus for education policy making 
The above considerations about the role of education in Peruvian state development 
offer a macro level framework for approaching the problem of discontinuity and the 
data analysis in the following section. At a more specific level, the analysis will also 
focus on issues concerning the policy making apparatus in education, and its relation 
to the characteristics of the Peruvian state. State institutions are the pool of 
constraints and resources which shape and open possibilities for policy making, and 
the issue of discontinuity is especially related to problems in the realm of institutions. 
The theoretical and analytical focus is set here on state strength, understood in 
terms of the state’s capacity to organize the population and pursue desired goals.   
As will be seen in the next section, interviewees often point to the institutional frailty 
of the Peruvian state as a major hindrance for policy making and as one of the major 
causes of policy discontinuity. Such institutional frailty and the need to strengthen 
institutions is at the centre of most discussions concerning the development 
possibilities of the Latin American region (see Inter-American Development Bank 
2004; Pinzón 2003). 
The notion of institutions is used here in the broad sense defined by North (1990), for 
whom they are ‘the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, … the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction…’ (p.3). According to this, the aim 
of institutions is to ‘reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life’ 
(p.3)47. North (1990) distinguishes institutions from organisations: the latter have 
                                                
47 In case the definition of institutions as ‘rules of the game’ gives rise to questions about the possible 
structural determination of institutions, it might be necessary to emphasise that North’s (1990) definition 
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more specific aims, and consist of ‘groups of individuals bound by some common 
purpose to achieve objectives (p.5). Institutions define what organisations exist and 
how they evolve, but at the same time organisations are ‘agents of institutional 
change’ (North 1990:5).  
In this broad sense the existence of institutions is not specifically related to any 
particular historical development, as ‘rules of the game’ have existed at all times. 
Here, however, and especially when the issue of ‘institutional weakness’ is 
concerned, the notion of institutions is linked to modern state developments. In 
relation to this, Giddens (1990) suggests that modern states should be ‘interpreted in 
terms of the coordinated control over delimited territorial arenas’ (p.57). As in North’s 
definition, Giddens also relates the role of modern institutions to the reduction of 
uncertainty, and therefore links them to the notion of trust. The operation of modern 
institutions, which aims to reduce uncertainty, entails, when working properly, 
citizens’ trust as well as their willingness to act ‘according the rules’. There is a 
double dynamic here, as institutions depend on individuals and their willingness to 
act in certain ways, while at the same time individuals rely on the certainty provided 
by institutional arrangements. 
These definitions provide a basic ground for understanding what is meant by the 
weakness of Peruvian institutions and how this contributes to the problem of 
education policy discontinuity. Before going into some more substantive issues, 
however, it might be convenient to consider Mouzelis’ (2000) distinction between the 
paradigmatic (normative) and syntagmatic (actual) dimensions of social action, as it 
provides a useful framework for understanding where the sources of institutional 
weakness might lie. Institutions define a ‘virtual [paradigmatic] level’ of social 
relations and help define roles that are translated (i.e. both instantiated and modified) 
into ‘actual relationships between actors unfolding syntagmatically in time and space’ 
(p.744)48. The trust that individuals put in institutions and their willingness to act 
according to existing rules – both of which are conditions of possibility for the 
existence of institutions – presuppose a kind of continuity between the paradigmatic 
and syntagmatic level, that is between norms (or rules) and individuals’ actions.  
The institutional weakness which is often mentioned when trying to explain the 
inability of the Peruvian state to steer social development in desired directions, can 
                                                                                                                                        
considers rules both as constraining and enabling. This implies that within some more or less defined 
boundaries, there are infinite possibilities for change – even change leading to the modification of the 
institutional framework.    
48 Mouzelis (2000) links this the langue-parole distinction, where the langue constitutes the paradigmatic 
(virtual) level of linguistic rules, while the parole is the instantiation of those rules in the here and now, 
and in a way that is profoundly creative.  
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then be read as the existence of a strong ‘distance or discrepancy’ (Mouzelis 
2000:747) between the normative level of how things should be done and the way in 
which things are actually done49. The weakness does not mean that institutions do 
not exist, as there are always some rules according to which social interaction takes 
place - and as Mouzelis (2000) suggests, even in spite of the existence of such 
discrepancies institutions still can shape social interaction in positive ways. The 
problem is rather one of lack of coordination between the norm and individuals’ 
actions, which leads to a stronger degree of uncertainty, and – as the other side of 
the coin – a generalised mistrust in institutions.  
Institutional weakness can be linked to the historical development of the state in Peru 
and the Latin American region, and what Touraine (1998) described as the process 
of ‘exogenous modernisation’ that led to the importation of modern institutions 
without necessary social changes. This has led to the existence of a fundamental 
distance between the normative and the actual levels of social interaction that has 
been reinforced by ongoing political and social developments.  
Looking at the current situation of Latin America, O’Donnell (1998) links the 
institutional weakness of most countries in the region, to the inoperativeness of ‘the 
rule of law’. This leads to widespread corruption and undermines the possibilities of 
democratic governance. In a different analysis, Ostiguy (2001) links institutional 
weakness to the prevalence of populist forms of political representation in Latin 
American countries, which by definition, have an ‘anti-institutional nature’, as 
‘populist leaders tend in general to be oblivious of formal institutional rules and 
procedures’ (p.26). The trend, then, which sets the distance between the normative 
and actual levels of social action, is to overlook formal institutional arrangements50.  
More specifically relevant for this study, the problem of discontinuity appears to be 
directly linked to institutional weakness. As will be seen in the data analysis section, 
policy makers operate in a context of feeble rules which enables them to act in ways 
that might be negative for the consecution of desired aims – in terms of education 
policies in this case -, but which also limits their possibilities for carrying out policies 
with long-lasting effects.   
The data analysis illustrates both these issues, as it combines a focus on institutional 
elements with a more specific analysis of policy making cultures as seen in the 
                                                
49 It is relevant to note that Mouzelis (2000) refers to the case of Latin America when using the idea of 
‘distance or discrepancy’ between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic levels. 
50 In some cases this can lead to extreme corruption, as in the case of Fujimori’s government in Peru, in 
which not only there existed virtually no separation between the legislative and the executive, but where 
corruption permeated to the most intricate levels of public action.  
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various interview narratives. Before going into this, however, the next chapter 
presents a more detailed account of perspectives on policy analysis, which has been 
another main guiding thread in the research.  
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CHAPTER 9 - POLICY MAKING AND ANALYSIS 
 
The problem of policy discontinuity, as was shown in the opening pages, sets the 
focus of analysis on the process of policy making, rather than on the content of 
specific policies. It is here that an understanding of what is at stake in various 
existing approaches to policy making and analysis becomes pressing.  
The vast literature on this topic is often daunting as one is presented with an 
extensive array of approaches to policy making that bear different names in each 
discussion. Accounts are often overly descriptive, each offering a particular definition 
of policy making which leads to a focus on specific aspects such as the stages of 
policy making, the prevalence of networks, problems of implementation, the 
prevalence of ideas or the rational behaviour of policy actors. Some authors have 
suggested that this rather fragmented array of approaches requires an effort to 
integrate perspectives as to achieve a more complete view of what is at stake in 
policy making (see John 1998).  
Despite this variety, it is possible to identify some main trends within approaches to 
policy analysis. A central trend in policy analysis emphasises the technical aspects of 
policy making and seeks to overcome the influence of politics. Criticisms of such a 
technical approach highlight the need to analyse policy making as inextricably linked 
to political processes, and thus to values and normative considerations. A more 
recent trend draws from the post-empiricist turn in the social sciences and takes on 
developments from critical and post-structuralist theories to emphasise policy as 
deliberation and the need to deconstruct the way in which policy problems are 
represented. There are considerable differences between specific approaches in 
each of these groups, but also some basic epistemological assumptions that guide 
proposals within each of them and which justify the threefold typology. 
The origins and development of the discipline of policy analysis sheds some light as 
to the variations in perspectives. Fischer (2003) points out how policy analysis was 
initially associated with ‘managerial practices’ of government, and had therefore an 
overly technocratic outlook. The aim of policy analysis in this model was to ‘translate 
political and social issues into technically defined ends to be pursued through 
administrative means’ (p.4). This led to the prevalence of rational actor accounts that 
aimed to show the kinds of constraints and incentives that policy makers had when 
making decisions. This perspective does not consider the way in which problems are 
shaped by values and interpretations, and focuses mainly on the technical means to 
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solve them, thus indicating the prevalence of a neopositivist/empiricist perspective 
that determines methods of analysis. This generally leads to a certain contempt for 
democratic practices in policy making, as policy is seen as a realm for experts rather 
than citizens. Moreover, although the perspective has been subjected to strong 
critiques, it still dominates the policy landscape today.  
Critics of the technical-rational approach point towards the value-ladenness of policy 
making and the inseparability of policy from politics, as well as to the complexity of 
policy making processes, which do not match technical-rationalist accounts. Many 
authors then attempt to offer better accounts of the complexity of policy making by 
considering how political, organisational and other factors influence policy making. In 
some cases this has led to a shift in the focus of analysis from ‘the best way to solve 
a problem’ to ‘how to improve the politics of problem definition’ (see Bacchi 1999).  
Developments in the field of policy analysis have more recently incorporated post-
empiricist critiques and highlight the need to question the way in which problems are 
represented, rather than focusing on ways of solving them. The previous positions 
are criticised precisely for not problematising the way in which problems are framed, 
which leads to a lack of critical perspective about the kind of power relations that 
problem setting indicates or helps reproduce. The aim of analysis in this perspective 
would be to show the kinds of power dynamics that lie behind the representation of 
problems in particular ways. Some developments in this trend are influenced by post-
structural critiques, especially Foucault’s analysis of discourse as power, while 
others are more in line with Habermas’ critical theory and attempts to link policy to 
normative aims.  
In what follows I will focus on each of these trends in more detail, as to define my 
own analytical standpoint for the analysis of policy making. It will become clear that 
my position is close to some post-empiricist developments, especially those that 
have managed to maintain some more pragmatic commitments in relation to the 
need to improve policy making practices. In this, however, I stand in a middle ground 
between the normativist focus on communication and consensus and the more 
agonistic models51, usually associated with post-modern critiques, which emphasise 
permanent contestation of problem representations. Here I take on Barnett’s (2003) 
emphasis on democracy as ‘a system of rule, requiring binding decisions’ (p.27), a 
                                                
51 The term ‘agonistic’ here alludes to a commitment to permanent contestation or denunciation proper 
of some versions of democracy that have been developed as part of the cultural or post-modern turn in 
the social sciences. Agonism is seen as the only possible political form in view of critiques of 
foundationalism and representation which impose new forms of power relations. It is a way of avoiding 
the imposition of new representations. In contrast to this, I follow Barnett’s (2003) proposals, that we 
might need to redeem, rather than overcome, representation.  
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point that is especially relevant for the analysis of discontinuity, as the latter indicates 
precisely the lack of binding decisions in the education policy arena.  
 
9.1 POLICY AS TECHNIQUE 
The basic assumption within this perspective of ‘policy as technique’ is that policy is 
about the resolution of objectively identifiable problems. Starting from this, the policy 
process has usually been portrayed as a series of more or less discrete stages that 
go from analysis to evaluation, passing through the establishment and 
implementation of solutions. This perspective is commonly associated with rational 
actor models which attempt to understand the constraints and demands that policy 
makers face at each stage of decision making and which lead to the establishment of 
particular solutions to attain desired aims. It is the specific objective of solving an 
existing problem that guides policy makers at each step. The focus of analysis is the 
decision making process, rather than the framing of problems in specific ways, and 
the aim is ‘outlining the reasons for which a decision was taken’ (McGrew et al. 
1982:8)52. 
This initial technical-rationalist approach53 has suffered considerable modifications 
and many of its newer versions seem to have incorporated some of the ongoing 
critiques to which it has been subjected. However, the basic assumption about the 
possibility for objective determination of problems has remained unchallenged. 
Changes are more to do with accounting in a more complex manner for the sorts of 
influences that affect decision making, and have in some cases led to the 
reformulation of the original view that policy making consists of a series of discrete 
stages. 
McGrew and Wilson’s (1982) typology of policy making models is an example of the 
‘variations within the same theme’ that characterise this perspective. Apart from the 
rational actor model, which assumes that policy is the outcome of the rational 
calculation of the possible outcomes of a decision as to guarantee maximum 
benefits, they identify an organisational processes model and a political bargaining 
one. The first takes the rational actor model one step further by showing the kinds of 
organisational constraints that frame rational actors’ decisions. The model therefore 
                                                
52 Much of the policy literature that falls under this category is therefore about ‘mapping’ the policy 
process, as to have a clear picture of how policymakers make decisions and solve problems that could 
then guide prescriptions of better ways to do things. 
53 This is the term use by Lindblom (in Bacchi 1999:25). Bacchi prefers to call them ‘comprehensive 
rationalists’.  
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discusses the different and often contradictory aims of different units within an 
organisation, and shows how such differences can mean that ‘the final decision 
taken at the summit of the organization may negate, directly or indirectly, the 
objectives of the initial problem-to-be-solved’ (McGrew and Wilson 1982:9). 
The political bargaining model does something similar, but focuses on the political 
rather than the organisational constraints within which policymakers operate. Political 
processes that influence decision-making are described as having their ‘own 
(usually) implicit rules, in which outcomes are determined by the relative resources 
devoted by each participant to the achievement of some satisfactory solution 
(McGrew and Wilson 1982:10). Political gains or losses therefore have to be 
considered when assessing the process of decision-making as to have a better 
understanding of the ‘incentives’ policymakers have for promoting or avoiding certain 
decisions. This latter view can be associated with public choice theories of policy 
making which, starting from an understanding of the rational self-interested 
behaviour of policy makers, focus on the need to introduce measures to control the 
negative effects of the latter, and which can be seen, for instance in the growth of 
bureaucracies (Bacchi 1999:19)54.  
What the last two models do is make the rational actor model more complex, 
therefore accounting ‘better’ for the constraints and demands that policymakers 
confront and which considerably influence both decisions and the expected 
outcomes of the latter. The two latter models seem to be taking on the critique made 
to the rational actor model’s ‘expectation that the policy process will be an organized 
and systematic one’ (Hill 1997:10). By incorporating organisational and political 
elements, some newer approaches aim at accounting for the complexity of policy 
making. Although closer to political accounts of policy, Hill’s (1997) own approach 
can be seen in these terms, as he portrays the policy process as an open system 
with constant influences from the ‘environment’ in which policy making takes place, 
and where demands, support, and ongoing information and questions about specific 
policies have to be balanced in the policy process. Policy is therefore seen as an 
everchanging process, with no clear beginning and end (see John 1998) – a 
perspective that directly challenges ‘stages models’ of policy making55.  
                                                
54 See also Geddes (2000b), who discusses the failure of reforms in Latin America as the outcome of 
politicians pursuing their own self-interest rather than social wellbeing.  
55 There are considerable differences and similarities between approaches in the presented trends in 
policy analysis which sometimes blur the boundaries between approaches (see John 1998; Sabatier 
1999).  
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The challenge to rational actor models of policy making appears to be even more 
relevant for states – like Peru – that are ‘still struggling to achieve a legitimate 
superordinate role’ (Hill 1997:10) in terms of the coordination of human activities 
throughout a specific territory – as was discussed in earlier chapters. Geddes 
(2000a), for instance, without challenging the rational actor model, suggests it has 
limited explanatory capacities in the Latin American context, where the ‘rules 
governing the survival and advancement’ (p.84) of individuals in the public sector – 
another aspect of institutional weakness - are unclear. Grindle and Thomas (1991) 
pursue a similar line of discussion that starts from the assertion that ‘[p]olicy making 
and implementation processes in many developing countries look superficially like 
they do in Western industrial societies (my stress)’ (p.44). Beyond the surface, 
however, they are characterised by ‘uncertain information, poverty, pervasive state 
influence in the economy, centralization of decision making’ (p.45), not to speak of 
corruption and the fact that ‘state action is always open to dispute’ (p.57) due to 
legitimacy problems. As Geddes (2000a) suggests, then, rational actor explanations 
require a more clearly structured environment as to explain, predict or prescribe 
policy paths. In the case of policy environments like that of Peru, a model assuming 
the instability and constant change of demands and constraints, like that proposed 
by Hill (1997), would seem more adequate.  
Also attempting to develop an approach better geared to the explanation of 
complexity in policy making, John (1998) proposes an ‘evolutionary model’ in which 
he integrates the contributions of different approaches to policy analysis. After 
reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of various approaches, the author takes the 
position that each sheds light on particular aspects of policy making, and concludes 
that integration is the most adequate move. In this he follows recent evolutionary 
models that highlight the importance of cooperation and not only competition as an 
evolutionary strategy56. In the case of policy theories then, integration (i.e. 
cooperation) would be the most appropriate solution: 
‘The institutions are sets of constraints upon actors that can sometimes be 
reshaped if actors so choose. Interests are important because they structure 
the sets of choices for other actors. Economic power structures similarly offer 
alternative choices. Individual self-interest drives the machine and interacts 
with the constraints. Ideas provide solutions and meanings for policy-makers. 
                                                
56 The author refers specifically to the work of Dawkins on genetic evolution (John 1998:183). 
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But what drives policy is the continual interaction between these features.’ 
(John 1998:183)57
Here one could take on Sabatier’s (1999) suggestion that frameworks that involve an 
increased degree of ‘logical interconnectedness and specificity’ tend to decrease 
their explanatory ‘scope’ (p.6), as they are unable to account in detail for any of the 
aspects under consideration. Sabatier’s own model, for instance, proposes to set the 
focus of analysis on ‘advocacy coalitions’, that is, on the interactions between 
different coalitions ‘each consisting of actors from a variety of institutions who share 
a set of beliefs within a policy subsystem’, and where ‘policy change is a function of 
both competition within the subsystem and events outside the subsystem’ (p.9). 
Sabatier’s critique notwithstanding, his own model can be seen to account for a 
greater degree of complexity than the more linear stages and rational-actor models 
of policy making.   
Although these more recent developments can be seen as a step-forward in the 
understanding of the complex process of policy making – especially when compared 
to the more linear and limited models that were predominant during the early years of 
the discipline of policy analysis – they appear to have some fundamental 
weaknesses. As Bacchi (1999) shows, approaches within this perspective tend to 
assume that ‘there is a readily identifiable social/economic problem which needs 
addressing and that policy makers get together and do their best to come up with a 
policy which will address this problem (p.17). The trouble with this is that it leaves the 
process of problem definition or representation untouched, excluding the possibility 
that problem representations themselves might be problematic and the product of 
power struggles. Even the most complex theories that do account for power in policy 
making tend to overlook the need to contest problem representations. 
The problem, more than one of adequate conceptualisation of the policy process 
seems to lie at the level of epistemological assumptions. Here Fischer (2003) joins 
Bacchi (1999) in criticising the empiricist and neo-positivist approach to knowledge 
that is characteristic of the technical-rationalist approach. Fischer suggests that the 
discipline of policy analysis has generally been based on the ‘general sense that 
better information would lead to better solutions’ (p.11). This is more or less clear 
from the positions that have been discussed, and is expressed in attempts to 
develop more complex understandings of policy making, but which express ‘little 
                                                
57 The quote illuminates the integration of the different perspectives discussed in detail by John (1998): 
implementation analysis, rational choice models, institutional approaches, group and network 
approaches, socio-economic approaches, ideas based approaches  
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sense at the outset that policy problems [are] as much the result of socio-political 
interpretations as they [are] concrete manifestations of relatively fixed social 
processes’ (p.11). This, according to Fischer, and also Bacchi, is the outcome of a 
perspective on knowledge that overlooks that our perceptions and definitions of 
social problems are inextricably connected to values, and that ‘[n]o matter how 
efficient a programme might be, if it fails to confront the basic value frames that 
shape out understandings of the problem, it is bound to be rejected’ (Fischer 2003: 
12)58. This critique takes on post-empiricist developments, which stress the 
inseparability of facts and values, and take on a more social constructionist approach 
that emphasises that reality is always interpretively mediated.  
 
  
9.2 POLITICS AND POLICY MAKING 
The movement within the discipline of policy analysis shows increasing concern with 
developing accounts of the ways in which normative elements (i.e. values, politics) 
enter the policy making process. Although this represents a considerable change in 
comparison to technical-rationalist approaches the aims of these two trends are not 
far from each other. Political rationalists, as Bacchi (1999) calls them, are still 
concerned with coming up with better ways in which to solve problems, the main 
difference is that they recognise that values and political concerns often interfere in 
the process. The main difference then, between technical and political rationalists, 
lies in the way in which they ‘approach policy problems’, the former put the emphasis 
on ‘analysis’, while the latter highlight ‘interaction’ between groups and individuals 
(Bacchi 1999:25).  
Lindblom and Woodhouse (1993), for instance, are particularly critical of stages 
models of policy making, and their portrayal of policy making as a rational process. 
For them, policy making ‘resembles more a “primeval soup”’, where policies rise and 
change continuously as they are matched with political concerns (p.10). They also 
stress that ‘policy might emerge without any explicit decision, by failure to act’ or 
‘may be an unintended byproduct of some other action’ (p.11). This leads the authors 
to develop an incrementalist model of policy making, where policy analysis has to 
follow policies as they develop, assessing change within policy programmes and 
their objectives as the policies develop. As Hoppe (1999) shows, this constitutes ‘an 
                                                
58 There are some important differences between Bacchi and Fischer that will be discussed below, but I 
think their critique of technical-rationalist models using post-empiricist arguments is very similar.  
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enormous step towards a fallibilist and learning concept of rationality’ (p.13) which 
contrasts with the rather unproblematised and neo-positivist tenet of technical-
rationalists in relation to the cognitive and scientific superiority of policy analysts. 
Political rationalists work under the assumption that human beings have limited 
cognitive capacities that do not allow them to have a clear picture, or develop a clear 
and definite solution to policy problems (Bacchi 1999:25). The analyst is then seen 
as a political strategist, rather than a scientist in the neo-positivist sense (Bacchi 
1999:25), and his role is one of ‘piecemeal social engineering’ or incremental 
improvement (Hoppe 1999:14)59. 
The main criticisms that have been made of this perspective have to do with the fact 
that, as in the case of technical-rationalists, they leave the nature of problem 
representations untouched, and focus on providing ‘better’ accounts of how policy 
goes on in practice. The analyst is still seen as a largely objective player, capable of 
considering and balancing choices in each step of the policy process. On the other 
hand, the fallibilist model itself has been questioned by post-empiricist critics, who 
stress the interpretive nature of scientific practice. This is especially so in the realm 
of social theories, which ‘unlike physical ones, are difficult to falsify with experimental 
data because the interpretation of such data is mediated by the assumptions, frames 
of reference, and ideologies of social scientists and other stakeholders in reform’ 
(Dunn quoted in Hoppe 1999:16). But even in the natural science it has become 
clear that ‘science measures an interpretation of the object rather than the object per 
se’, and ‘[u]nder such circumstance, the possibility of conclusive disproof has to be 
largely ruled out’ (Fischer 2003:126)60. 
Although political-rationalists’ portrayal of policy differs considerably from that of 
technical-rationalists their assumptions about the development of truth and 
knowledge are fairly close. For Hoppe (1999) they are part of one same tradition 
which is initially associated with analycentrism and neo-positivism, and then moves 
towards a critical-rationalist perspective (or what Bacchi (1999) defines as political 
rationalism). This is the trend described in the first pages of this chapter, in which we 
                                                
59 Hoppe (1999) establishes a link between this position and Popper’s falsificationism, the contribution 
of which can be seen in terms of promoting an ‘attitude’ towards knowledge that is based on the 
permanent questioning of ones ideas and positions. As will be seen below, Popper’s views have been 
criticised more in terms of his depiction of scientific method and the possibilities of falsificationism as an 
approach to scientific practice.  
60 Haig (1995) establishes a useful distinction between data and phenomena, the latter being the 
‘relatively stable, recurrent features of the world that we seek to explain’ and which are only theoretically 
or interpretively apprehensible (i.e. as data) 
On a different line Lakatos and Musgrave (1970) argue against the falsificationist depiction of science. 
They suggest that error or counterproof in science is entirely expected, and that theories are not 
renounced when they appear, but rather adapt to enhance their explanatory capacity, and are only 
abandoned when better (more robust) theories are developed.  
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saw how definitions of policy have moved towards more complex accounts that 
include the consideration of politics as a fundamental element of policy making. In 
this sense, a perspective such as Hill’s (1997) lies on the more political side of the 
continuum described by all these perspectives, and which is characterised by the 
unproblematic approach to knowledge and problem representation. As Fischer 
(2003) notes, in spite of the increasing acknowledgement of the pervasiveness of 
politics in policy making, political rationalist approaches still have ‘little sense… that 
policy problems [are] as much the result of socio-political interpretations as they were 
concrete manifestations of relatively fixed problems’ (p.11). Accounting for the 
generally interpretive nature of policy, as well as of knowledge more broadly, has 
been the focus of theorisations based on a post-empiricist perspective.  
 
9.3 THE POST-POSITIVIST TURN IN POLICY ANALYSIS 
Critiques of technical and political rationalist approaches have led to what Hoppe 
(1999) describes as a ‘post-positivist turn’ in policy analysis. This refers to a change 
of perspective based on post-positivist epistemological developments that 
emphasise the theoretical and interpretive nature of our relation to the world.  
In spite of the common epistemological standpoint, however, the body of literature 
that has risen from this turn is rather heterogeneous. As will be discussed below, 
approaches tend to differ in their conceptualization of ‘the real’ which leads to 
different positions in relation to the possibility and form of engagement with practices 
of policy making. Such differences stem from authors’ allegiance to critical or post-
structuralist traditions and lead, in the first case, to a commitment with 
communicative or deliberative practices (in the manner of Habermas), and in the 
other to more agonistic practices of policy analysis in terms of contestation and 
deconstruction of problem representations (Bacchi 1999).   
 
9.3.1 Critical Policy Analysis 
Hoppe (1999) locates the work of authors such as Forester and Dryzek within the 
first line of analysis. They embrace critiques of empiricism and positivism, which they 
see not only as portraying a misleading picture of scientific development, but also as 
conductive to the alienation of common citizens from politics and policy making, 
which are portrayed as the realm of experts. This matches Habermas’ (1981) famous 
critique of the ‘uncoupling of lifeworld and system’, which is the basis of his argument 
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on how the modern project of improving life through rational means has been led 
astray. This view is critical of both pluralist approaches to policy making for their 
claims to value neutrality, and technical-rationalist approaches that lead to the 
‘scientization of policymaking by the state through methodologies such as policy 
analysis and planning’, and which ‘has been one of the primary strategies for 
carrying out [a] depolitization [of governance]’ (Fischer 2003:36). While recognising 
that power differences shape political and technical arguments, Habermas advocates 
a shift towards deliberative democratic practices of policy making (Kelly 2004) and is 
committed to an ‘improvement’ of social conditions through a better connection 
between politics and everyday life. In this way, theorists such as Hajer and 
Wagenaar (2003) emphasise the need to arrive at shared problem definitions 
through engagement in public discussions or in ‘communities of action’ (p.11)61
Habermas and his followers in what as Hoppe (1999) describes as a ‘critical-
theoretical approach’, propose that rather than abandoning reason – as supposedly 
some of his adversaries in the post-structuralist or so called post-modern tradition62 
propose – we should attempt to rescue it through a reconnection of lifeworld and 
system. Rationality should be revamped by means of critical thinking aiming at 
bridging the gap between citizens’ everyday practices and the realm of politics and 
‘social engineering’. This aim, for Habermas, can be achieved by boosting a ‘public 
sphere’ through participatory practices. The latter would create a space for citizens 
and policy makers to engage in dialogue about common values and social aims, and 
would be based on a ‘communicative ethics’ derived from an ‘ideal speech situation 
in which people communicate free from power relations, deception and self-
deception’ (Hoppe 1999:19). The move is from allegedly technical considerations of 
policy to a more normatively guided policy process, where notions of ‘the good life’ in 
the Aristotelian sense, rather than considerations of evidence or technique, guide 
decisions. The approach to policy making that stems from these views therefore 
emphasises discursive participation ‘with an eye to the quality of decisionmaking and 
the authenticity of consensus formation’ (Hoppe 1999:20). The emphasis on ‘critical’ 
discourse and theory that stems from Habermas’ perspective refers to the 
importance of deliberation as a means to ‘liberate’ policy ‘from the narrow play of 
                                                
61 A term they borrow from Hanna Arendt.  
62 Although I will not go into a detailed discussion of this here, I think the term post-modern is 
problematic, and possibly inadequate, as it indicates a kind of move away from any kind of practical or 
epistemological commitments. It is, I think, what leads to charges of nihilism or relativism in the case of 
thinkers such as Foucault and Derrida. The term post-structuralism on the other hand, refers more 
specifically to the critique of foundationalist and totalising theories that such thinkers were committed to, 
but do not necessarily entail a denial of reality or a relinquishing of political commitments - this is 
particularly clear in the case of Derrida (see Clark 2003).  
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interests’ (Fischer 2003:46) to which it is tied when left exclusively in the hands of 
politicians and policy makers (i.e. when there is little or no citizen participation). 
This perspective, and Habermas’ proposals more broadly, has been the target of 
criticisms that highlight that the idea of the public sphere and deliberative democracy 
with equal participation of citizens in the public sphere presumes a shared rationality 
and values. Apart from the ideal, and therefore rather unreal, possibilities of 
egalitarian dialogue and consensus formation over certain fundamental aspects of 
human life, critics like Fraser (1992), have argued that Habermas’ conception of the 
public sphere conceals the fact that modern dialogic rationality and values already 
express a form of dominant discourse which has potentially excluding 
consequences. According to Fraser, Habermas has a ‘burgeois, masculinist 
conception of the public sphere’ (pp.117, 118) that overlooks the fundamental 
impossibility of fully overcoming power and status differences when engaging in 
deliberation. Beyond formal limitations to participation class, ethnicity and gender 
differences will be reflected in access and participation to public deliberation. 
Furthermore, Fraser highlights how the public sphere can be the ‘institutional site for 
the construction of the consent that defines the new hegemonic mode of domination’ 
(p.117). So the idea of consensus itself is tied to the establishment of dominant 
discourses and practices tending to normalise life in ways that will inevitably conceal 
difference and exclusion.  
The notion of ethics as justice and equality that guides Habermas’ thought seems to 
conceal or overlook the asymmetries of social life, where difference, rather than 
equality appears to characterise social relations. As Critchley (1999b) suggests, the 
ethics of justice tends to overlook the ‘curvature of social space’ (p.269) and all that it 
implies in terms of the distance and difference between human beings, where 
‘otherness’ cannot be dissolved into egalitarian modes of organisation. In doing this, 
Habermas is more focused on the moral and legal aspects of social life, where the 
principle of equal treatment is fundamental (Critchley 1999b:265). 
Although the influence of Habermas’ thought on the public sphere and deliberative 
democracy is what characterises developments within this strand of policy analysis, 
some authors seem to have taken on some of the criticisms discussed above. In this 
way, the work of Fischer (2003), for instance, has a foot on both the critical and the 
post-structuralist traditions. Although the possibility of combining these two traditions 
of thought will be discussed below, I shall consider Fischer’s proposals in some 
detail as to pave the way for the final discussion. 
 110
Fischer bases his conception of deliberative policy making on a critique of empiricism 
and neo-positivism which leads him to stress ‘the theoretical construction of the 
empirical realm’ which ‘calls for the use of interpretive methods to probe the 
presuppositions that discursively structure social perceptions, organize ‘facticity’, and 
deem events as normal, expected or natural’ (Fischer 2003:14). By acknowledging 
that reality is always interpretively or theoretically mediated Fischer stands at a 
definite distance from the positivist tradition. Moreover, he explicitly states that his 
conception of a post-empiricist stance for policy analysis draws from social-
constructionism, critical theory and post-structuralism. In different ways they all 
constitute critiques of post-empiricism. The integration of the three, however is what 
seems interesting and relates to the points I want to make in the end of this chapter.  
Social-constructionism and post-structuralism in particular provide Fischer with a 
conceptualisation about the elusive nature of reality63, which means that all theories 
are temporary and contestable. This, however, does not mean there is no base for 
choosing among competing theories – I will come to this again later. Moreover, 
Fischer incorporates Foucault’s ideas on the way in which discourse shapes all 
practices, including the perspectives and practices of the policy analyst. While 
acknowledging this, however, Fischer, rather than relinquishing the possibility of 
political participation or engagement (as some authors reviewed below seem to do), 
suggests that this should lead to a particular kind of democratic politics. ‘Recognising 
social reality to be a human construction, the focus shifts to the circumstantial 
context and discursive processes that shape the construction’ (Fischer 2003:130). It 
is this more pragmatic commitment and the fact that he conceives democracy in 
terms of deliberative practices where Fischer is influenced by critical theory.  
Fischer’s conception of policy as deliberation draws heavily on the work of 
Giandomenico Majone (1989), for whom policy should be conceived fundamentally 
as an argumentative process. Even the concept of evidence is reframed in terms of 
selected information that is ‘introduced at a specific point in the argument in order to 
persuade a particular audience of the truth or falsity of a statement’ (Majone 
1989:11)64. As in the case of Fischer, for Majone, the emphasis on the interpretive 
nature of our knowledge of reality has specific consequences for political action, 
which have to do with thinking about ways in which policy argumentation takes place. 
                                                
63 Note this is not to be taken as a statement about the inexistence of reality.  
64 My emphasis on the word selected is to stress that evidence is not self-evident, it is – following the 
post-empiricist critique- always theoretically mediated and, as Majone suggests, strategically framed to 
support certain arguments.  
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In a way that resembles Barnett’s (2003) conception of democracy – discussed 
below - as ‘the giving of reasons and inviting responses’ (p.196), Majone argues that: 
‘to recognize that policy analysis has less to do with proof and computation 
than with the process of argument is to make contact with an old 
philosophical tradition that defines rationality not in instrumental terms, but as 
the ability to provide acceptable reasons for one’s choices’ (p.23) 
This process of argumentation understood as the giving of reasons is fundamental to 
Majone’s understanding of consensus (or continuity) and change in policy making. 
Deliberation in his view should lead to some degree of settlement as to better ways 
to proceed, which, however, are contestable in time. In order to explain this, Majone 
develops a definition of the process of policy making that is analogous to the 
portrayal of scientific development presented by philosopher Imre Lakatos (1970), 
and which is especially relevant for the present study of policy discontinuity. 
According to him, policy should be understood both in terms of continuity and 
change. Continuity is given by the ‘hard core’ or assumptions, values, definitions of 
certain problems, which remain more or less stable in time, while discontinuity is 
what gives policy adaptability, in the sense that ‘many values, assumptions, 
methods, goals and programs are disposable, modifiable, or replaceable by new 
ones’ (p.150)65.  
I will come back to this definition of policy later in the data analysis chapters, where it 
will be argued that discontinuity in Peruvian education policies has to do with the lack 
of definition of a policy core due to the particular policy cultures that arise in the 
context of existing institutional arrangements. For now I just want to note that change 
in this conception of policy is closely related to the notion of argumentation, as 
policies will or should change due to better arguments being developed to support 
changes. The robustness of arguments, or their relation to normative notions of the 
common good, as well of course, as evidence in the sense discussed above, should 
determine the rejection of policies or changes in policy directions. This is the sense 
in which Majone considers that deliberation can lead to the improvement of policy 
making – improvement in the sense of making the process more democratic, with 
policy makers being held accountable for their decisions and having to provide solid 
arguments or reasons for their actions.   
                                                
65 According to Lakatos (Lakatos and Musgrave 1970) this is precisely the way in which the natural 
sciences proceed: there is a hard-core of assumptions that is surrounded by a series of more flexible 
‘protective belts’. This explains both the possibility of normal science and paradigmatic change.   
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Like Fischer and Majone, other authors like Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) seem to 
share some of these conceptions. For them the idea of consensus building should 
not be conflated with the ‘definitive resolution of a problem’, but rather with ‘the 
discovery of a workable definition of the problem, or the temporary stabilization of a 
situation’ (p.23)66. How to reach such temporary stabilisations and how to ensure that 
they are temporary is the focus of deliberative policy analysis.  
 
 
9.3.2 Post-structuralist approaches to policy analysis 
A different strand in policy analysis is more exclusively related to post-structuralism. 
Here the emphasis is put on the way in which discourse - in the case of Habermas 
the discourse of rationality, dialogue and consensus – expresses and defines 
particular ways of thinking. In this case, rather than an emphasis on critical theory as 
a means to ‘rescue’ rationality, theorists take on post-structuralist critiques that point 
to the difficulty of establishing one superior or accepted mode of discourse (i.e. 
rational discourse in the case of Habermas). The work of Foucault has been 
particularly influential here and has set the focus of policy theory on discourse 
analysis, while theorists following the work of Derrida place the focus on the 
deconstruction of policy problems.  
As Olssen et al. (2004) explain, ‘Foucault was interested in discerning how cultural 
formations were made to appear ‘rational’ and ‘unified’, how particular discourses 
came to be formed and what rules lay behind the process of formation’ (p.19). It is 
the lack of concern with how discourses ‘normalise’ practices that authors like Bacchi 
(1999) question about critical policy theorists, a flaw that leads them to focus on 
processes of argumentation as to improve the outcome of discourses, rather than on 
the practices reflected and installed by discourses.  
The work of Bacchi (1999) lies within the post-structuralist strand of policy analysis. 
She goes so far as to deny that authors like Fischer, who explicitly elaborate their 
post-empiricist standpoint, are actually post-empiricists due to their commitment to 
‘improving’ the conditions of policy argumentation. For her, a post-structuralist stance 
seems to be incompatible with political engagement in the way that deliberative 
policy analysts propose. In contrast to this, Bacchi elaborates a ‘What’s the 
problem?’ approach, in which she suggests that policy analysis should focus on 
                                                
66 A similar conception can be found in ‘Unpopular Education’ (Education Group - Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies 1981) where the authors develop the notion of policy ‘settlements’.  
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problem representations, thus questioning the specific power relations that such 
representations produce, reproduce, conceal or maybe help change. Bacchi argues 
that critical policy theorists following the lines of Habermas neglect the existence of 
‘contending representations at work at every level of discussion – about 
acceptability, affordability and availability’ (p.37). So rather than trying to create 
better conditions for consensus building and deliberation, the analyst should be 
aware of the implications of problem representations as well as of the kinds of power 
relations that they express or give rise to. For Bacchi the difference between her own 
approach and that of deliberative policy theorists is ‘a shift in focus from the role of 
values in policy making to the production of meaning’ (p.39). ‘Applied to the policy 
field, an interest in discourse becomes an interest in the ways in which arguments 
are structured, and objects and subjects are constituted in language’ (Bacchi 
1999:41).  
 
9.3.3 A critical post-structuralist approach to policy: is such a thing possible? 
Although I take Bacchi’s point that some critical policy theorists do not fully question 
the idea of policy as discourse and the role of discourse in policy – focusing, rather, 
only on the rules of communicative practice - I do not entirely agree with her 
suggestion that this necessarily denotes a lingering empiricism. Besides, some 
developments from ‘critical-policy theorists’ show a concern for both critical theory 
and discourse analysis – this is clearly the case of Fischer’s (2003) most recent 
work, in which he combines the work of Foucault and Habermas to elaborate his 
perspective on deliberative policy analysis67.  
I think the problem with Bacchi’s work, and therefore with the distinction she makes 
between critical and post-structuralist approaches, has to do with her 
conceptualisation of ‘the real’. Her position is made clear in the following statement: 
‘It needs to be made clear that there is no assumption in the use of this language [of 
representation] that there is a reality which stands outside representation’ (p.37). 
This, I would argue, leads Bacchi away from any pragmatist commitment to the 
improvement of policy and political practices, as is the case with critical policy 
theorists, and into the realm of representations. It is in this relinquishing of reality that 
I think Bacchi goes too far. I entirely agree with the idea that we can only apprehend 
reality through interpretation or theory, that is, that there is only interpretively 
                                                
67 It should be noted that in 1999 Bacchi already perceived a change among critical policy theorists 
towards a better conceptualisation of problem representations in policy. This trend is now evident in 
Fischer’s (2003) work.  
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mediated reality. However, although this implies overcoming metaphysical notions of 
truth as correspondence, I think it should not necessarily entail an anti-realist 
position. By denying the existence of a reality ‘out there’, Bacchi falls into what 
Bhaskar (1997) typifies as a common mistake of reducing ontology to epistemology 
(the epistemic fallacy in Bhaskar’s terms), or what even a discourse theorist like 
Laclau (Laclau et al. 1998) criticises as the ‘reduction of the real to thought’. This 
means that acknowledging the discursive or theoretical nature or the way in which 
we apprehend reality does not entail the denial of reality as such, at an ontological 
level.  
Bacchi seems to conflate the notion of realism with that of foundationalism or 
correspondence theory. For her, the fact that we cannot prove the correspondence of 
our statements with ‘reality’ seems to entail the inexistence of reality. However, 
various forms of non-foundationalist realism have been articulated in the recent past 
(see Bhaskar 1997; Davidson 1986), which on the one hand clearly posit the 
ontological status of reality, and on the other try to develop a basis for choosing 
between judgements about that reality. Davidson (1986), for instance, develops a 
‘coherence theory of truth and knowledge’, where coherence and, I would add the 
argumentative coherence or robustness in the sense discussed by Majone (1989), is 
a condition to assess the ‘truth of judgements’ – policies in this case – without 
confrontation with reality or recourse to ‘evidence’ in the empiricist sense. As will be 
discussed below, the emphasis on coherence, which as Davidson himself suggests, 
can never be complete68, opens up representation to deliberation, as advocated by 
Fischer (2003), particularly in the case of political or policy arguments. Bhaskar 
(Laclau and Bhaskar 1998), on the other hand, has stronger arguments about the 
connection of knowledge and theory to reality, which suggests that ‘there are causal 
interactions between discursive practices or reasons and extra-discursive realities’ 
(p.13), but at the same time ‘all extra-discursive realities are constituted within 
discursive practice, from the point of view of their intelligibility’ (p.13). 
Bacchi’s stance seems to derive from a kind of common interpretation of post-
structuralist or so called post-modern thought which has been the target of critical 
theorists under claims of relativism – and which amounts to the reduction of reality to 
thought or discourse69. Bacchi explicitly addresses the problem of relativism, but I 
                                                
68 ‘[I]t is absurd to look for a justifying ground for the totality of beliefs, something outside this totality 
which we can use to test or compare with our beliefs. The answer to our problem [of relativism or 
scepticism] must then be to find a reason for supposing most of our beliefs are true that is not a form of 
evidence [in the metaphysical or objectivist sense]’ (1986). 
69 It is important to stress here that in recent years there has been a shift in these common 
interpretations of post-modern thought, as authors have challenged interpretations about the alleged 
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think the statement quoted above is a trap that she cannot completely escape, and 
which demands a more complex conceptualisation of the nature of reality and 
interpretation, such as that offered by Davidson or Bhaskar, or such as indeed can 
be found among post-structuralist thinkers as Foucault and Derrida. Bacchi’s 
approach to policy analysis seems to stand on a misconception of the implications of 
assuming the interpretive nature of knowledge. So while offering a valuable 
contribution to the conceptualisation of policy problems and of policy as discourse, it 
cannot, I think, be taken as an approach to policy making - something that is 
particularly important when looking at the problem of discontinuity. If analysis of 
discontinuity were concerned with the content of specific policy discourses Bacchi’s 
perspective might fit better. I am not saying that her focus on policy as discourse or 
as problem representation is inadequate, but rather that it is insufficient when looking 
at the processes of policy making. The major problem in her approach is that it 
attempts to overcome the limitations of the so called critical policy theorists, but lacks 
the more pragmatic elements that critical theory does seem to offer.  
Bacchi’s attempt to overcome the relativism of her anti-realist position lies at the core 
of what I find problematic in her approach. She quotes Nancy Fraser to show why ‘an 
analysis that focuses on problem representation does not leave us trapped in 
language’. ‘[I]nterpretations’ according to Fraser, ‘are not merely representations – 
they are acts or interventions’. Hence, concludes Bacchi, ‘we can and must comment 
on the nature of the interventions which accompany particular representations’ 
(p.38/39). I think the use of the word ‘comment’ to describe what analysts can strive 
to do reflects Bacchi’s anti-realist and anti-pragmatist position, as it does not say 
anything about the possibility or need to change practices. In this, critical theorists 
have a much stronger and politically involved position that I find much more useful 
when thinking about very real problems of social injustice such as poverty, inequality, 
etc. or indeed about the ineffectiveness of the policy machinery, as in the case of 
discontinuity. Of course, when thinking about such problems it is important to take on 
Bacchi’s stress on discourse and to analyse the implications of different 
representations. But this, I think, is only one aspect of analysis.  
Fischer’s (2003) most recent work suggests that it is possible not only to combine a 
discourse analytic with a critical perspective, but that the emphasis on policy as 
discourse actually leads towards highlighting deliberation, albeit in more complex 
ways that are not necessarily tied to notions of consensus building. For him: 
                                                                                                                                        
anti-realist stance (and therefore nihilism or immorality) of authors such as Foucault and Derrida (see 
Critchley 1999b; Olssen 2004; see Pryke et al. 2003). 
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‘The goal [of deliberative policy analysis] is to improve policy argumentation 
by illuminating contentious questions, identifying the strengths and limitations 
of supporting evidence, and elucidating the political implications of 
contending positions. In the process, the task is to increase communicative 
competencies, deliberative capacities, and social learning’ (p.202)  
As discussed above, this conception of deliberation is not tied to any view of policy 
as final solution or consensus over objectively identifiable problems. Furthermore, 
the possibility of getting involved in promoting such deliberative practices and 
capacities stems, I believe, from Fischer’s realist, although still post-empiricist, 
position. Whereas for Bacchi the post-empiricist critique led to the complete 
abandonment of the concept of reality for that of interpretation or representation, for 
Fischer (2003) ‘public policies are not only influenced by the discourses of particular 
groups, they are shaped and supported by the institutional processes in which 
specific discursive practices are embedded, processes which can have a life of their 
own’ (p.45). Fischer, then, appears to have a much more materialistic position than 
Bacchi. Most importantly, such a materialist conception of reality, locates Fischer 
closer to recent readings of so-called post-modern thinkers, which suggest a much 
more robust and materialist conception of reality than some interpreters have 
assumed (see Olssen 2004; Pryke et al. 2003).  
In Fischer’s view, it is precisely the emphasis on discourse that opens up a link 
towards deliberative practices and democratic politics. Although the combination of 
post-structuralist and critical approaches leads Fischer to formulate a conception of 
policy as linked to democracy but not necessarily to notions of consensus building 
(as can be found in more Habermasian policy theorists such as Dryzek (see Hoppe 
1999)), it might be necessary to consider some of the dangers of emphasising 
communicative practices. As Barnett (2003) warns, the view of ‘politics as 
communication is simultaneously a highly idealistic image, which holds the promise 
of agreement and consensus, and a cynically realist one, in which politics is reduced 
to a zero-sum clash of opposed principles and interests’ (p.3). 
Barnett’s warning, which I think is taken on in Fischer’s conceptualisation of 
deliberative politics70, refers on one hand to the dangers of believing in the possibility 
of consensus, since, following the Foucauldian warning, any kind of consensus will 
install and reflect a new discourse with potentially excluding consequences. On the 
                                                
70 For Fischer ‘Although answers are not worked out by rigid adherence to the scientific methods of 
demonstration and verification, interpretive understandings can be based on the giving of reasons and 
the assessment of arguments’ (Fischer 2003:53). 
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other hand it warns against the danger of thinking that participation in communicative 
practices will eventually lead to perfecting political practices through a full 
identification between citizens’ demands and political responses. For Barnett the 
emphasis on deliberative practices of policy making should be understood in the 
context of a conception of democracy as an always incomplete process, as ‘a 
boundary concept, whose meaning is inherently connected to movements of 
translation and reconceptualization’ (Connolly quoted in Barnett 2003:2), and not as 
tied to consensus building or perfect identification between policy and citizen will71. 
The idea of consensus, which presupposes the ideal possibility of perfect agreement, 
could be replaced by notions of settlement (Education Group - Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies 1981) or temporary agreement (Majone 1989), which 
denote a fundamental openness to contestation and therefore entail a disposition 
towards argumentation and deliberation.   
Barnett follows Iris Marion Young’s deconstructive critical theory. Young, although 
committed to deliberative forms of democracy, questions many advocates of 
deliberation for their emphasis on consensus. This is particularly the case of 
Habermas, for whom, deliberation in the public sphere presupposes the possibility of 
arriving at universal agreements.  For Young ‘The fundamental question is whether 
the notion of generalisable interests necessarily implies shared, universal interests 
that can be articulated in a universally shared language of justification’ (p.62). As 
Barnett highlights:  
‘A fully inclusive conception of dialogic reason must forswear the ideals of 
impartial universalistic reason, replacing the assumption that communication 
depends on a priori foundations of understanding with a notion of public 
deliberation in terms of translation.’ (p.62). 
This means also that deliberation is favoured as a process, rather than as a means 
for consensus. Barnett’s view, however, differs from agonistic models of democracy 
– that ‘tend towards a purification of the political, which contrasts the closure of 
instrumental decision-making to the infinite semiosis of subject-formation’ (p.12)72 - in 
that, as he states from the beginning, he is well aware of the pragmatic dimension 
                                                
71 Barnett (2003) questions certain idealised conceptions of participatory democracy which he sees as 
resting ‘on the assumption that the same social subjects, gathered together in a forum of mutual 
communication, should participate in deliberation and carry out decision-making’ (p.10). Such practices, 
which are seen as overcoming the limits of representative democracy, rest on a ‘logic of identity’ that 
assumes the possibility of full identification between citizen wills and political practices, or, more 
fundamentally, the stability of citizens’ wills across time.  
72 Agonistic models of democracy and policy making conceive political processes as permanently open, 
and question the moment of decision in favour of a permanent political movement. Bacchi’s (1999) 
approach, I think, lies within this trend. But as Barnett warns, ‘Agonism is an end, and only one element, 
of democratic political action, not its essence’ (p.13).  
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that both democracy and deliberation should have. For Barnett, ‘the value of 
communicative practices of public deliberation cannot be properly grasped if it is 
detached from the objective of arriving at binding decisions’ (p.12). But the latter 
have to be seen in the context of ‘giving reasons and inviting responses’, rather than 
as permanently valid positions. Representative democracy is a system that enables 
‘binding decisions and effective public action in the absence of final agreement’ 
(p.12) – something that, as Majone (1989) suggests, leads to the idea of democracy 
as a system of government by discussion.  
This view of democracy, and of policy more generally, as based on a deliberative 
process, understood as a process of permanent translation that leads to the 
‘articulation of promises, giving reasons, and a willingness to talk and listen’ (p.63) is 
quite contrary to the cultures of policy making that have been found in the analysis of 
discontinuity and which are examined in the data analysis section. In spite of 
differences between the policy makers’ narratives, each of them suggests an image 
of the policy process in which individuals appropriate the space for policy making and 
reject the need to both give reasons and invite responses. The tendency is rather to 
redefine the space and discourse of policy by imposing individual views. The 
existence of such ‘cultures of policy making’ can be partly explained by reference to 
institutional problems, but they can also be seen as contributing or reproducing such 
problems. In any case, it is the interaction between institutional elements and policy 
making cultures that seems to explain the problem of discontinuity.  
A reconceptualisation of policy practices with these ideas on deliberation, ‘the giving 
of reasons’ and the permanent invitation for people to respond, question and engage 
in dialogue, sheds some light as to the possible orientation one could take to 
‘improve’ the conditions of education policy making in Peru. In this, I am aware, I 
might be taking a step towards a more committed position that gets me out of the 
more protected and comfortable position of critic to the realm of politics or policy 
making. But this might be an inevitable move in the consideration of a problem such 
as that of discontinuity (see Lauder et al. 2004). 
Barnett’s conception of policy and political practices in terms of the coming up with 
binding decisions, as well as in terms of a disposition towards the giving or reasons 
and inviting responses, combines critical and post-structuralist positions. Barnett is 
explicit about this, as his position, while being strongly based on Derrida’s notion of 
deconstruction as a critique of the metaphysics of presence and the logic of identity – 
seen in struggles for consensus and a ‘better’ identification between citizens and 
political leaders - is also tied to the tradition of critical theory in terms of a 
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commitment to improve political practices through deliberation73. In doing this, 
Barnett has to assume ‘the fundamental aporia in deconstruction… [which] is the 
relation between ethics and politics’ (Critchley 1999b:275), or, as Critchley puts it, 
the passage from undecidability to decision. This aporia or irresolvable tension that is 
inherent in the move from the undecidability stressed in post-empiricist notions of 
reality and representation, to decision, as seen in proposals for deliberative policy 
practices tied to notions of democracy and the making of binding decisions, does not 
mean, however, that politics should be renounced as Bacchi seems to propose. As 
Derrida74 himself insists ‘judgements have to be made and decisions have to be 
taken, provided it is understood that they must pass through an experience of the 
undecidable’ (Critchley 1999a:275 [my stress]). Hence, an attitude towards the 
deconstruction of problem representations, as is presented by Bacchi, ‘would seem 
to be essentially connected to the possibility of political reformation, transformation 
and progress’ (Critchley 1999a:275). 
Taking on post-structuralist critiques of knowledge, with their emphasis on discourse 
and deconstruction, while leading one away from totalising notions of truth and from 
‘the problems of structuralism, which posited a single founding structure as the basis 
for explaining the nature of experience’ (Olssen 2004), does not necessarily imply 
renouncing politics. Although post-structuralist critiques have pointed to some 
fundamental problems in historical materialism and critical theory, their ‘commitment 
is to a form of ‘permanent criticism’ which must be seen as linked to [their] broader 
programme of freedom of thought’ (Olssen 2004:476)75. This opens up the ‘ethical’ 
concerns of post-structuralist thinkers, who raise awareness about the excluding 
consequences of totalising discourses, to the realm of political action. In this sense, 
is it possible to ‘marry’ post-structuralist and critical theorists – as the title of 
Critchley’s (1999a) paper ‘Habermas and Derrida Get Married’ suggests. This allows 
for a more political attitude on the part of the policy analyst, or citizens in general – 
something that I think is missing in Bacchi’s (1999) approach, and which seems 
fundamental when considering the problem of education policy discontinuity. 
Discontinuity speaks of problems at the level of discourse formation as well as of 
social and political problems and the role of education in the Peruvian state. But it 
relates also to material and institutional practices of policy making. So while it is 
important to question education policy discourses and the possible meanings of 
                                                
73 Barnett (2003) is highly influenced by the pragmatist philosophy of William Dewey, who was deeply 
committed to the possibility of transforming social practices through a reinvigoration of the public (p.36). 
74 Allegedly one of the more politically uncommitted and immoral post-structuralist philosophers! 
75 Olssen is referring specifically to the work of Foucault, but I am using his ideas to refer to post-
structuralist thought more broadly.  
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discontinuity, it is also important to keep an eye on the material practices of policy 
making that ultimately seem to delay the possibility of improving the quality of 
Peruvian public education. 
By way of conclusion: this discussion about the possibility of ‘marrying’ a post-
structuralist with a critical perspective has shown how it is possible to embrace a 
political project while at the same time acknowledging the elusive nature of reality 
and the incompleteness of representation. A deliberative attitude towards policy 
making appears to be a fundamental correlate of both tenets. Incorporating the 
principles of post-structuralism suggests that while engaging in deliberation one 
should always have a reflective attitude towards the way in which problems are being 
represented, as to de-stabilize them, show fissures within them, and point to the 
ways in which they normalise practices and give way to new hegemonic discourses. 
Such an attitude should be a fundamental aspect of the critical engagement of the 
policy analyst. But the latter should be tempered by pragmatic demands and 
limitations, which point towards the need to establish binding decisions as a 
fundamental element of government. Such decisions can be arrived at by 
deliberative practices, which, let us not forget, should also be tied to the giving of 
reasons and inviting responses.  
With this in mind, it is important to remember that in order to devise new forms of 
policy making it is also necessary to understand the way in which policy actually 
operates. In this sense, different models of policy making can offer insights into the 
influence of networks, corporate interests, coalitions and other elements of policy 
making. Different perspectives shed light into the various layers of which a social 
practice like policy making is composed, and considering their contributions has 
heuristic value in that it might help develop a better understanding of problems like 
discontinuity.  
 
 
9.4 SOME NOTES ON EDUCATION POLICY MAKING  
 
The initial chapters of this section presented a discussion of various approaches to 
understanding the state and how they influence conceptions about education. Some 
of the issues considered constitute central debates in the field of education policy 
analysis. A Marxist perspective on the analysis of the state such as that presented by 
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Dale (1989) , for instance, suggested that the problems that emerge in the field of 
education policy are analogous to those that emerge at the core of capitalist states, 
which have to respond to contradictory demands. Ball (1994c), on the other hand, 
espoused what some have described as a more pluralist perspective, in which the 
state’s influence appears to be counteracted by the capacities of actors in various 
levels of the education system. Through the discussion of the Peruvian case, I 
suggested that these two perspectives can be seen as complementary – a position 
that both Dale and Ball seem to sympathise with. While Dale’s considerations focus 
on structural elements of state and society relations, Ball’s perspective highlights the 
way in which agency exerted by different actors in the system can generate changes 
in policy. While the state has the capacity to define education policies, the latter do 
not constitute a monolithic set of prescriptions that will be transparently followed by 
all actors, but are rather subject to interpretation, contestation and change.  
A similar perspective is presented by Vidovich (2001), who discusses state-centred 
and policy-cycle approaches to education policy. The former refers to those analyses 
that highlight how the state structures education and how this takes place amidst 
existing economic and political demands (the needs of capital, for instance). On the 
other hand, the policy-cycle view – as espoused by Ball - stresses the idea that 
policy takes place at all levels and is made by different actors, and not only by the 
central authorised body of policy makers. While central governments can have more 
or less capacity to impose policies, and have the legal backing to enforce them, 
actors at different levels reinterpret policies and adapt them to their practices, or 
even contest them. Moreover, while the more Marxist analyses point to a rather 
linear notion of power as interest based, Ball’s Foucauldian perspective on power as 
discourse/knowledge, suggests a much more diffuse and pervasive idea of power, 
that is linked to various practices and ideologies. As Ball (1994c) suggests in his 
response to Hatcher and Troyna, we should avoid unnecessary dualisms and try to 
develop more complex understandings of policy making without falling into ‘either/or’ 
positions in relation to the capacities of the state vis a vis those of actors at different 
levels.   
Majone’s portrayal of policy making in terms of a core surrounded by a series of 
protective belts can help with this discussion. While central governments can be 
seen to have the capacity to redefine the core of policies – in specific areas or more 
generally, through comprehensive reforms – actors in different levels adapt those 
reforms to their own practices and change the policies without necessarily modifying 
the central tenets that were introduced by government officials. The way in which this 
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takes place in practice will probably depend on the structure of government and the 
degrees of centralisation/decentralisation. In the case of Peru, for instance, where 
the structure of government has been – at least until the application of recent 
decentralisation policies - highly centralised and hierarchical, the scope for 
redefinition might be less, although this does not mean that there is no interpretation, 
and therefore change, at every level.  
The move towards a policy-cycle conception of policy can also be related to the 
changes in perspective on policy making and the move from technicist to post-
empiricist analyses. While the understanding of policy in terms of central government 
statements corresponds to a more technicist understanding of policy making, the 
policy-cycle approach is more adapt to an understanding of policy making as a 
political process, where contestation and reinterpretation are present at all levels. As 
Vidovich (2001) shows, the emphasis on the micro-politics of education reform, 
which contributes to the policy-cycle view, was developed as part of a critique to 
existing analyses of policy, which focused only on official discourses, as if they 
defined exactly what went on in practice. This is the sense in which Ozga (quoted in 
Vidovich 2001) talks about the need to develop better theoretical perspectives for 
understanding policy, which should move away from a focus on the intentions of 
policy makers, to an understanding of how policy is appropriated, interpreted, 
changed and developed in all the other levels of education systems. 
Much of the current body of education policy literature describes a move consistent 
with the trends in policy analysis which were discussed above. Ball’s (1990) work, for 
instance, incorporates post-structuralist perspectives in order to analyse education 
policy discourses. For him, ‘policies embody claims to speak with authority, they 
legitimate and initiate practices in the world, and they privilege certain visions and 
interests. They are power/knowledge configurations par excellence’ (p.22).  
The move towards the analysis of discourse and towards a policy-cycle view of 
policy is critical of more structuralist approaches to education policy, such as the one 
presented by Dale. For Ball (1990), ‘education is not immediately and directly 
produced’ by economic or interest based constraints. Rather, changes ‘can be traced 
to ideological shifts and changing patterns of influence’ (p.15). While I sympathise 
with this position, and have followed similar lines of enquiry in the study of 
discontinuity, I do take the view that social and economic factors offer a broad 
framework for the making of education policies. In this case, while I have attempted 
to trace the existence of policy discontinuity to ‘ideological shifts and changing 
patterns of influence’, I believe that understanding such shifts and changes requires 
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a focus on the role of education in state development – more in the lines argued by 
Dale. Using Ball’s (1994a) terms, it can be said that education policy making takes 
place within a landscape that is underdetermined, but influenced by a multiplicity of 
factors. Structural elements such as the economic order that the state seeks to 
maintain, and the role that education plays in such a process, some of those factors. 
But the ideologies of policy makers, and how they are linked or give rise to dominant 
discourses about education also help define what goes on in education policy.  
Introducing a different perspective that draws from the ideas of Bourdieu, Ladwig 
(1994) has developed the idea that education policy can be understood as a social 
field on its own, with more or less objective relations and a relative autonomy both 
from the field of education and from that of the State (Ladwig 1994). This idea 
suggests that policy making has certain dynamics that cannot be explained only in 
terms of their relation with the State and broad socio-economic processes, nor 
through their relation to educational needs or dominant ideologies, but, rather, ‘as 
strategies by which players defend or advance their positions [within the field]. (…) 
[Thus, the] ‘stances educational policy players take… are related to the player’s 
position within the field of educational policy.’ (p.345). In other words, much of what 
goes on in terms of education policy seems to be related to attempts by policy 
makers and education experts to gain or maintain positions of influence within the 
field itself, rather than with goals in terms of educational improvement or in terms of 
economic developments. As will be clarified below, this seems a particularly good 
description in the case of Peru.  
While much of the existing literature on education policy focuses on the content of 
policies and attempts to trace its origins in structural or ideological elements, 
Ladwig’s perspective opens up to considerations of the policy process itself. This 
view introduces important issues in relation to the conditions in which policy making 
takes place. The landscape of policy making is not only that of the broader socio-
economic structures or existing dominant discourses; it is also the landscape of the 
education policy field itself. To a large extent, education policy in Peru seems to 
respond to issues of actors’ positionality within the policy field, and thus, it is the 
topology of the field – the characteristics and positions of actors - that explains much 
of what goes on in education policy. What I am suggesting is that the internal 
dynamics of the field of policy making cannot be entirely explained by reference to 
broader structural or ideological elements, but need, in addition to the latter, 
considerations about the characteristics of the field itself. In part this is because in 
Peru the broader economic, social and political structures (i.e. highly centralised 
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decision-making, a weak institutional an political context, etc.) provide rather loose 
rules and constraints to the actions of policy makers, thus allowing for the greater 
prominence of agendas and individuals (Grindle and Thomas 1991; O'Donnell 1998; 
1999), and the volatility of policy representations. 
These ideas have been explored and developed through the data analysis presented 
in the following section.  
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PART IV - THE INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURES OF POLICY 
MAKING IN EDUCATION 
 
In this section I will present the analysis of the interview data. The latter will be 
framed by an initial chronology of the main education policies and reforms that have 
been promoted between 1990 and 2004, and which helps convey an idea of the 
strong discontinuities that have dominated the policy arena. The interview data will 
then be analysed following two main lines. The first will present a thematic analysis 
with a focus on the institutional arrangements under which policy making takes 
place. The second will focus on ‘policy narratives’, that is, parts of the interviews on 
which the interviewees reflect on their experiences in policy making and which 
convey their views of policy making, the state and the problems faced in the policy 
process, and which are the basis for an understanding of how individual authorities 
act within the existing institutional arrangements76.  
 
CHAPTER 10 - CHRONOLOGY OF EDUCATION POLICIES AND 
REFORMS 1990 - 2004 
 
10.1 FOCUS 
The following pages focus on a chronology of the main education policy trends that 
can be identified in Peru between 1990 and 2004. 1990 marks the beginning of a ten 
year period in which Alberto Fujimori’s government set a series of reforms in motion. 
Most of these reforms, as will be seen, did not achieve consolidation, and many have 
been revoked during the government of Alejandro Toledo.  
Methodologically speaking, the period under study is particularly interesting because 
of the changes in the nature of the state under Fujimori and Toledo and as it marks 
an increase in awareness (not only in discourse but also as seen in investment 
patterns) about the need to reform the education system. A kind of 
hyperconsciousness has developed about the need to bring changes in education, 
which has brought an ‘epidemic’ of education policies (Levin 1998), which can be 
associated with trends in globalisation and the shift towards the development of 
                                                
76 For the purpose of helping the reader I have included at the end of the thesis both a 
glossary and a relation of people’s names that appear during the interviews.  
 126
knowledge societies (Stehr 1994). Policies that are part of this ‘epidemic’ share 
certain basic characteristics: their justification in economic terms; criticism of schools 
and school administration; a move towards school autonomy; the introduction of 
choice and other market mechanisms to improve demand of quality from schools 
(e.g. strengthening parental participation and control of schools); no large increase in 
funding for education (Levin 1998)77. At the level of application, the commonalities 
are less and there are considerable differences in policies –choice mechanisms, for 
instance, can range from privatisation to increased participation and influence of 
parents and local communities in school matters.  
As will be seen below, Peru, as most of the Latin American region, is not extraneous 
to these trends. In this case, however, the hyperconsciousness about the need for 
reform in education has come accompanied by a large increase in funding, 
especially for reform programmes, from loan agreements with international 
organisations. The increase of funds and of proposals, however, has not yielded 
expected changes, at least not according to the ways in which desired changes are 
being measured. In spite of the common analytical framework, an educational 
discourse capable of guiding policies and reforms in practice has not consolidated. 
Interpretations of what needs to be done are thus varied and change constantly, 
creating an environment of discontinuity. As will hopefully become clear in the 
following pages, this relates to the role that education seems to play in the country, 
or in other words, the relation between education and the Peruvian state. But it also 
raises questions about the extent to which the new economic and political orthodoxy 
(as seen, for instance, in the principles discussed by Levin (1998) can be the basis 
for a more articulate approach to policy making in education.  
 
10.2 THE FUJIMORI YEARS 
Following Du Bois (2004), three main periods can be identified during the nineties in 
terms of education policies: an initial period in which there were two unsuccessful 
reform attempts, a second period in which the emphasis was put on school 
infrastructure, and a third period marked by the Education Quality Improvement 
                                                
77 The existence of such a common discourse is often staggering. I have often heard or read reports in 
which the problems of British education are analyzed in much the same terms as those of Peruvian 
education in spite of obvious differences: reference to standardised tests, decrease in educational 
quality, and the consequent need to introduce quality improvement reforms.   
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Programme (MECEP) which was funded with resources from international loans78. 
After an initial period of economic, political and social stabilization in which the 
government of Fujimori effectively managed to stop mounting levels of inflation and 
control the terrorist activities of Sendero Luminoso by capturing its leader, education 
reform entered the government’s social reform agenda. According to some, this 
emphasis on education came through pressures from the World Bank and other 
international organisations, which considered education a crucial part of the 
structural reform package.  
 
10.2.1 The initial period (1991 - 1993) 
During this first period, reform proposals focused on educational management, a 
trend that reflected the view that one of the main causes of educational stagnation 
was the extreme degree of administrative centralization and the complete lack of 
school autonomy. With this in mind, in 1991 the government issued a legal decree 
(D.L. 69979) that promoted community participation in school administration through 
the creation of ‘promoting entities’ that could generate additional resources for 
schools (apart from those provided by the state) and which could participate in 
selection, changes and increases in the number of school personnel (i.e. teachers). 
This reform attempt elicited strong opposition from teachers, parents and even the 
Church, who claimed that the norm aimed to privatise education and that it thus 
breached the constitutional mandate that guaranteed free access to educational 
services. This opposition, together with the government’s minority in Congress led to 
the final dismissal of the decree.  
In 1992, after Fujimori had closed and reorganised Congress, thus achieving the 
majority vote, a series of laws were promulgated – the D.L. 26011 for ‘Communal 
Participation in school management and administration’; the D.L. 26012 on ‘School 
Funding’; and the D.L. 26013 for the ‘Quality Improvement and Extension of 
Peruvian Education’. The latter were similar in spirit but went far beyond the previous 
reform attempt. The norms created the Communal Education Councils (COMUNED) 
which would administer schools. This initiative was accompanied by a municipalized 
funding system based on the Chilean voucher model – which funded schools on the 
basis of the number of pupils and promoted parental choice in school selection.  
                                                
78 The chronology of reforms carried out during the nineties is mainly based on Du Bois (2004). The 
present analysis, however, adds to Du Bois’ chronology as it goes beyond a focus on institutional 
reforms and considers also the efforts to reform curriculum and pedagogy.  
79 ‘D.L.’ Stands for Decreto Legislativo, i.e. legal decree 
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As with the previous attempt, the latter reforms gave rise to very strong opposition – 
even, as Du Bois (2004) points out, from those who were supposed to be its main 
beneficiaries (i.e. parents). Criticisms were mainly directed at the idea of 
municipalizing education, which was seen as a move towards privatization and to the 
state’s relinquishing of its main role as provider of educational services. The 
opposition also criticised the idea of profit-making in schools which was introduced 
by the norms, and which changed the traditional status of educational organisations 
as being non-for-profit – this move, it was argued, would turn schools into 
‘educational businesses’.  
As in the case of the previous reforms, and in spite of the government’s majority in 
Congress which did allow it to get the legal norms approved, the government ended 
up taking a step back vis a vis the opposition. According to Du Bois (2004) the 
government could not afford opposition in a context that was already socially and 
politically tense after Fujimori’s auto-coup. In 1993, Fujimori himself announced that 
he had ‘changed his mind’ about the reforms, and both the Prime Minister and the 
Education Minister, Alberto Varillas, were dismissed from their posts.  
 
10.2.2 Emphasis on Infrastructure (1994 onwards) 
After the failure of these first reform attempts the focus of educational investment 
was set on infrastructure. According to one interviewee, ‘that was almost a personal 
view of president Fujimori, because he said, according to the people who were close 
to him and who told us, that investment projects are actually only visible in time when 
they have an infrastructure component’ (CASE 03 – former head of ministerial 
office). This emphasis on infrastructure has also been associated with the president’s 
electoral aims, as new schools bore the colours and slogans of the government’s 
party. As Du Bois (2004) reports, this emphasis on infrastructure led to the 
development of the National Institute for Educational and Health Infrastructure 
(INFES) was created, which, together with other institutions like the National Fund for 
Compensation and Development (FONCODES), the Transitory Regional 
Administration Committees (CTAR) and the Ministry of Education’s Educational 
Infrastructure Office (OINFE), as in charge of building and refurbishing schools all 
around the country. The emphasis on infrastructure lasted all throughout Fujimori’s 
government, leading to an increase in the number of primary and secondary schools 
from 37,938 in 1990 to 42,653 in 1997, and then to 44,107 in 2002 (Diaz quoted in 
Du Bois 2004). 
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10.2.3 MECEP and the Proposed New Structure for the Education System (1994-
2000) 
Although between 1993 and 1994 the major administrative reforms of the education 
system had been discontinued, these years saw an important effort to develop a 
more comprehensive reform strategy. In 1993 UNESCO, together with other 
organizations like the World Bank and GTZ, funded a series of studies that led to the 
publication of a General Diagnosis of Peruvian Education (Ministry of Education of 
Peru 1993), which would be the basis for an educational development plan. The 
Diagnosis’ main conclusions were that: 
- there was a lack of a national educational project capable of guiding the actions 
of different agents. 
- there was considerable lack of investment in the education sector. 
- there was a rigid bureaucracy and an excess and superposition of norms and 
regulations that made the administration very inefficient. 
- the basic education curriculum was inadequate, being based on rote learning and 
without much articulation between subjects. 
- there was a lack of adequate educational materials. 
- school infrastructure was insufficient and inadequate.  
 
The Diagnosis led to the establishment, in 1994, of the Primary Education Quality 
Improvement Project, which was largely funded with a World Bank Loan. The Project 
tackled many of the problems identified in the Diagnosis, and although it initially 
focused on Primary Education, it later incorporated moneys from other sources 
(mainly the InterAmerican Development Bank – IDB), changing its name to Peruvian 
Education Quality Improvement Programme. MECEP aimed to tackle a series of 
areas considered crucial for the improvement of Primary education, and the 
education system more generally.  
The MECEP loan was agreed in 1994 and the project officially began in 1995, but it 
was only in 1996 that investment in educational reforms started to rise. Between 
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1994 and 1996 constant changes in the Ministry of Education’s authorities added to 
the usual length of project negotiations and delayed programme spending. In 1996, 
according to one interviewee, such delays and the MED’s incapacity to come out 
with a coherent set of proposals to achieve the project’s main objectives led the 
World Bank - allegedly concerned with the low rate of expenditure - to threaten with 
cutting the Programme. The graph below illustrates the trends in multilateral financial 
cooperation and shows the increase in investment through loan funds since 1995, 
and particularly after 1996. 
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Domingo Palermo was appointed minister in 1996, and according to his own 
account, he was called upon by Fujimori with the express mission of remedying the 
delays in the implementation of MECEP and putting an end to the discontinuities 
brought about by the succession of ministers who had preceded him. Palermo 
managed to negotiate an extension with the World Bank and finally came out with a 
project proposal that accelerated the implementation of reform policies (as seen in 
the graph above)  
                                                
* The graph shows investment with moneys from the two main funding sources, the World Bank 
(MECEP-IDB) and the InterAmerican Development Bank (MECEP-BIRF), in both cases the loan 
programmes had two stages, thus the four lines in the graph. 
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In 1997, the MED’s Strategic Planning Office published what could be described as 
the framework for the reforms that were being set in motion through MECEP. This 
proposal contrasted with those of the early decade as it focused on changes in the 
education system’s structure, and on the pedagogical and curricular aspects of 
education, rather than on institutional reforms.  
Since the first reform attempts, and although some moves were made to increase 
school autonomy, there was little advancement in terms of institutional reforms. 
Palermo’s predecessor in the MED had managed to get a series of norms for the 
management and development of activities in schools and education programmes 
(DL. 016) approved by Congress in 1996. The latter, as in the case of the early 
reforms, aimed at modernising the system’s management by transferring 
pedagogical, administrative and financial responsibilities to schools. Amongst other 
things, the norms allowed school head-teachers to carry out activities within the 
school premises to raise money that could then be used by the school for 
infrastructure improvements and developing special programmes. As Du Bois (Du 
Bois 2004) shows, however, there was little advancement in relation to this new 
normativity. The intermediate administrative organs of the MED kept on acting ‘in a 
spirit contrary to the norm’, while head-teachers went on having ‘limited capacities to 
select or evaluate school personnel’, and had no influence over the school budget. In 
this case, Du Bois suggests, it was mainly the ‘central and intermediate levels’ 
resistance to loosing power’ and an extensive and cryptic legislation what hindered 
the reform. 
The other major effort in terms of the promotion of changes in the legal framework 
came during this period came through the approval of the DL. 882 for Promoting 
Private Investment in Education. The latter proposal, which was concomitant with the 
government’s conviction that there needed be more participation from the private 
sector in the provision of educational services, led to a massive increase in the 
number of private schools, higher education institutes and universities. The number 
of private schools increased from 5,506 in 1990 to 14,655 in 2002 (Du Bois 2004), 
but still the public sector covers 85 percent of the whole education supply. As some 
critics suggest, this de-regulation of the system was not accompanied by adequate 
monitoring and regulation, which meant that the quality of many of the new 
educational institutions that came to being after the norm was passed is 
questionable.  
Once the MECEP programme was set in motion its main objectives were to improve 
problems in teaching quality - through curricular reform, production of school 
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materials and teacher training; modernising educational administration - by 
strengthening planning and monitoring capacities at the central administrative level 
and providing management training at the intermediate and school levels; and 
replacing and rehabilitating educational infrastructure. The project was thus divided 
into three main components, each for one of the objectives, which were incorporated 
into the MED’s organic structure and became the main activities of most of the 
MED’s Offices (Du Bois 2004). Later loan agreements with the InterAmerican 
Development Bank increased MECEP’s scope of action to include policies at the 
secondary and post-secondary education levels.  
In 1997 the MED came out with a Proposal for a New Structure of the Education 
System (Ministry of Education - Peru 1997), which would serve as the basic 
framework for the reforms carried out through MECEP and other MED’s offices. The 
latter proposed: 
- Universalising pre-school education for five-year-olds, in order to prevent children 
from lagging behind, repeating school years and leaving school 
- Improving the quality of Primary Education, consolidating the changes promoted 
by MECEP 
- Reducing Secondary Schooling from five to four years, and 
- Introducing a new non-compulsory post-secondary level, the Bachillerato, which 
aimed to improve the articulation between school and higher education and the 
labour market.  
 
More substantially, the reforms proposed in the context of the MECEP programme 
aimed at generating changes in school practices, which were seen as the core of 
quality and student achievement problems. Such changes were promoted through 
comprehensive curricular reform, as well as through teacher training and the 
introduction of school materials and technologies. The aim was to promote a 
thorough transformation of the education system, which entailed a shift from a 
vertical, rote memory and teacher-centred pedagogy which was, moreover, based on 
an obsolete and extremely prescriptive curriculum, to a pupil-centred pedagogy in 
which teachers were seen as facilitators of learning processes, and where the 
curriculum was a basic structure that should be adapted to school and classroom 
needs. These changes would be achieved by the introduction of a new national 
curriculum which would guide not only classroom practices but also teacher training 
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processes and the production of new school materials. The MED initially worked on 
the new curriculum for primary education which began to be implemented during the 
first years of MECEP, and then went on to prepare the curriculum for Secondary 
education and the Bachillerato.  
As Ferrer (2004) details the MED’s new curriculum proposal followed regional trends 
which focused on developing students’ competencies, rather than on curricular 
objectives, and which, contrary to the latter have a more holistic approach to 
individual development, in which students participate actively and constructively in 
the world and in their social milieu. This view of learning entails, among other things, 
a new emphasis on meaningful learning, rather than on memorising an 
encyclopaedic list of contents –as was the case of the old curriculum.  
Although some similarities can be identified between this curricular reforms and 
those of countries such as the United Kingdom – where a central curriculum and 
standards have been introduced in recent years – it should be stressed that the 
starting point of for such reforms are very different in these countries. In the case of 
Peru, the new curriculum entailed a flexibilisation and an increase in school and 
teacher autonomy – rather than an increased rigidity and centralisation of control as 
in the UK. On the other hand, the introduction of standards and centralised 
assessments came in a context in which there was virtually no measure of student 
performance and achievement, and is therefore a fundamental move towards 
improving support for schools.  
The early start of curricular reform for the Primary education level, together with what 
some describe as a lesser degree of complexity in the definition of the curriculum for 
Primary education, allowed for changes in this level to achieve a degree of 
consolidation. As will be seen later, this was not the case of the Secondary education 
curricular reform, which experienced a great deal of difficulties and discontinuities.   
 
10.2.4 The final years of Fujimori’s administration 
In 1999, when the reform projects were at their peak (as seen for instance in the 
investment graph above), Palermo was replaced by a new minister, Felipe Ignacio 
Garcia-Escudero. This change took place at a time when Fujimori had decided to run 
for a third election –which breached the constitutional mandate that presidents can 
only be re-elected once. According to many interviewees, Palermo’s replacement 
with Garcia-Escudero responded to Fujimori’s political aims, and entailed a shift in 
the concerns of the MED, from the reform policies to contributing to Fujimori’s re-
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election. It is even argued that the new minister was appointed as part of a political 
alliance that would grant support for Fujimori’s re-election. According to some 
interviewees, Garcia-Escudero’s appointment was the beginning of a series of 
changes in relation to the reform programme, as ‘the re-election campaign began, 
they all forgot about the education policies, of the sense that those education policies 
had. There’s no transference of ideas at that moment’ (CASE 08 – Former Ministry of 
Education official).  
The following minister, Federico Salas, who was appointed once Fujimori was re-
elected did not have much time in office before the collapse of the government, when 
evidence of deep corruption levels became public. 
 
Reflecting on the education reforms of the 90s, Arregui (2000) argues that the major 
achievement was probably the development of a widespread view and shared 
discourse about the need to improve the quality of education. The author stresses, 
however, that most of the programmes and activities initiated during the decade have 
experienced strong difficulties which can be initially explained by the ‘acute economic 
crisis, the internal war and the deep impoverishment of public institutions which were 
experienced during the eighties’, the effect of which continued to be felt in the 90’s. 
However, according to Arregui (2000), such problems are also associated with ‘the 
lack of a qualified bureaucracy in the Ministry of Education and instability in its 
leadership, plus ‘a national political process and a presidential politics that gave 
priority to issues of the moment and electoral considerations rather than to more 
coherent development policies’. As a consequence, there is a general ‘lack of 
definition as to what role should be played by the State in the preparation and 
implementation of educational policies’. This is the context in which the transition 
government that replaced Fujimori came into power.  
The result of this is that much of the diagnosis done in the early nineties is still 
applicable at the turn of the millennium, that is, there are still major problems in the 
quality of education, which relate to institutional, pedagogical and financial issues.  
 
10.3 THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 
The transition government that took over after Fujimori fled the country had the 
difficult mission of preparing a new election and re-establishing the political order for 
the transition to democracy. In terms of education policies, most interviewees agree 
 135
that the administration of Marcial Rubio did not do much in terms of introducing new 
policies, its main aim being to administer the transition process. Some of the teams 
that had worked in the Reform Programme of the previous government remained in 
office, so this gave some continuity to reforms after the parenthesis of Garcia-
Escudero. The main contribution of Rubio’s administration was the National 
Consultation for Education and publishing an institutional Memoir that presented the 
MED’s main lines of action, and which would help to guarantee some degree of 
continuity once the new government came into place (Ministry of Education of Peru 
2001).   
 
10.4 EDUCATION POLICIES IN THE GOVERNMENT OF ALEJANDRO TOLEDO 
 
The 2001 election saw Alejandro Toledo achieve the presidency, and Nicolas Lynch 
become minister of education of the new government. The first of Toledo’s cabinets 
was diverse and included individuals from very different backgrounds – right-wing, 
centre-left, left-wing. This was seen as a move to achieve legitimacy and support for 
government action from a broad range of political groups.  
Although the Transition Government was evidently critical of the corruption levels of 
Fujimori’s government and had emphasised the need to establish more transparent 
and democratic administrative processes, it had also attempted to give some 
continuity to the policies initiated during the time of Fujimori. In contrast, Lynch 
highlighted the lack of legitimacy of Fujimori’s government and used this as a political 
justification to put an end to many of the reforms that were in motion.  
At the administrative level, for instance, Lynch’s administration put an end to the 
MECEP programme, arguing that it had created a parallel system that did not 
contribute to the long-lasting improvement of the MED’s competencies. In relation to 
the more substantive reforms, the new administration decided to stop the 
Bachillerato programme and go back to the structure as it was previous to the 1997 
proposal (Ministry of Education - Peru 1997). This also meant that the secondary 
education curriculum was modified, as it now had to cover five years, rather than the 
four years of the ‘Proposed Structure’. Lynch’s administration also got rid of many 
Heads of Office who had remained in their posts during the Transition Government.  
In January 2002, Lynch’s administration published a document named ‘Education for 
Democracy’ (Ministry of Education of Peru 2002) which presented the educational 
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plan for the 2001-2006 period. As the title suggested, the document emphasised the 
need to democratise both educational administration and educational process, as 
well as the need to promote democratic values in all levels of the education system. 
Lynch’s administration also saw the beginning of the National Council for Education, 
the New Law of Education and was responsible for publishing the results of the 
National Consultation for Education carried out by the Transition Government.   
Eleven months after being appointed, however, Lynch was dismissed from his post 
during the first of Toledo’s major governmental crises. The latter gave way to a 
recomposition of the Cabinet, which came to be composed mainly by partisans of 
Toledo’s political party – Peru Posible. Gerardo Ayzanoa, a close collaborator of 
Toledo, was appointed Minister of Education. Although Ayzanoa had been one of 
Lynch’s vice-ministers, he halted the major programmes that his predecessor had set 
in motion. Ayzanoa did not produce another reform proposal, but he implemented 
major changes in several areas, particularly in Secondary Education, where his 
advisors questioned and changed the curricular reform that was proposed by Lynch’s 
team.  
Ayzanoa’s policies were severely questioned by the education community, especially 
by the newly formed National Council for Education (Lauer 2002; Rivero 2003). The 
minister was also highly criticised for the way he dealt with the 2002 teacher’s strike, 
which led to the signing of an agreement in which, analysts suggested, the MED 
agreed to a kind of co-government of education with the teacher’s Union, and 
relinquished the possibility of implementing changes to the teacher’s law.  
Ayzanoa’s administration did not last long. The whole of the second cabinet was 
modified in the second major crisis of Toledo’s government. The new cabinet was 
one of conciliation and was led by an independent prime minister with ample 
experience in public administration, who emphasised the application of technical 
criteria for decision-making. In education, the new appointed minister was Carlos 
Malpica.  
Malpica, who was close to Ayzanoa, did not implement any major changes in policy. 
One of his main ‘achievements’ was to declare an Educational Emergency 
Programme, which came after Peru’s low performance in the OECD-PISA evaluation 
was made public. During his time in Office, Malpica, as he himself expressed in an 
interview, was more concerned with promoting a major fiscal reform that would bring 
more funds to the education sector. Before this reform was achieved, however, both 
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Malpica and the head of cabinet were dismissed and a new cabinet was formed. This 
time, Javier Sota was appointed minister.  
Sota assumed office with a conciliatory discourse that emphasised openness all 
sectors. This was his approach, particularly, to negotiations with the Teachers Union, 
which had been the source of conflict in the preceding years. Sota called upon some 
of Lynch’s collaborators, so it is assumed that some of his policies would follow the 
directions established by Lynch’s reform proposal. One of Sota’s major contributions 
has been to sign a Social Pact of Reciprocal Compromises (Foro del Acuerdo 
Nacional 2004), in which the government pledges to increase teachers’ salaries as 
well as the general budget for education, while the teachers’ pledge to engage in 
serious reforms. The following table illustrates the chronology of reforms.  
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10.5 NO POLICY CORE? – AN ANALYSIS OF REFORMS 
This chronology of reforms conveys a strong sense of the discontinuities that have 
affected education policies since the early nineties. For methodological reasons the 
account offered focuses only on the period between 1990 and 2004. If one were to 
look back, however, the presence of fundamental discontinuities would still be a 
constant feature of education policies.  
In a case study of the 1970’s education reform that the military government of 
President Velasco promoted in Peru, for instance, Haddad (1994) portrays a picture 
of education policy-making that bears strong similarities to the events that have 
taken place in Peru in recent years. Such similarities are not to do with the content 
and aims of the reforms, but with what Haddad describes as ‘the dynamics of 
education policymaking’. As happened in the change from Fujimori’s to Toledo’s 
government, at the end of the 1970’s, the transition into democracy after a decade of 
military rule, led to the disarticulation of a reform programme, which has often been 
praised in retrospect for its high level of articulation and appropriateness to Peruvian 
reality. Although differences between the two cases are evident, both in terms of the 
ideological and theoretical framework of the reforms, as in their aims and contents, 
the similarities in terms of how the reforms were handled are undeniable. That this 
was so was also suggested by some of the interviewees:   
 
That reform [Velasco’s], was progressively dismantled up to a point when there was a 
complete distortion, in the 80’s, when the country regained democracy with 
Belaunde, and the parliament, rather than attempt to rescue some positive elements 
of that educational change, decided to erase everything and start anew... after having 
reached a well achieved basic education level. This generated a very strange, very 
traditional, situation. (CASE 07 – Former ministerial adviser and member of the 
National Council for Education) 
… something must be really wrong in the system that never allows us to build the 
second floor, never. Belaunde [in the early 60’s] comes in saying that Prado did 
everything wrong, and then comes Velasco and says that Belaunde did everything 
wrong, and so on. In all governments there’s a need to start anew in... in the 
foundations that had been laid. (CASE 08 – Former Ministry of Education Official) 
 
In the second extract the idea of ‘starting anew’ in the ‘foundations’ of policies is 
especially important. Here it may be relevant to bring back Majone’s (1989) 
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adaptation to policy-making of Lakatos’ ideas, which suggests that policies tend to 
have a core, usually theoretical or ideological, that provides a sense of continuity to 
policies, and which is surrounded by a series of ‘protective belts’ that can change 
over time but which, on the whole, help maintain the core. The interviewee’s 
reflections suggest, as does the chronology of events presented above, that in Peru, 
the core that makes sense of education policies has changed continuously. 
Discontinuity has thus been radical, and not only the outcome of the normal flux that 
the ‘protective belts’ are in. It would seem that a core has never been formed, ideas 
have never fully consolidated. This is, according to Majone, an important difference 
to bear in mind. Policy cores can change in time due to crises – which can be 
induced by criticism or can come through the incremental loss of the core’s 
explanatory and creative capacity. But it can also be the case that cores never form. 
Each situation is indicative of different problems.  
In the Peruvian case, the lack of consolidation of a policy core appears to be related 
to the role that education has in the Peruvian state. The high levels of social 
inequality that have prevailed in the country throughout the process of post-colonial 
state development help explain the early portrayal that was offered of public 
education as an ‘education for the poor’. This, as will be discussed in the following 
pages, helps explain the lack of a better or stronger commitment towards the 
improvement of public education services. In a country in which, as seen in previous 
chapters, national development has generally been based, albeit tacitly, on a high 
level of exclusion for a vast majority of the population, thinking seriously about 
educational reform seems out of the question. Educational discourses can therefore 
be constantly reshuffled to express the personal views of policy makers, who 
sometimes  are more concerned with their positional advancement within the field of 
education policy (Ladwig 1994), than with promoting a more coherent set of 
educational policies.  
The extent to which this trend has strengthened due to the prevalence of a Neo 
Liberal economic and political model that doubts the role of the state in national 
development is something to have in mind. But such associations need to be 
handled with care since, as the chronology evidences, there is no clear cut ideology 
running through the reforms of the period under study. The first decade of Fujimori’s 
government could be associated with the prevalence of Neo Liberal trends in 
education, as reforms –which, however, were never implemented – aimed at market 
 141
oriented decentralisation80. But while these trends were consolidated in the 
economic sphere, opposition faced in the sphere of education led to the development 
of varied policy frameworks that cannot be entirely associated with the prevalence of 
Neo Liberalism. As was shown, during the second half of the nineties the emphasis 
on decentralisation and school autonomy decreased, extending only to the 
transference of very reduced responsibilities to schools and the emphasis on school 
involvement in the determination of curricular activities. At the same time, the 
centrepiece of reforms was curriculum and pedagogical change, that is, a concern 
with educational processes which are not typically seen as part and parcel of the 
Neo Liberal agenda in education. This was combined with more openly liberalising 
policies, such as those promoting private investment in education (e.g. the 882 
decree). But the prevalence of a specific reform direction inspired by Neo Liberal 
ideals is difficult to identify (see Narodowski and Nores 2003).  
Following this mixed trend in the application of reforms during the nineties, the 
change of government amid deep political turmoil set the focus of education and 
other reforms on the need to democratise politics and policy making. New trends in 
decentralisation – such as those promoted in the 2003 Law of Education - are based 
on a discourse against deep and entrenched corruption in the central government, 
and an emphasis on community participation rather than choice.  
The identity of education reforms is thus varied enough to require a more complex 
critique than the one which assumes the prevalence of a single theme within the 
multiplicity of reform and policy initiatives. The lack of coherence of reforms seems to 
show, however, that in Peruvian education, rather than more policies, what is 
required is a new political economy capable of guiding reforms and policies in 
desired directions, and of taking more seriously the reduction of social inequalities. 
These ideas will be discussed in the next chapter. For now, let us go into the 
interview data.  
 
                                                
80 For a thorough discussion of the characteristics of neoliberal policies in education and their spread 
throughout the Latin American region see Ball et al. (2003), especially Narodowski’s and Nores’ (2003) 
chapter, which discusses the variety and extent of the application of neoliberal policies in education. 
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CHAPTER 11 - THE INSTITUTIONAL MATRIX OF POLICY MAKING 
(THEMATIC ANALYSIS) 
The interviews focus extensively on the institutional context in which education policy 
making takes place and on the ensuing characteristics of the policy process. The 
portrayal interviewees offer matches characterisations of Latin American states 
which link institutional weakness to social and political developments in the region 
(O'Donnell 2002; 1998). Kobrin (1977), for instance, suggests that institutional 
weakness is the outcome of having imported modern governmental institutions, 
rather than the latter having emerged from changes at the social and civil level. 
Drawing on the interview data, the following pages will deal extensively with the 
institutional matrix in which education policy making takes place in Peru.  
The concept of institutions is being used in a broad sense, to refer to ‘the rules of the 
game in a society’ or, in other words, to the formal and informal ‘humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction’ (North 1990: 3). Institutions, in this 
perspective, constitute ‘the  framework within which human interaction takes place’ 
(North 1990: 4). As O’Donnell (1994) defines them, institutions are ‘regularized 
patterns of interaction that are known, practiced, and regularly accepted (if not 
necessarily normatively approved) by social agents who expect to continue 
interacting under the rules and norms formally or informally embodied in those 
processes’ (p.57). Institutions can ‘Sometimes, but not necessarily (...) become 
formal organizations: they materialize in buildings, seals, rituals, and persons in roles 
that authorize them to “speak” for the organization’ (O'Donnell 1994:57). 
In the present study, the focus is on the patterns of interaction related to the policy 
making process in education. The aim of the analysis presented in the following 
pages is to identify those patterns in order to understand the rules of the education 
policy making game. A central aspect of this on which the analysis focuses is the 
education process machinery or bureaucracy. Interviewees have pointed to 
limitations of the current bureaucratic organisation, seen, for instance, in the lack of a 
civil service career, which allows the employment of unqualified officials to the 
Ministry of Education, and which generally offers no clear mechanisms for 
advancement or change among public servants. The lack of formal procedures for 
appointing or firing officials not only weakens the legitimacy of appointed officials. It 
also seems to lead to the prevalence of other regularised patterns of interaction such 
as clientelism, given that there are no clear rules for advancement in the career 
ladder. Interviewees have also discussed the influence of politics over policy making, 
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the lack of clear procedures for the introduction, discussion, implementation and 
assessment of policies, and the processes through which new policies are generally 
introduced.  The following interview extract illustrates some of the points that will be 
analysed in the next pages: 
The issue is one of poverty. But this poverty is an institutional poverty, what has been 
described as Peru’s low institutional density. So our space, which should be 
saturated by institutions, is not, it is institutionally shallow. In this poor space, what 
we’ve got is a poor education, but poor not only in economic terms, but poor in 
conceptual terms, poor in terms of content, poor in terms of perception... the air is 
thin. Now, since the air is thin, there’s a kind of continuous need for more air, you’re 
all the time saying where, where, where, what can I get, what can I do, what do I 
change, what do I move. So there’s an effervescence in terms of looking for changes, 
which is a bit blind and a bit crazy. That’s the origin of discontinuity. (CASE 16 – 
Former ministerial adviser) 
 
This institutional poverty sets the framework for policy making in education, and 
generally weakens policies, as it allows for and promotes constant changes, and  
fails to provide a pool of resources from which policy makers can draw to carry out 
policies and reforms. The picture that emerges from these reflections offers an 
important entry point for understanding the problem of policy discontinuity. It is a 
portrayal of the institutional context in which education policy making takes place, of 
the rules that guide, limit or make possible the actions of policy makers. This section 
thus paves the way for an exploration of how individual agents, policy makers in this 
case, operate within existing institutional arrangements, how they overcome or help 
reproduce the existing limitations – an exploration that will be presented in the next 
section on policy narratives.  
 
 
11.1 THE PROCESS MACHINERY FOR THE MAKING OF EDUCATION POLICIES 
Some of the most serious difficulties to policy making in education seem to stem 
from the characteristics of the bureaucracy. The lack of a civil service career hinders 
the formation of a more stable administrative system which might help ensure a 
fundamental degree of continuity in policies. Ministerial teams change continuously, 
thus impeding the formation of an institutional memory and hindering a learning 
process which might guarantee some degree of incremental change. The lack of 
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clear criteria for entering or leaving the education administrative system, leads to the 
prevalence of clientelistic mechanisms which make the existing bureaucracy one of 
temporary pacts and alliances – a situation that strongly contributes to the radical 
discontinuity of education policies.  
Interviewee’s reflections on the institutional framework in which education policies 
are made dealt mainly with the characteristics of the education bureaucracy and the 
limitations that the current bureaucratic organization sets on policy making. In 
general, interviewees suggested that the lack of a well-established and well-
organised process machinery means that policies have little institutional support and 
can therefore be changed according to political and personal agendas. The problems 
in the education bureaucracy – which extend also to other policy sectors –  stem 
largely from the fact that Peru does not have a public service career, nor a clear set 
of mechanisms for entering (or leaving) the public service. In part, as interviewees 
suggest, this allows for the prevalence of clientelistic criteria in the selection of civil 
servants, and for the entrance into the Ministry of Education of individuals who 
sometimes lack preparation or commitment to their jobs, and who are often more 
concerned with the personal politics that will allow them to maintain or advance their 
positions than with the projects they are involved in.  
 
11.1.1 The context 
Understanding problems related to the education bureaucracy requires some 
consideration of the criteria by which officials, at different levels, are appointed to 
occupy administrative positions. Given the scope of this work, the following 
description will focus mainly on the appointment of officials for the central 
administration (i.e. the Ministry of Education), which is in charge of defining policies 
and ensuring their implementation. An idea of the problems faced in the bureaucracy 
is obtained precisely when considering the variety of mechanisms through which 
officials are appointed. 
The original structure for the appointment of administrative officials that existed 
before the structural reforms of the early nineties followed a common career ladder 
pattern. In the latter, teachers could progress until they sometimes reached 
administrative positions, generally at the meso-level of regional and local 
administration. Progress in the career ladder could also lead teachers to occupy 
positions in the central administration, particularly in middle and lower ranks.  
Although they were not specifically qualified for policy making, reaching policy 
 145
making positions was one of the best possible rewards in the teaching career. 
Appointed officials, like the rest of public servants, had job security. Although to 
some extent such a career ladder existed, the mechanisms for promotion were not 
so clear. Although officially based on formal criteria, the system was (and still is) 
permeated by clientelistic relations, which are often the basis for the selection of 
officials. To this we have to add the considerable expansion, that the educational 
administration, like all of the public sector, underwent since the 1970’s, and which 
rendered the system highly inefficient (World Bank 1994).  
Since the early 1990’s, however, with the beginning of Fujimori’s government, there 
was an explicit attempt to reform public administration, which was part of the 
structural reform package that was being applied. Many of the reforms that were 
carried out were promoted by institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, and 
were explicitly aimed at assigning the state a subsidiary role in national development, 
in the expectation that this would make it more efficient (see: World Bank 1994). In 
the MED, this meant massive reductions in the number of officials, made possible 
through changes in labour laws, which created flexible employment by eliminating 
work security, and through the introduction of redundancy packages for existing 
public servants. A small number of public servants refused to accept these packages 
and remained in the MED, but the overall administration was radically changed.  
The discourse of Fujimori’s government focused on ‘modernisation’ and technical 
decision-making, and although this remained so for the ten years of government, the 
discourse was undermined in practice by rampant corruption, which interfered with 
the aims of policies and reforms. These were, however, the principles that guided the 
re-development of the MED, in which, according to some interviewees there was an 
explicit attempt to build a ‘technocracy’. The new administration incorporated many 
officials with a managerial background – including a minister –  who were radically 
different from the traditional public servants. In most cases, these new ‘technical’ 
teams coexisted with members of the ‘old bureaucracy’, and, as will be seen, the 
differences between them were often a source of tension.  
After the reforms implemented by Fujimori’s government there are two main 
categories of administrative officials in the MED. Those who are part of the MED’s 
payroll and have longer term contracts, and those who work under short term 
contracts. The former are generally in the lower levels of the administration. Above 
them are the heads of office and other mid-rank officials who tend to work on short-
term contracts. Those who are part of the MED’s payroll constitute the more stable 
ministerial bureaucracy, but occupy positions of reduced responsibility, particularly in 
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relation to the definition and implementation of policies. Officials on short-term 
contracts tend to be specialists in educational issues who are in charge of 
conceptualising and developing policies. During the time of Fujimori, differences 
between these two types of administrative personnel were accentuated given that 
the salaries of officials who were part of the MED’s payroll came from the national 
budget, and were comparatively low to those of the specialists under contract, who 
were paid with money from international loans – such differences were justified 
because the low national salaries did not allow hiring qualified officials with the 
necessary technical skills. As will be seen below through some interview extracts, 
the extent to which this allowed for a real institutional strengthening (which was a 
central aim of the projects funded with international loans) is questionable, but the 
possibility of carrying out a reform without a higher paid technocracy also raises 
many questions.   
 
11.1.2 A feudal bureaucracy? 
 
… this is a country where the income curve can be associated with the curve of 
developed/acquired skills, capacities. We’re very unequal as a country, so the 
problem we have is that cycles take place when a group of the people which have 
the most capacity arrives, but they’re not the bureaucrats. What happens when... 
when they leave what remains is the wasteland of the bureaucracy. Our bureaucracy 
is not an elitist bureaucracy, an elite, it’s a bureaucracy of pacts... but it’s not like you 
have much to choose from... If we had a bigger middle class, a better middle class... 
but we have devoted to wipe ourselves out. There’s an issue there, an issue of how 
much stability can policies based on such a flat income structure have. (CASE 08 - 
Former Ministry of Education Official). 
 
The extract above illustrates some of the fundamental problems in the area of public 
administration which affect education policy making and the possible consolidation of 
policies. Firstly, the image of the bureaucracy as one of pacts suggests that policies 
are made in the context of temporal alliances that might change or come apart 
according to political movements. The idea of a bureaucracy of pacts indicates the 
prevalence of clientelistic and patronage relations, where personal loyalties take 
precedence over more democratic and transparent decision-making criteria, and 
where the appointment of officials responds largely to political considerations, rather 
than to principles of merit and competition.  
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The extract also supports the idea, discussed above, that the central bureaucracy of 
the MED is split into two levels, that of more stable, but sometimes less qualified, 
civil servants, and that of the experts, who are generally in charge of promoting 
reforms and new policies, but which change continuously.  
Finally, the extract also indicates that there clearly are wider structural issues related 
to the characteristics of the bureaucracy and that problems stem not only from the 
lack of more transparent career and accountability mechanisms. What the 
interviewee suggests is that the lack of a well-prepared bureaucracy is a 
consequence of the country’s polarised income structure, which does not offer a 
good source of well-qualified middle rank officials. This, according to the interviewee, 
creates a situation in which those with a good level of technical capacity tend to be in 
the less stable ranks of the MED, working under short term contracts and prone to 
being replaced when the higher levels (ministers, vice ministers) change –something 
that, as has been already shown, takes place at rather frequent intervals. 
The issues that the extract raises appear throughout most of the interviews with 
individuals who have had direct participation in the central administration:  
 
If there’s something I learned there [in the MED] is the need to promote the public 
career. Because, look, [people] came to me and told me ‘this one’s Fujimorist, sack 
him’, and I said no, I won’t sack him for being Fujimorist, because he’s the MED’s 
hard drive. So, how do we protect those hard drives? It’s only through a public 
career. So that you can change viceministers and ministers a hundred times if you 
want, but [in such a way] that they don’t have the power to change those people. 
That’s fundamental, because that gives you continuity (CASE 11 – Former vice-
minister of education.). 
 
This description suggests that political criteria, which in most democracies are limited 
to the selection of the higher ranks of policy sectors, are here extended to the 
selection of middle ranks, and this substantially hinders continuity. This trend was 
particularly strong in the transition between Fujimori’s and Toledo’s governments, 
due to the shift from authoritarianism and corruption to democracy. Most importantly, 
however, is the interviewee’s reflection on how such changes undermine the MED’s 
institutional memory and thus the continuity of reforms. Another interviewee pointed 
in a similar direction: 
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... the MED is in an unfortunate situation. I don’t know about other sectors, but it is 
indicative of the fragility of the state. Over here there’s no civil service, so there’s no 
teams that prepare to take over the MED’s direction. There’s no schools where teams 
for the MED get prepared. And besides, instead of being a space that gathers the 
best professionals in the country, because supposedly the MED has the leadership in 
education it’s an employment centre to which people get through friendship, 
sympathy, political recommendations, through political pressures. And it’s difficult to 
direct things from an organisation with such a professional composition. (CASE 15 – 
Fomer Ministry of Education Official )  
 
Looking more into the way in which these issues affect the policy process, one 
interviewee suggested that: 
 
The concept of ‘feud’ still prevails when one looks at the way in which things are 
done in the MED, and I say this because I’ve often used it.  
The problem with the MED’s ‘feudal’ organisation is not necessarily that there’s 
certain attributes of authority that have to be respected. One problem is, for instance, 
that the higher spheres supported a discourse that could be resisted below, which is 
actually a violation of the feudal laws.  
[In another case], the feudal power of the primary education office [for instance]  
wanted to subordinate the feudal power of the teacher training office to make it work 
under it’s own ideas and conceptions. (CASE 18 - Former Ministry of Education 
Official) 
 
This extract opens a different, although related line of analysis, which suggests that 
as a consequence of the social organisation through which officials are recruited to 
the MED, the way in which the central administration operates is also caught up in a 
highly politicised logic where there is a prevalence of patronage criteria for the 
appointment of personnel – a trend identified by Grindle (2004) for the whole of the 
region. When read in relation to Ladwig’s (1994) ideas on the possibility of analysing 
policy decisions as the outcome of social relations within the field of education policy, 
the idea of the MED being organised according to a ‘feudal’ pattern opens very 
relevant lines of analysis that can help understand the problem of policy 
discontinuity. In the feudal model, the actions of groups and individuals often 
respond to criteria that differ radically from concerns with outcomes. It is the 
competition for favours, or the struggles between ‘feudal’ groups that determines 
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decisions. In this sense, policy actions can be read ‘as strategies by which players 
defend or advance their positions [within the field of education policy’, where the 
‘stances educational policy players take... are related to the player’s position within 
the field of education policy’ (Ladwig 1994: 345), rather than to concerns with the 
application of relevant policies. 
Although a closer analysis of what goes on in other instances of the policy making 
process goes beyond the scope of the present study, it is relevant to note that 
according to some interviewees, similar problems of politicisation, clientelism and 
corruption seem to take place in other levels of the educational bureaucracy.  
 
80percent of the budget is administered in the regions. But in the regions there are 
very serious problems, of corruption, very high, very high. And when contracts and 
the official appointments existed it was worse, because each appointment was 
negotiated. Then there’s quality problems with the personnel that’s there [in the 
regions]. I mean, there’s no teams… in the rest of the country the teams that are in 
the education system are very very bad. So you have those problems. You can 
decide whatever you want over here, but those people don’t have the capacity to 
implement anything. That’s what worries me about regionalization, because the 
transference of more responsibilities, including some pedagogical ones, is to those 
people [CASE 02 –  Former Minister of Education]. 
 
According to this extract, the problems faced by the administration in the central level 
are reproduced and even intensified in the case of regional administration. This is 
particularly worrying at a time when so many expectations are being put over the 
process of decentralization, and calls for a thorough revision of the processes 
through which policies are made.   
 
11.1.3 Formal limitations on policy making 
Interviewees pointed to the limitations stemming from the existing legal framework, 
which sets a high level of ‘red tape’ that slows down decision making and thus 
hinders the consolidation of policies. The following extract illustrates this point: 
 
Administration processes in the state are very complicated, slow and… what 
happens? Because of that you don’t have spending capacity. And we didn’t manage 
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to reform that. Many thousands, millions, were lost only because of that. So I think we 
erred in that. (CASE 11 – Former vice-minister of education) 
 
In public administration you have to do a public contest [hire people or buy goods], 
publish it in the news paper, invite organisations to participate and a lot of things. 
What this generates... and I assure you it has been an enormous problem... [in a ] a 
small project, of only five million dollars, more than a year had gone by and only 
100thousand dollars had been spent.  (CASE 03 – Former Ministry of Education 
Official) 
 
The slow pace at which policies are approved and set in motion due to the 
complicated legal framework implies that there is little time for them to gain 
momentum and the possibility of achieving consolidation. More often than not, there 
are changes in the teams responsible for policies before the latter have been fully 
approved or regulated, and this makes it easier for incoming teams to change 
direction. The complexity of the legal framework for policy making also gives way to 
the influence of political interests, which can often block or slow down the approval of 
policies.   
In the time of Fujimori when there was a higher level of continuity, that is, when the 
MECEP project was set in motion, such difficulties were partly bridged by 
establishing a parallel administrative system. The need to do so, which was criticised 
by the new teams that entered with Toledo’s government, stemmed partly from the 
requirements of the international organisations that funded the project, but partly also 
from a concern with the possibility of carrying out the project within the State’s legal 
framework. This is illustrated in the following comment:  
 
If we go through the administrative side, there’s a clause in the loans that demands 
having separate accounting and registries, and the best way to do it, in my opinion, is 
having a separate unit from the central administration. Because when you get 
resources assigned, in the schedules that come from the MEF, you get only one 
figure from public treasury. So the administration can decide to use those funds for 
one thing or another, for one programme or another. If you don’t have a sufficiently 
strong administration, that is, with capacity to say no to certain things that the 
administrations in office might want, and I mean the ministers and the---, then there’s 
a very high risk that the money which should be initially destined to investment will be 
destined to other things. Now, that risk hasn’t been minimised, what’s more, it’s still 
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latent in the MED today, when loans aren’t being used to create capacities.  (CASE 
03 – Former Ministry of Education Official ) 
 
According to other interviewees, this system of having two administrations did not 
generate capacities within the MED to appropriately run projects.  
 
They were a group of capable professionals, they had everything from porters, 
chauffeurs, accountant, lawyer, all theirs. They were a kind of… I called it the colonial 
enclave inside of the MED. I called the banks and told them, gentlemen, I understand 
why this MECEP phenomenon has happened, but it has to end. Because supposedly 
one of the aims of the cooperation is to institutionally develop the MED. (CASE 02 – 
Former Minister of Education) 
 
The problem with these decisions – i.e. that of establishing a parallel administration, 
and that of dissolving it - was that they both hindered institutional learning. In one 
case it was because the system of administration and decision making was not 
articulated to the more stable process machinery, and long lasting changes were 
therefore unlikely. In the other, because the change from the existing system was 
abrupt and did not take into account the limitations that had led to the establishment 
of such a ‘solution’ to existing problems.  
 
11.1.4 Transference of ideas 
The possibility of institutional learning also appears to be weakened by the 
processes through which ministerial authorities are changed, and which determine 
the degree to which ideas are transferred between one team and another. As 
discussed above, the lack of a more structured bureaucracy and, generally, of a 
‘thicker’ set of institutions means that ministerial elites have almost absolute power to 
impose their will and views over policies. It is the ministers and their close set of 
advisers who define whether new policies are to be introduced and whether existing 
policies are to be continued or not, and, as will become clearer in the narrative 
analysis presented in the following section, such decisions often respond to personal 
views and agendas. These points are illustrated in the following extract: 
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I think that each new minister has the obligation, and this should be in his contract, of 
having meetings and interviews with previous officials and try to understand what the 
MED was doing when he got in. Because they come with a series of assumptions, 
95percent of which, I tell you, are false assumptions about what was being done. So 
they introduce innovative ideas, which are part of the common sense but are creative 
and all, and they find that they were already being carried out. But it wasn’t them who 
were carrying them out, which irritates them profoundly. In this context there should 
be a more ordered transference, but responsibility should fall on the new teams and 
not on the old teams. (CASE 16 – Ministry of Education Official)  
 
The extract points to the lack of transference of ideas between ministerial teams, and 
also to the difficulties that the lower-rank officials experience, as they see new teams 
reinventing policies once and again, rather than supporting or improving existing 
policy lines. This tendency seems to be encouraged by the inexistence of a better 
structured system of party politics, which could provide a more stable source of ideas 
and constraints over policy makers, who would have to follow party policy lines when 
entering the executive. At the moment, the weak party structure, which is dominated 
by independent movements and alliances that form for electoral purposes, does not 
constitute a source of shared ideas for policy makers. This is at the root of the 
existence of radical discontinuities even between policy makers who, in theory, have 
the same party allegiances, but who, in practice, work on the basis of their own 
particular views of how things should be done, rather than on the basis of a shared 
party ideology.  This also accounts for the changes of emphasis in policy lines that 
were shown in the chronology of policies and reforms, and which illustrates how 
during one same governmental period policies can change from an emphasis on 
choice and performance-based funding, to an emphasis on pedagogical changes or 
the improvement of school infrastructure, without there being a continuous line of 
thought permeating all levels and areas of decision-making. These points are 
illustrated by the following extract: 
 
(Int.) But is there a coordination stage [between the incoming and the leaving 
minister]? 
Very minimal, very brief. 
(Int.) And do you think that would facilitate things a bit in terms of continuity? 
Look, I think that’d be important the day that a party system that processes an 
ordered change from one government to the next in the state is established. Once 
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that wheel gets in motion, not in education but in all sectors, that will be useful. 
Meanwhile the importance of that is relative. (CASE 02 – Former Minister of 
Education)  
 
The trend towards discontinuity and the lack of transference of ideas between 
ministerial teams is also encouraged by the existing system for appointing officials. 
Most interviewed ministers said they were only appointed with very short notice, and 
so they had to assume office without having had much time to prepare or to 
coordinate and discuss things with the leaving teams. Besides, there is no 
institutionalised process or stage for new teams to discuss things with the teams that 
remain in office after the higher rank officials change. Another element that adds to 
this is that, as seen above, the change of ministers usually occurs amidst political 
crises, in which governments face opposition or their legitimacy weakens, and thus 
attempt to regain strength by appointing figures that might elicit sympathy or convey 
a stronger, more efficient, image of governmental action – this has been the case 
particularly during the government of Toledo, but was a trend also present during the 
time of Fujimori, where, for instance, we saw how the appointment of minister 
Garcia-Escudero responded exclusively to the electoral strategy.  
 
 
11.1.5 Difficulties in Inter-sectorial coordination 
An issue that emerged from the interviews was that of lack of coordination between 
sectors in the executive, which was described as a source of difficulties and 
discontinuities in policy making. In particular, interviewees reflected on the limitations 
imposed by the Ministry of Finance, which sometimes limits the MED’s scope for 
action. The following is particularly illustrative of this: 
 
I think that in that sense the National Council for Education has a clear notion that the 
MED isn’t really the main political actor, not for teachers’ policies nor to get a better 
budget for the sector, or for any of the important issues.  
(Int.) It is not, how come? 
Because the MED hasn’t got much capacity to decide about the fundamental things, 
that is, about [budgetary] resources, about priorities, about the possibility to develop 
certain actions together with other sectors.  
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(Int.) However [the MED] does have the capacity to say ‘we’re not doing this and 
we’re doing that’? 
One could see it that way. Or you could understand that when the Ministry of 
Education does that it is actually because there’s someone else that is telling it that it 
cannot do anything else. When the MED signs the 40 points with the Teachers’ 
Union, and then doesn’t comply with them, it’s not so much because the MED doesn’t 
want to comply, but because those [agreements] in which there are resources 
involved, the MEF tells it that it wont give it the money, or it tells [the MED] that it has 
to take that out from its own budget]. (case 13 – Member of the National Council of 
Education) 
 
The extracts suggest that the MED and the MEF operate according to different and 
often contradictory assumptions, and that when conflict emerges in relation to 
specific issues, the MEF tends to impose itself. This view is also endorsed by 
another interviewee according to whom: 
 
At the end of the day, when the [national] budget is discussed, for instance, the 
budget’s ugly duckling is the education sector, isn’t it? Because the minister of 
finance, I don’t whom he listens to. I get the impression that he doesn’t listen to 
president Toledo, but that he listens to the recommendations of international 
organisations like the World Bank and the IMF, and that’s what prevails in the long 
term. (CASE 17 – Member of the Teachers’ Union) 
 
In the future it would be useful to analyse the discourse of policy makers in the 
finance sector and compare it to those of the education sector, as to determine the 
source of conflict between the two. From some informal conversations with an official 
in the Ministry of Finance, for instance, I could gather that the MEF generally views 
problems in education in terms of inefficient spending, and even of incompetence on 
the part of the MED’s officials. While the MED is trying to increase the education 
budget to fund reforms and improvements in crucial areas such as infrastructure and 
teachers’ salaries, the MEF is trying to reduce spending. This might be an indicator 
that the influence of the economic orthodoxy associated with the World Bank and the 
IMF might be higher in and come through the finance sector, rather than through the 
education sector, and also that some of the conflicts between the two sectors might 
stem from differences in fundamental conceptions about the state and its role in 
social and national development.  
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 Up to now we have seen some of the difficulties that current institutional 
arrangements set on the making of education policies due to flaws in the process 
machinery through which policies are made. In the previous pages I have discussed 
the effects that the lack of a civil service career, together with the prevalence of 
clientelistic mechanisms for the appointment of officials and a rigid legal framework 
that slows down and obstructs the policy process have on the making of education 
policies. As has been shown, such an institutional matrix makes the transference of 
ideas and any sort of institutional learning that might give more continuity to policies 
almost impossible. Now I want to turn on to the policy process itself. The analysis 
offered in the following pages will be especially concerned with the processes of 
policy deliberation, which as was shown in the previous chapter, are a fundamental 
source of strength for policies in democratic contexts (Fischer 2003).   
 
11.2 THE FORMULATION OF EDUCATION POLICIES: DELIBERATION OR 
IMPOSITION? 
 
As some policy theorists highlight (Fischer 2003; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; Majone 
1989), the processes through which policies are arrived at are as important, if not 
even more, than the policies themselves and the outcomes that they might yield. 
This appears to be particularly so in the context of democratic governments, in which 
open discussion of policy options and a disposition towards dialogue, deliberation 
and accountability are seen as crucial requirements.  
Many interviewees pointed to weaknesses in the process though which policies are 
made in Peru. In most cases, it was suggested that policies are not based on an 
essential degree of consensus. A further exploration of this idea shows that the 
predominant attitude in policy making is alien to a deliberative disposition – this also 
matches the narrative analysis that is presented in the next section (Fischer 2003). 
This, as will be shown, weakens the legitimacy of policies and breeds discontinuity.  
A first reading of the interview data shows two lines of reflection which relate, 
respectively, to the characteristics of policy making in Fujimori’s and Toledo’s 
governments. In relation to the former, interviewees suggest that there was a lack of 
disposition on the part of the government towards public deliberation and 
accountability in relation to policies. This, they suggest was concomitant with 
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Fujimori’s authoritarian government. In contrast, Toledo’s government, and the 
victory of democracy with which it is associated, is portrayed as having brought 
about a stronger disposition towards dialogue. This followed a tendency already 
evidenced since the transition government, which was responsible for initiatives like 
the National Consultation for Education. 
A second reading however, brings into question this rather straight forward approach 
and suggests that problems relate not only to regime characteristics (i.e. 
authoritarianism or democracy), but have to do with such things as the disposition of 
both governments and the education community and broader civil society towards 
deliberation of and compromise with policy options. In this reading, it appears that 
the problem is not one of consensus building, but, rather, one of the practical 
commitments that such consensuses generate. This seems to suggest that the 
notion of what a consensus is must be scrutinised. 
The following pages trace these two readings. A chronological analysis of the 
processes by which policy decisions were made that focuses on the deliberation of 
policies will be combined with a more reflective reading that considers the 
conceptions of policy making which seem to underlie the problems that interviewees 
point to.  
 
11.2.1 The Fujimori Years 
The following extract expresses a widespread view among education specialists and 
policy makers who are critical of the policies of Fujimori: 
 
in the time of Fujimori there was no policy negotiation. But it was the time... precisely 
because of the weakness of human resources in the MED, in which consultants and 
international organisations did whatever they wanted. The IDB and the WB, the 
Spanish cooperation, they did and undid, the GTZ, they did whatever they wanted in 
the MED, that is, there was no proposal from the country. (CASE 12 – Member of the 
National Council of Education) 
 
The first statement here is the most relevant. According to the interviewee ‘there was 
no policy negotiation’. This fits the view that Fujimori’s government acted unilaterally, 
without seeking consent from the broader civil society. This kind of attitude was 
largely feasible because of Fujimori’s majority in parliament after 1992, which meant 
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that policies could be approved without the need for broad deliberation. The 
interviewee then goes on to suggest that this lack of deliberation entailed a great 
degree of slack in the policy process, which allowed for a largely unmediated 
influence of international agencies on the definition of policy options81. 
The prevalence of this view, which suggests that there was no negotiation among the 
broader education community, is confirmed by an interviewee who worked in the 
MED during the time of Fujimori: 
 
we did do things based on a principle of authority, not an authoritarian principle, but a 
principle of authority: this is the MED, the MED has certain hierarchical positions vis a 
vis the teachers for instance, or vis a vis curricular decisions, which is normative, and 
has the right to be so, and in the exercise of such rights some decisions were made. 
Complaints from the “civil society”, at that moment, were because they weren’t being 
consulted. (CASE 16 – Ministry of Education Official) 
 
Note here, in particular, the conception of the MED as having ‘a hierarchical 
position’, which, as the interviewee suggests, entitles it to proceed not only without 
consultation, but without necessarily having to justify chosen courses of action82. 
This image of lack of consultation during the time of Fujimori is tempered by other 
interviewees: 
 
(interviewer) So [in the early years of Fujimori] there was a logic of trying to find some 
degree of consensus...? 
It wasn’t a consensus in every level, for instance by opening big forums, but the fact 
is that the MED worked with a lot of people... including Foro, it worked with Gloria 
Helfer, Juan Ansion... At least we tried to find out or get some ideas about how 
people perceived this. (CASE 03 – Former Ministry of Education Official) 
 
... with Fujimori’s government... I participated in an inter-agency mission that was 
conformed by the World Bank, UNDP, GTZ and UNESCO in 1992. It’s such a well-
done diagnosis that it’s still a reference source. But more than the diagnosis itself I 
think that the interesting thing was the process generated by that mission, the 
                                                
81 I will later discuss the role and influence of international agencies in more detail.  
82 This contrasts strongly with Majone’s (1989) conception of policy making, in which justification of 
decisions plays a fundamental role in the legitimation and possible consolidation of policies.  
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dialogue with the civil society. (CASE 07 – Former Ministerial adviser and member of 
the National Council of Education) 
 
It’s very difficult to take away the pointer that says ‘dictatorship’ to a section of 
governmental action. It’s not true that we didn’t try to sow consensus. What’s more, 
we have managed to, and this is documented and you can ask almost anyone, we 
have managed to get the people from Foro to design our things, and then they 
attacked them and stopped their names from being published. Why? Because they 
didn’t want to be muddled with a pointer that said ‘dictatorial’. So we have dedicated 
a lot of time. Could that battle be won? I’m not sure that it could have been won. 
Honestly, I’m not. I think we dedicated all the time we could have dedicated to that. In 
my view, dedicating more time to that wouldn’t have rendered much more. I don’t 
think that mistakes have to do with us not making enough efforts to persuade. As I 
said, we won all discussions... (CASE 08 – Former Ministry of Education Official) 
 
These comments suggest that, at least during the first stages of planning the reforms 
that took place under the MECEP project, there was an explicit attempt on the part of 
the MED to engage in a dialogue with the education community. This idea is partly 
supported by available documents which evidence the participation of a variety of 
actors in the discussion of policy alternatives during the early nineties (Ministry of 
Education of Peru 1993).  
The final extract is particularly illustrative of the approach to deliberation that seems 
to have prevailed at the time of Fujimori. The interviewee talks about ‘winning 
battles’, an image that conveys a lack of openness to competing ideas. On the other 
hand, the extract also points towards the difficulties for achieving consensus in a 
dictatorial context, which not only blocks participation in public discussions, but 
supposes that there are no clear binding forces to sustain agreements.  
This latter point is supported by the following interviewee, who suggests that policy 
deliberations did not entail a compromise on the part of the government, which was 
not overly concerned with the democratic legitimation of policies:  
 
I think that work [the diagnosis that preceded the MECEP programme] was very 
technical, because not only were there people who knew about the subject involved, 
but also experts who knew about the issues were brought. Apart from this the 93 
school census was done with the donation. Each group produced a report which had 
details on a series of activities and which prioritised what had to be done.  
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... at the end of all these studies there was a thing called the closure seminar, to 
determine policies... it was deemed necessary to work in curriculum, educational 
materials, teacher training, management, funding, strengthening of the MED. 
That was very funny because in the closure... there was a mission and just at that 
point there was a change of minister. That mission imposed the issue of 
infrastructure, which, although it had appeared as a necessary issue, at that moment 
the government was very worried about having an infrastructure component.  
And that was almost a personal view of president Fujimori, because he said, 
according to the people who were close to him and who told us, that investment 
projects are actually only visible in time when they have an infrastructure component. 
 (CASE 03 – Former Ministry of Education Official) 
 
The interviewee suggests that an initial attitude towards open discussion and 
agreement of policy choices did not lead to a policy settlement, as the agreements 
were modified according to the president’s personal and political views. This is an 
indication that agreements, or consensus, do not operate as binding mechanisms to 
guide the actions of policy makers. Without appropriate institutional constraints policy 
makers can dismiss agreements and change policies at will, thus generating strong 
discontinuities that hinder the formation and application of more coherent policies.  
Once the MECEP programme began the MED’s attitude towards deliberation of 
policy options was, according to one of the interviewees: 
 
tense and with little dialogue. 
(...) I cannot generalise in relation to academic institutions, but I think that from many 
of them there has been a willingness to participate 
[But] the MED’s practice has always been, and that’s still the case, to build 
commissions within the Ministry [rather than promote open participation] (CASE 19 – 
Member of the National Council of Education).  
 
This idea is supported by a policy maker from the time of Fujimori: 
 
we allowed ourselves to say that we didn’t want the consensus of mediocrity, that we 
wanted a serious discussion, then we would discuss. 
 160
(...)what we have to learn is that we mustn’t dismiss anyone, we have to listen, we 
have to see what is going on in the scenario before making decisions, and we have 
to recover the things that are worthwhile (CASE 08 – Former Ministry of Education 
Official). 
 
The last phrase in particular, in which the interviewee is being self-critical, implies 
that during the time of Fujimori there was not an attitude of open dialogue and 
debate of policies. Although initially this might have given the government 
considerable slack to go ahead with it’s reform programme, in the long term, this 
non-deliberative attitude seems to have weakened policies, as the lack of 
participation of the wider education community in policy deliberations was one of the 
main arguments for putting an end to most of the policies carried on during the time 
of Fujimori.  
 
11.2.3 Policy making under Toledo 
 
The collapse of Fujimori’s regime opened up the promise of democracy once again. 
The transition government which followed put the emphasis not only on the need to 
have fair elections, but also on the need to democratise decision making and make it 
more transparent. In relation to education, this was the spirit that led to the National 
Consultation for Education, which was supposed to serve as a basis for the 
development of education policies in the following years. The Consultation was a first 
attempt to base policies on broader social participation, partly as a way of stopping 
the unilateral action of governments based on merely political criteria, and partly to 
guarantee a greater degree of sustainability of policies. This effort was later followed 
by other initiatives carried out by the government of Toledo, such as the creation of 
the National Council for Education and the National Agreement – a project that aims 
to gather representatives from all political parties and trade-unions for joint 
discussion and agreement of policy options for the country.  
The effects on policy making of this willingness to engage in public debates, 
however, does not seem to have had all the desirable effects on actual policy 
processes: 
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(...) in the transition government there was an attempt to generate what they called a 
national agreement for education, and the strategy that was chosen was to do a big, 
massive, consultation, that would give it legitimacy, as a support and social backing, 
for the proposals that came out of the consultation, and at the same time have a 
commission of experts 
(...) [Once] the transition government is over that disappears completely. 
Lynch did comply with publishing the materials.... But the high administration of the 
MED, the new high administration, completely ignored that previous process. So, the 
supposed legitimacy of policies proposed on the basis of the consultation and the 
consensus really isn’t such. (CASE 14 – Member of theNational Council of 
Education) 
 
The idea that Lynch did not follow the lines proposed through the Consultation is 
confirmed by a member of Lynch’s team: 
 
(int.) The National Consultation for Education...? 
That’s it... It’s as if that had ended up being a bit ambiguous, that’s the impression I 
got. I mean... I don’t think that the new [Lynch] administration was against those 
agreements, it considered them good agreements, and it took some of them, I think, 
but it didn’t enhance the agreements, you see? ... I didn’t get the impression that 
there was anyone against them, but... it seems to me that what was done previously 
wasn’t translated with so much vigour... (CASE 04 – Former ministerial adviser). 
 
The two extracts above show that the process of public deliberation can take place at 
a formal level, and does not necessarily work to bind or guide the actions of policy 
makers. Some interviewees suggested that the problem with such attempts was that 
they were flawed from the beginning: 
 
When you say I’ll ask, but you ask in a completely... I don’t know, a completely open, 
vague and flexible way...  You’ll always find people that think what you want people 
to think. So you can always put, quote textually what a certain teacher in a focus 
group said, no? Because it illustrates what you want to illustrate. But what someone 
else said, which might be the opposite, you won’t include it. (CASE 13 – Member of 
the National Council for Education) 
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The National Consultation, have you seen it? The National Consultation for 
Education was an open questionnaire sent to every body, and people... like one goes 
to the supermarket and says I want this and that, then they put everything together 
and elaborated a list of priorities. And guess what came out? I want more teachers, 
better salaries, better libraries, better desks. That is, if you’re going to do... and you 
ask people, 60thousand questionnaires, what they want from education... That’s not 
the way to do an agreement. (CASE 12 – Member of the National Council of 
Education) 
 
The interviewees’ criticisms focus on the open procedures on which the consultation 
was based which did allow agreements to operate as binding mechanisms. 
Furthermore, they suggest that the procedures for interpreting the consultation data 
were flawed and expressed the particular views of those responsible for the 
consultation. This, in part, might account for the later dismissal of the agreements 
(not only in Lynch’s administration but also in those of his successor). But the 
problem of linking the outcome of deliberations with policy decisions seems to go 
beyond methodological issues. One interviewee, for instance, suggests that there 
have been other similar cases, which might indicate problems in the process of 
political representation, and the compromises the latter entails between both elected 
representatives and citizens: 
 
with the APRA government [in the second half of the eighties]...in Meche Cabanilla’s 
[ministerial] administration a series of very respectable ideologues and intellectuals 
were hired to imagine an educational change; this was motivated by what Matos Mar, 
who conducted the project, had called the ‘popular overflow’. The commission was 
formed by Matos Mar, Luis Jaime Cisneros... very valuable people that worked for a 
year. You’re not going to publish this, but an interesting thing is that apparently 
there’s not a single document left about this. I’ve gone to the sources, even to Meche 
[Cabanillas], to ask for it. She must have it, but there’s no sign of it. (CASE 06 – 
Former ministerial adviser and member of the National Council of Education) 
 
This extract suggests that the problem is not that there have not been attempts to 
discuss educational issues, and possible education reforms, but, rather, that the 
product of such efforts does not materialise into actual policies.  
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The comments on the policy process during Fujimori’s and Toledo’s regimes 
suggest, in the first case, a lack of concern with validation of policy options through 
open debate – which is explained by the government’s authoritarian characteristics; 
and, in the second case, when such concerns for deliberation were high, the 
comments point to the weakness of agreements as binding mechanisms for the 
actions of policy makers. In relation to this, it is relevant to note that according to 
some interviewees, being under an authoritarian context allowed for some continuity 
in policies, while according to others, the emphasis on consultation that existed when 
democracy was regained slowed the policy process, making the consolidation of 
policies difficult and giving way to discontinuities.  
 
In education dictatorships bring good luck. The flourishing periods in education are 
Odria, Velasco [both military dictators]... (CASE 08 – Former Ministry of Education 
Official ) 
(...) we lost a lot of time on debates. A lot of time. That is, we paid to much attention 
to the inertias and to the force of those inertias.   
I guess this was related to the democratic opening? 
Yes. I would have created, mandum militari [by military rule], the pre-school 
education direction and the technical education direction. To start with. Then I would 
have done the rural unification much faster. But there my friend ‘X’ who comes from 
NGOs wanted to please everyone, and he discusses again and again, and [in the 
end] I went out of the meetings, because I couldn’t stand--- [They were] unbearable, I 
can’t stand that. (CASE 11 -  Former vice-minister of Education) 
 
These comments, together with the previous ones, suggest that a straightforward 
reading that identifies positive consequences for policy making of open debate needs 
to be tempered by further considerations. What does it mean that ‘in education 
dictatorships bring good luck’?, and the reflection in the second extract that it would 
have been better to act by ‘military rule’. Is this so? Or is it rather a matter of 
problems in the conception of what public deliberation is, what it should entail, and, 
more fundamentally perhaps, a matter of problems in the representative system in a 
country like Peru? Some interviewees offered reflections in relation to this: 
 
Why? It’s difficult to say. You know, you know what plays a strong role in these 
things, it’s ahhh... the lack of national aims, but not only as discourses, but... 
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Because as that they exist... As discourses they exist. But of assimilated national 
aims, that is, that have been adopted by the political elite if you want, by the political 
and intellectual elite, I think. That is, the intellectual and political elite, and I don’t 
know whether also businesses and labourers, but at least the political and intellectual 
elite, to talk in the broadest terms... (CASE 04 – Former ministerial adviser) 
 
In essence, policies should come from the people, express themselves through a 
representation system, attain cleanliness through a legislative process that really 
defends what is being proposed in a technical law, and finally be expressed in the 
acts of the citizenry, which does what it demanded. But in Peru that circuit is false, it’s 
not like that. Our representation system is not a representation system. (CASE 16 – 
Ministry of Education Official) 
 
The first extract suggests that one of the reasons why agreements do not materialise 
is because they fall into a vacuum of no ‘national aims’, that is, they do not fit within a 
broader framework that could give them strength and sustain them over time. The 
second interviewee reflects on the problems of political representation in Peru. 
O’Donnell’s (1994) ideas in relation to the ‘delegative’ character of many Latin 
American democracies which ‘rest on the premise that whoever wins election to the 
presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the 
hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term in office’ 
(p.59) show some of the limitations of the system of political representation. The 
interviewee’s comment, however, suggests a rather static understanding of 
representation processes, where there can be a perfect identity between 
representatives and citizens, and which contrasts with more dynamic forms of 
representation based on an ongoing relation between citizens and representatives, 
and which might be the necessary requisite for agreements, consultations and 
consensus to have an impact on the course of policies (Barnett 2003).  
From a different perspective, and although this might imply a bit of a departure from 
the interview extracts presented in this section - but, as will be shown later in the 
policy narratives, is related to the conceptions of the policy process that prevail 
among policy makers – the understanding that interviewees appear to have of policy 
deliberation could be taken as a limitation on the possibilities of the process. In most 
cases, the conception of policy deliberation seems to have a rather formal character. 
It appears as a moment in policy making that is considered necessary for policies to 
have some legitimacy, rather than an ongoing process that might indicate a degree 
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of openness on the part of policy makers to incorporate new ideas, re-evaluate 
desirable courses of action and take on criticisms coming from the education 
community or the citizenry. Such a degree of openness might provide ongoing 
support for policies and fend-off radical discontinuities.  
 
 
11.4 EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON POLICY MAKING: THE ROLE OF 
INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES 
 
The influence of international agencies on education policies has been particularly 
evident during the period under study, as most reforms have been funded through 
loan programmes. This makes it especially important to consider the extent and 
mode of influence that international agencies have had on policies, as well as the 
impact of this influence on policy discontinuities. 
Although there are discrepancies in interviewee’s opinions about the role of 
international agencies – specifically the World Bank (WB) and the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) – on the definition of policies, most interviewee’s suggest 
that the mode and extent of such an influence is dependent on the characteristics of 
the Peruvian state, rather than on a single-minded approach on the side of 
multilateral agencies, as some of the existing literature suggests. Coraggio (1995), 
for instance, criticises the ‘usual clichés that assign exclusive responsibility over 
national education policies to a supposedly monolithic World Bank’, and suggests the 
need to analyse the ways in which international agencies interact with different 
states. Reflecting on the diversity of policies and outcomes that exist within the policy 
templates used in WB’s projects, he suggest that states have got a considerable 
space for exerting their agency within the constraints and pressures of international 
organisations. This, however, does not imply that the assumptions under which the 
WB and other international organisations operate shouldn’t be questioned and 
refined, as they surely help define much of the discursive arena in which education 
policies are made83.    
 
                                                
83 For a detailed account of the World Bank’s conceptions in education policy see Coraggio (1995) and  
Bonal (2002). 
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11.4.1 Imposition or lack of alternative views? 
The widespread view that international funding agencies impose specific policy lines 
on developing countries was contested by most interviewees, who suggested that 
rather than a forceful imposition, the application of pre-defined reform lines depends 
on each country’s capacity for negotiation and for coming up with alternative 
proposals. The following extracts illustrate the common view among policy makers 
and education specialists: 
 
More than a problem with agencies there’s a problem of weakness in the Peruvian 
state.   
(...) the main issue is that the Peruvian state is not enough counterpart as to compel 
agencies to march to the country’s rhythm and not the other way round. (CASE 07 – 
Former ministerial adviser and member of the National Council of Education) 
 
(1) I’d also say that the [the level of external influences coming from international 
agencies] is a lot less important to the extent that depending on the elites that might 
get in on one side there will be better negotiation with the international organisations 
or there will be no negotiation. (CASE 08 – Former Ministry of Education Official) 
 
[the] influence [of international agencies] depends on your own weakness. Because 
as soon as they see that you have capable teams and that you’re not going yield, 
they yield. (CASE 11- Former vice-minister of education) 
 
If the banks have more influence it is because of the MED’s weakness, the 
country’s weakness. In countries where ministries have had more institutional 
strength and capacity to propose, a leadership, a stronger professional capacity, the 
banks have had to support what the countries wanted to do. But here, sure, during 
the first part of Fujimori’s government, up to 96/97, there wasn’t much interest to 
make changes in education, no? Education was not a priority, definitely, and there 
was no interest... so there was pressure because the [World] Bank wanted to allocate 
its money, there were processes that were already in motion in other countries, 
important reform processes, in Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, everywhere, Argentina... 
(CASE 13 – Member of the National Council of Education) 
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The extracts point to various issues and open up a rich line of reflection in relation to 
the characteristics of the Peruvian state and its ability (or lack thereof) to come up 
with a coherent national development project which might constitute and alternative 
to the proposals of international agencies like the WB and the IDB.  This standpoint 
is similar to certain outlooks on the effects of globalisation on different states. 
Hobson’s and Ramesh’s (2002) thesis, for instance, suggests that ‘globalisation 
makes to states what state’s make of it’, and, following interviewee’s reflections 
something similar could be said about the effect of international funding agencies, 
that is, that agencies make to states what states make of them84. This thesis stands 
in a middle ground between the more rigid structuralist perspective that seems to 
dominate critiques of the role of international agencies in developing countries, and 
which often portray states as being weak and unable to exert any kind of agency vis 
a vis the imposing force of agencies’ discourses and practices. The interview 
extracts suggest - again similarly to Hobson’s analysis of globalisation -  that states 
do have some capacity to negotiate their entry into the dominant discourses of 
education reform that are promoted by international agencies. This thesis is also 
closer to the views on the state advanced in previous chapters, which suggest that 
the degree of agency that states have has to be understood in view of historically 
specific developments (Evans et al. 1985). The degree of influence of international 
agencies is the product of a relational dynamic in which the historical specificity of 
states combines with the (economic and discursive) strength of the agencies. In the 
case of Peru, the historical specificity – the state weakness pointed up by 
interviewees – has to do with the development of a national state on the basis of 
fundamental inequalities that hinder the consolidation of a stronger national 
discourse capable of articulating the needs of all into the national development, and 
also with the specific pathways followed in national development in which the growth 
of institutions has not been accompanied (much less sprung by) social changes.    
Interviewee’s comments point also to the country’s institutional framework, which 
helps explain the incapacity to develop stronger national proposals capable of 
balancing those of international agencies. This links with and extends the ideas of 
the previous section, in which the lack of stronger institutions, seen as regular and 
clear rules for interaction, was seen to affect the state’s capacity to pursue education 
policies.  
                                                
84 Katzenstein (1985) offers a similar analysis that considers the different ways in which small nations 
have adapted to the demands of an open – i.e. globalised -  economy, and which also suggests that 
states can come up with different alternatives vis a vis external economic forces.  
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In the two-way relation between the country and international agencies, the state’s 
incapacity to develop a clear discourse about educational reform – a policy core in 
Majone’s (1989) terms -, seems to make the state more amenable to the influence of 
international agencies. On the other hand, it is also important to reflect upon the 
extent to which international agencies take advantage of such weaknesses, or at 
least play blind to them, rather than contributing to stronger forms of development 
which might include strengthening the process machinery and, in general, the state’s 
capacity to articulate and sustain reforms over time.    
 
11.4.2 Paper tigers: Negotiating with international agencies 
At a more specific level, the idea that multilateral agencies do have some flexibility, 
which is dependent on the strength and capacity of states to come up with alternative 
proposals, is supported by various comments that offer a more detailed account of 
how negotiations between the state or the MED and the agencies take place: 
 
I recently had to explain the difference between the European Union cooperation and 
that of the agreements with the WB (…) So, one can accuse the bank of many things, 
but you cannot say that it doesn’t have a theory. When you have a theory you have a 
more difficult interlocutor. So the Bank’s theory at that moment said, with empirical 
proof, that investing in teacher’s wasn’t profitable and that it didn’t produce any 
results; investing in school materials was profitable and produced results. That’s what 
the WB’s theory said. So the Bank also said, and it still holds that, that the marginal 
achievement of one more year of primary education is enormous, while the marginal 
achievement of another year of secondary education is not so high, so we’ll focus on 
primary education. That’s the WB logic. However, if the country stands strong, the 
country can introduce into the Bank’s agenda issues that weren’t so well managed. 
(CASE 08 – Former Ministry of Education Official) 
 
The last statement is supported by documents showing how the WB’s original 
emphasis on primary education, specifically on school materials, was modified and 
incorporated a strong teacher training component and also funding for the post-
secondary Bachillerato programme. At the same time, the WB’s reluctance to fund 
reforms in other areas was bypassed by the state when it negotiated another loan 
with the IDB to fund reforms in secondary education. Furthermore, as the chronology 
of reforms shows, the World Bank’s emphasis on institutional reform and finance was 
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accompanied and to some extent replaced, in the second half of the nineties, by a 
strong emphasis on educational and learning processes, which were the centrepiece 
of reforms, and which are not part of the WB’s reform package. This suggests that 
countries can come up with alternative views to complement and even contest the 
proposals of multilateral agencies, and that the problem, rather than one of 
imposition, is one of incapacity to consolidate policy proposals capable of contesting 
the strong theoretical frameworks under which agencies operate. Whether such 
frameworks are adequate or not is a different matter. But as the extracts below show 
they can often help to anchor policies in a context prone to policy volatility due to 
inadequate institutional support.  This is clear from the following extracts: 
 
Given our system of political representation and the way in which we elect our 
representatives, there’s no way that even a mid-term project will survive. So the only 
possible stability is that provided by those agreements. The agreements with the 
IMF... such budgetary compromises. A fierce cashier is a guarantee that we’ll go in a 
certain direction for six or seven years. That’s all. (CASE 16 – Ministry of Education 
Official) 
 
(2)  I’d say that in our case, international organisations have, curiously, functioned as 
an anchor (CASE 08 – Former Ministry of Education Officials) 
 
In a context of weak institutions, where policies from the national level can change 
constantly due to personal and political agendas, the existence of an institution that 
has a strong theory and a series of structured proposals can help ground policies. 
This is clear in the following comparison between the WB and the IDB: 
 
When we’ve spoken to the IDB people they’ve told us: we come and talk to a minister 
that talks about pre-school education, we talk with another minister and they say they 
want 150million for technical education. So the IDB designs, or pre-designs if you 
want, projects for day care units, for pre-school education, for technical education 
and finally for secondary education. Because, let’s say, it doesn’t come with such a 
clear template. Whereas the WB came with the idea that ‘we do primary education’, 
what shall we do with primary education? (CASE 08 – Former Ministry of Education 
Official) 
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A complementary view suggests, however, that the proposals of multilateral 
agencies can be negotiated if local elites and policy makers come up with strong 
alternative views. This is suggested by the interviewees whose comments are 
quoted below, who were largely critical of the influence of international agencies in 
education policy making:  
 
As I told those who said that this was the only way: gentlemen, you have to get inside 
Peru, and Peru is the MED. If you want to help Peru you have to integrate with the 
MED. That they’re lazy, that money gets lost… yes. That’s definitely true… that 
they’re disorganised, yes. Let’s improve the MED’s administration, that’s the point.  
(…) 
(Int.) And to what extent did that bring you problems during the negotiations for the 
second WB and IDB projects? 
No problem. They respected me as a tribe’s chief. In this life, he who doesn’t make 
himself respected is dead. (CASE 02 – Former Minister of Education) 
 
At first there was some resistance, but then an excellent relation with the Banks. 
Because the teams that were created for the projects that would be funded by those 
agencies were very good teams of Peruvian professionals. (CASE 11 – Former vice-
minister of Education) 
 
The extracts, as with some of the comments quoted above, suggest that new policy 
ideas were built into the agendas of multilateral agencies, support the view that when 
policy makers at the national level are able to articulate strong and coherent 
proposals, multilateral agencies show a considerable degree of flexibility. This idea is 
also supported by the following extract: 
 
Mr. X and I had an expression in the MED in which we said ‘the Banks are like paper 
tigers’. Because you sometimes think that the Bank will support you when you have 
to act strongly in face of a government imposition. As an intermediary between the 
bank and the government you say ‘this can’t be done because the agreement doesn’t 
establish it and the Bank will say no’... moreover, we considered that resources 
shouldn’t be destined to certain things. And then the Bank comes, it negotiates with 
the government and that’s it.  (CASE 03 – Former Ministry of Education Official) 
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In this case, the flexibility of the multilateral agencies vis a vis the State is portrayed 
rather negatively, and suggests that in some cases multilateral agecies should have 
a stronger position to support certain agreed policy lines, rather than concede to 
governmental demands that might be an expression of politically specific concerns, 
rather than considerations about the quality or aims of policies – as was the case 
during the early years of the MECEP programme during the government of Fujimori.   
A more articulate and also more widespread view, however, suggests that the 
imposition of agendas takes place more subtly, at the level of discourse rather than 
at the level of specific policies and programmes. The following extract suggests this: 
 
Look, I’ve worked long enough with the Banks to understand, first of all, that not all 
banks think in the same way, and secondly, that they have different ethics and 
conducts, more than ethics, they have clearly differentiated conducts. And I think that 
the most responsible ones are those of the World Bank, which do have a statute that 
says that countries decide. Of course, we push them towards [becoming] modern 
states, relatively small, professional, putting money in the right direction. But that’s 
very similar to the way a bonsai is done: in order to get the little tree to bend towards 
one way, you water it only on that side, or you put a little mat on the soil of the 
opposite side so that it wont get any light. So you’re not doing physical things with the 
tree, but, in the long term, the tree does what you want it to do. I think that the Bank 
does bonsai with us.  (CASE 16  - Ministry of Education Officials) 
 
Although the interviewee is keen on contesting the argument that international 
agencies impose policies and programmes, the statement suggests influence at a 
broader level, in which agencies help shape the discourse on education reform, a 
kind of dominant orthodoxy. This, as suggested by the extract below, is an orthodoxy 
more at the level of the economy, which suggests the convenience of a reduced 
state and the need for more private investment, arguing that this model is more 
efficient, but also includes certain basic assumptions about education – as was 
suggested by one of the extracts above that pointed to the WB’s emphasis on 
primary education and textbooks rather than teacher training.  
 
The Banks have a lot of strength and in countries like ours, the weakness of teams 
responsible of elaborating policies is very deep. But apart from that, when the Banks 
say ‘we lend on the condition that certain measures are taken’, for instance, at the 
beginning of the nineties, reducing the state, slimming the state. And in the MED, 
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during the nineties, the best teams are fired... with this offer that if they left they’d 
receive several salaries, all the planning people left. 
 Look, I think that the Banks, the IMF, are institutions that have a view of the world, 
which translates into very specific proposals and policies. In 1990, in Jomtien, 
Thailand, a world conference on education for all took place. The team that 
formulated the proposals was a team from the banks. And what’s their proposal? 
That of basic education needs. It’s a minimalist proposal.  (CASE 15 – Former 
Ministry of Education Official) 
 
Interestingly, though, if one looks at investment figures and also at the number of 
public officials, both have risen during the period under study in which the influence 
of international agencies has been at its height. Moreover, the extent to which the 
model of a reduced state is actually promoted by international agencies is not clear, 
as it seems to be part of a widespread orthodoxy, shared by policy makers and 
governmental authorities, rather than a package imposed by specific agencies. Of 
course, the agencies have the power to exert pressure over governments, for 
instance, for the application of structural reforms. But it is also true that in many 
cases the policy makers who agree to such reforms and policies share the views of 
such international organizations, or do not have alternative formulations.  
Having said this, the interviewee’s arguments gain strength when seen in the light of 
some current analyses of the influence of international agencies in the region. 
Coraggio (1995), for instance, acknowledging that much of these agencies influence 
is the outcome of states’ incapacity to come up with alternative proposals, suggests 
that, precisely taking this into account the agencies’ proposals should be scrutinised 
as to allow refinement and a better impact on development85. 
 
The image that emerges from this analysis is a complex one showing that views 
which suggest a strong structural influence of international agencies at the national 
level of policy definition, as well as the opposite view that might portray absolute 
agency from countries vis a vis international organisations are limited. In particular 
this is because criticisms of the influence of international organisations have often 
focused on the discourses which they promote, and do not include reflections on how 
states operate and how this might make them more amenable to the influence of 
                                                
85 A detailed discussion of the proposals of the World Bank for education goes beyond the scope of this 
study and has been presented elsewhere, Coraggio (1995) offers a thorough discussion of such 
proposals.   
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international organisations. The analysis offered here supports a more intermediate 
view in which the influence of international organisations seems to be dependent on 
states’ capacities, not only to resist the influence, but rather to come up with 
alternative views that could be translated into a national policy agenda. Using 
Giddens’ (1984) terms, international agencies and national states seem to be in a 
relation of structuration. In the case of Peru the weak institutional matrix largely 
accounts for the state’s incapacity to develop its own policy core to guide decisions 
at all levels. Having said this, however, it has also been shown that some level of 
contestation and local initiative does exist, and current policies are at least as much 
the outcome of national initiatives as they are of the influence of international 
agencies86.  
A more subtle analysis, which suggests that international agencies impose their 
views at the level of discourse, rather than at the level of specific policies, appears to 
be more plausible. This matches Bonal’s (2002) analysis of the WB’s hegemony in 
education policy discourses. The extent to which this hegemony exists, however, has 
also been shown to be a function of the perspectives of national elites and policy 
makers, who can share or buy into the assumptions and theories of international 
agencies – more as part of a shared orthodoxy than through open pressure -, rather 
than a product of international agencies imposing their agendas. From this 
perspective, institutions like the World Bank appear to have a strong influence on the 
development of such orthodoxy. Furthermore, it is relevant to question whether 
international agencies take advantage of national weaknesses to impose their 
agendas, and whether it is not also their responsibility to promote the development of 
stronger institutions and capacities at the national level as to ensure a growing 
capacity to articulate and sustain policy proposals. This seems to be minimised by an 
almost exclusive concern with the allocation and expenditure of resources. 
Whatever the answer to this question, the present analysis has shown the need to 
analyse, at least with as much intent, the other part of the relation between states 
and international organisations, scrutinising states characteristics, policy making 
processes and the conditions that make different countries more prone to the 
discursive influence of international organisations.  
                                                
86 This matches Coraggio’s (1995) analysis which suggests that the same is true all over the Latin 
American region in which there is considerable variety in terms of policies within the templates of quality 
improvement programmes funded by the World Bank.  
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 11.5 SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter has presented an analysis of the institutional matrix in which education 
policy making takes place. Reflections have shown the limitations that the process 
machinery poses for the making of education policies: the lack of a civil service 
career, together with the prevalence of clientelistic and political criteria for the 
appointment of officials creates an unstable institutional structure which fails to give 
policies more sustainability, especially as there is little institutional learning in a 
context in which decision makers change continuously. The structure of the 
education bureaucracy also appears to make appointed officials more concerned 
with the political games that will allow them to maintain or advance their positions 
within the field of education policy, thus deepening a trend that is generally present in 
policy making (Ladwig 1994). Moreover, the legal framework within which policies 
are made was also discussed, showing how it makes the policy process very rigid 
and often demands that policy makers bypass the law in order to achieve desired 
goals. This, as was shown in the case of MECEP, which, by creating a parallel 
administration effectively avoided much of the usual red-tape of bureaucratic 
processes, hinders necessary processes of institutional strengthening. The analysis 
finally discussed the problems in the coordination between sectors in the Executive, 
especially between the MED and the MEF, which seem to operate according to 
different rationales.  
The first section led the way to a more in-depth analysis of the processes through 
which policies are formulated. The focus was set on approaches to policy 
deliberation and legitimation, which are seen as a fundamental basis for the 
consolidation of policies (Fischer 2003; Majone 1989). The analysis was based on a 
discussion of policy making within the two main governmental regimes in the period 
under study – Fujimori and Toledo -, which showed that although there have been 
some changes as a consequence of the shift from an authoritarian to a democratic 
regime, there are trends in the legitimation of policies through deliberation and 
accountability that are constant within the two periods. The discussion showed that 
there are fundamental flaws in the understanding of policy deliberation, which is 
approached in rather formalistic terms, rather than taken as a fundamental process 
for the legitimation and strengthening of policies, as well as the basis for 
accountability processes. Both those policy makers who view the policy process in 
technical terms and those who view it as a political and not only technical process 
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understand policy deliberation as a moment, rather than a constitutive and central 
element of policy making. In this way, agreements about the direction of policies tend 
to be very weak and are rarely incorporated fully into considerations about when or 
how to change the direction of policies. This understanding of policy deliberation 
seems to be tied to a conception of political representation which matches 
O’Donnell’s (1994) depiction of delegative democracies, in which those chosen to 
govern have absolute discretion to decide changes in the direction of policies – as it 
indeed is the case in Peru.  
On a different track of analysis, the idea of policy deliberation, which has been 
especially promoted in recent years – for instance through the new Education Law 
passed in 2003 – appears to be tied to ‘a logic of identity’ (Barnett 2003). This idea is 
used to criticise recent approaches to democracy which promote direct rather than 
representative forms of participation, and which appear to assume the possibility of 
achieving a perfect identity between citizens’ choices and political action. For Barnett 
(2003), in such approaches,  
‘democracy, understood as a certain kind of politics, is defined by holding 
together stable identities and transformation, decision-making and 
contestation, consensus and dispute in a pattern of deferred resolution of 
conflict’ (p.14).  
This ‘presupposes the capacity to clearly distinguish between representation and the 
represented, between the event and its repetition, allowing for an analysis of mis-
representation in the name of the authentic identity of the represented’. In the 
Peruvian case, the new General Law of Education (Congreso de la República del 
Perú 2003), with its emphasis on citizen participation and consensus building, seems 
to assume that the solution to existing problems will come from allowing citizens to 
express their views and demands. This, it is expected, will correct the mismatch 
between the decisions made by political representatives and the end users of the 
education services provided by the state and will make the policy process more 
transparent and more ‘adequate’ to the citizens’ will.  
Following Barnett’s (2003) argument for a particular form of representative 
government, as well as other recent definitions of deliberative practices (cfr. Fischer 
2003), deliberation is here understood as a constant and open process, not aimed at 
absolute consensus, but at generating binding decisions that should set the limits for 
the actions of policy makers. In this view deliberation appears to be necessary not as 
a means to an end (i.e. achieving consensus), but as a fundamental process aimed 
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also at challenging notions of what should or shouldn’t be done in education policies. 
This constant process, which requires a basic degree of openness on the part of 
policy makers, who must be willing to have their positions and views challenged, is 
limited, as Barnett (2003) suggests, by the need for specific action in relation to 
policy problems. ‘The value of communicative practices of public deliberation cannot 
be properly grasped if it is detached from the objective of arriving at binding 
decisions’ (p.12). In the case of Peruvian education policies, where discontinuity 
prevails, this basic aim of deliberative democratic practices seems to be overlooked, 
as policy makers have the power to change decision according to their personal and 
political positions.  
The final part of this chapter discussed the role of international agencies in the 
definition of education policies. The inadequacy of critiques that assume a monolithic 
stance on the part of international funding agencies, and suggest that they impose 
specific templates wherever they act, was questioned, and it was suggested that it is 
necessary to give more consideration to the characteristics and weaknesses of the 
states that are influenced by these organisations. Following interview data, it was 
shown how in the case under study it appears that the weakness of the state, in 
terms of its institutions, leads to an incapacity to articulate coherent and sustainable 
policy proposals, and that this makes the state, and the education sector in 
particular, more amenable to the influence of international agencies. This view 
notwithstanding, it was also suggested that the influence of international agencies 
operated more at the level of discourse than in terms of specific policy suggestions. 
This was clear as it was shown how in Peru there have been policy developments 
that depart and even contradict the orthodoxy of organisations such as the World 
Bank.  
With these considerations in mind, the next section offers a closer exploration of the 
particular ways in which policy makers operate within existing institutional 
arrangements. An analysis of policy narratives through which selected interviewees 
make sense and explain their experiences in policy making offers a strong and 
fundamental complement to the analysis of institutional arrangements, as it helps 
understand the ways in which individuals exert their agency therein.   
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CHAPTER 12 - POLICY NARRATIVES 
The present section has the aim of exploring the ways in which individual policy 
makers operate within the institutional matrix analysed above. The narrative 
approach used in this section is particularly relevant to illuminate the constraints and 
possibilities of the previous analysis, especially as it introduces a focus on agency 
that complements the preceding emphasis on structures (i.e. institutions). Different 
individuals make use of institutional resources in specific ways, and a deep 
understanding of education policy making processes cannot overlook the impact of 
policy makers’ agency on the definition of education policies.  
Four interviews have been chosen for in-depth narrative analysis to illuminate the 
issues raised above. Three of the selected texts are from interviews with individuals 
who occupied important positions during the main ministerial administrations of the 
period under study (i.e. those teams in which major reforms or policy changes were 
introduced). The fourth narrative is from an interview with a senior member of the 
Teacher’s Union, and has been selected to offer a point of comparison with the other 
narratives, as well as insights about the way in which the dialogue between policy 
makers and other stake holders in education takes place.   
The analysis will proceed in two stages. At first, the narratives will be presented in 
detail. The selected texts are composed of extracts from the complete interviews 
showing the interviewees’ reflections on their experience as policy makers, their 
views of the policy process, the arguments to support their decisions, their views of 
other teams, etc. – this was the criterion for the selection of extracts. I have chosen 
to present the narratives in an extensive form, with my comments following, rather 
than accompanying the presentation. In part this is because I do not want to 
fragment narratives that as a whole are powerful enough to convey to the reader 
many of the ideas I have worked through in the previous sections. Each narrative will 
be analysed in detail, they will be compared and theoretical connections will be 
made. The form I have chosen (of presenting the narratives first and then analysing 
them), rather than avoid theoretical elaboration, seeks to give the reader some space 
as to develop his/her own interpretations of the material and then judge whether my 
analysis and interpretations are convincing and match their own reflections (see 
Silverman 2000). This choice follows my understanding that text, interviews in this 
case, is polyvocal, and that although some readings are more plausible or better 
than others, different readings of the same text are possible.  
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The analysis of each narrative will seek to discuss the standpoints or reference 
structures from which interviewees speak and articulate their ideas, and which have 
to do with interviewee’s values, political interests, and understanding of policy 
making. Reflections on these issues will then serve as a basis for comparisons 
across interviews, to identify common features, points of divergence, and, mainly, to 
understand how individual perspectives and attitudes towards policy making impinge 
on the policy process and on the existence of deep levels of discontinuity.  
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12.1 THE TECHNOCRATIC THWARTED ANGELS 
 
The following pages report on an interview with two policy makers who worked in the 
MED during the second half of the nineties.  
 
9: (Int.) I’d like to begin with you telling me a bit how has it been... I know you came out of the MED in different 
moments, but not very far apart, but I’d like to know what happened in the MED, in terms of the administration, 
during the change of government.  
10: (1)  I think changes began much earlier, that is, I’d say that the change of minister produced an important 
change in the MED’s functioning and in decisions and in the importance that was given to things. When the 
reelection campaign began they all forgot about the education policies, of the sense that those education 
policies had. There’s no transference of ideas in that moment.  
11: (Int.) You mean the change of minister between Palermo and Garcia Escudero? 
12: (1) Yes. On the contrary, there’s a change in aims as a function of a political aim that the minister buys, 
and which has to do with the reelection process if you want, and what they could each gain in terms of 
particular/private interests. I think that before the change of government there’s something there, no? 
 
16: (2) ... I’ve increasingly got the impression that... there was a moment of design, a moment of 
implementation and exuberance, and a moment of decline, and we were in the exuberance moment when the 
minister changed. And when the minister changed, this Garcia Escudero, what there was... what was being 
expressed was a change in power, in the power structure. That is, there wasn’t anyone left in the power 
structure that could support a reformist energy. I think there’s a moment in Fujimori’s government in which... 
apart from being authoritarian, it had underneath... it was the voice of a series of reform movements that were 
necessary for the country. But that energy was lost, and there’s a moment in which the government is... the 
alliance between the government and Absalon, that is, the corrupt populists and the corrupt corrupt...  
17:  
18: (2)  ... and that’s very clearly expressed in the replacement in the MED with Garcia Escudero representing 
Absalon [ex member of the APRA party and leader of the hard wing of Cambio 90, Fujimori’s party] and 
viceminister Galli representing Montesinos [Fujimori’schief of the intelligence agency who was behind most of 
the corruption acts of the government]. 
 
 
21: (2) But one thing is that there’s... let’s say, let’s start differentiating things, there’s reforms that were done, 
that were designed and were done and were effective... 
22: (...) 
23: (2) Like that of primary education. And that are now in the middle of a process of dismantling, which is 
slower, without any rush but constant. It’s slower and more difficult, because what we achieved with primary 
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education was to capture everyone’s imagination. The discourse about the change from teaching to learning, 
everyone repeats it; there’s the discourse about putting the emphasis on long term skills, on competencies 
and less [emphasis] on memory and repetition, everyone repeats that; the existence of adequate school 
materials and teacher training, the fact that PLANCAD -I don’t know if I should put it this way- had coopted 
local leaderships through the contests for executing entities... the MED’s discourse is the discourse of the 
[local] leaders, there’s no alternative discourse because no one has summoned them and told them an 
alternative discourse. But there does exist a fierce resistance above, a process of demolition.  
 
27:  (2) I remember a conversation we had when we entered the MED, which had to do with one thing... at the 
time when we entered the MED there was nothing, literally nothing, there’s wasn’t a single idea.... So it was a 
very adequate moment to design and organise things, to organise ideas and start to develop them. And at that 
moment there was no idea to combat. This is being combated as ideas start to rise, and you find opposition as 
you propose, and this results in that in this first stage you had a great amount of initiative. You’re... and the 
others are beginning to come out of their retreat or their immobility or whatever it was. And that period 
somehow ended with the change of minister and with the entry of... with the last bit of Fujimori’s government . 
And, let’s say, then [after the government changed] begins a reversion on the basis of [arguing] that the ideas 
that had been developed then were not necessarily those that had to be used, that they were not the ones that 
were needed to change education, and nothing was done. What existed previously was dismantled and it 
wasn’t replaced with anything. And with that there’s a return to the situation that existed at the time of Garcia, 
and that of Belaunde and the previous governments, by and large. So what you now have, what you have 
after the transition government, from the transition government and on, is a huge discussion about what has to 
be done. What you have is a series of inertias that remain from the previous stage, which are, moreover, 
related to certain things, the inertias, with things that the MED has naturally got to do... Those inertias go on, 
but in reality they have no sense [orientation]... The MED recovers a certain capacity to minimally perform it’s 
role, no? But without leading the process anywhere. Without a policy.  
 
30: (2) it is true that we didn’t have... that when we entered the MED it was a waste land, but a waste land 
from our perspective, among other things, because to a large extent those of us who arrived into it did not 
belong to the environment.  
31:  
33: (2)  There was no one in the MED, and nobody wanted to go. But outside there was Foro. I’m not sure 
whether Foro would say they didn’t have ideas. They didn’t want to go to the MED... 
37: ... in spite that in 93 everyone had participated, nobody wanted to get their hands dirty, that’s my 
impression. 
40: (2) ... the people I called was mostly people that wasn’t in the environment. The day we published, that we 
decided to publish the project... at first nobody paid attention to us, then came Palermo and with him we 
published that brochure that went around on the same day that Foro was presenting its project, and if you 
read our project and Foro’s, ours is much more complete, structured, and it has a lot fresher ideas, that is... 
what I feel is that rapidly a group of intellectuals, who were new [to the field] but with great experience in 
NGOs and with knowledge of the heterogeneous realities of this country in urban and rural areas, and in some 
cases in the industrial sector... rapidly took off, but it didn’t articulate itself. And there we have a problem... 
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43: (Int.) It didn’t articulate with what? 
44: (2) With Foro... with the inertia, and [what was] then the club... 
  
47: (2) So what I feel is that, in general, what there was during Fujimori’s government was this: the building of 
a technocracy, a technocracy that still lasted during [the time of] Garcia Escudero. It’s during the time of 
Garcia Escudero that we finally signed the IDBII and during Garcia Escudero that we did the multiannual 
investment programme, which included the enormous rural project.  
 
51: (2) ... what existed [at that moment] is a disarticulation between the technocracy and the government, the 
top-levels, the fujimont... fujimorism and absalonism did not permeate the technocracy, that’s a destruction 
above. If you look at this through the documents of the investment programme, education hadn’t lost its 
priority What happens is that a repulsive crust of mobsters arrived to the government of education, and came 
to take away as much as could be taken away. But there’s still some resistance.  
 
63: (1)  Two ideas stem from there [from the initial World Bank project], teacher training, that was very 
interesting for the people from Foro, and where people of Foro would benefit and was interested, they thought 
it had to be done, and the idea of this famous 016 ministerial decree, about decentralising schools. Those 
were the two things that existed, there was nothing else. 
64: (2)  But those things were already ours. 
65: (1)  But they also belonged to Hugo Diaz, and also to Gloria Helfer. I mean that they were issues that... 
66: (2)  They were issues in which there was confluence.  
67: (Int.) They were issues with which the education community did agree? 
68: (1)  Including Foro, which agreed, there was no opposition. What there is, I think, is the construction of an 
education policy, which has to do with what (2) has been saying, with the technocracy, with these people who 
come... there’s the construction of an education proposal, at the same time that Foro began to develop, as a 
contestation if you want, their own education proposal. So the debate wasn’t about primary education, the 
debate was fundamentally about secondary education and about the issue of the Bachillerato. The proposals 
that were discussed about the structure of secondary education and the sixth year of the Bachillerato. 
 
79: (2) We have contributed to the WB the emphasis on curricular change.  
 
101: (2) I’d suggest that you go now to the Bank people and ask them how the current interlocutors are. 
Building a technocracy, which is going to be the interlocutor, takes a lot of time. Destroying the technocracy 
takes no time.  
 
104: (2) ... what you had was a logic in which your allies grew up, I mean, as the implementation of the 
Bachillerato and the discussion about what had to be done in secondary education went on you gained allies. 
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But this proposal loses its political allies, it loses all its support before the government ends. And you lose 
allies not because of politics, but because the complete rottenness, to call it some way. So there stops being 
any discussion about this and, let’s say, it’s the correct line [of thought] against the incorrect line [of though], 
you get polarised, if you want... that’s the impression I’ve got. 
105: (Int.) And those allies are lost only because of the generalised political rottenness, or because there 
wasn’t an effort from within... maybe it wasn’t possible, I don’t know, I wonder, to generate consensus? 
106: (2)  No, what (1) is saying is that when instead of dedicating time to win, to organise the teachers and 
systematise [what’s being done] and establish links with local leaderships so that the Bachillerato project, 
which was in motion, would mature, flower, be systematised, would be appropriated... When you have to 
dedicate the time you should dedicate to this, to defend yourself from the [...] viceminister [...] who wants to 
change the content, when you have to dedicate to cut the long nails of the people who want to get their hands 
into public biddings... I think there’s an earlier decline, but not because it had lost importance, the declaration 
[of intent] is maintained, but there’s a kind of reinvestment of efforts... the efforts are not so much dedicated to 
win the war, but rather to stop your internal enemy from killing you.  
 
122:  (2) I’ve got the impression, however, that an important issue is that we lacked the strength to touch the 
points that needed to be touched, and it’s that you cannot mistake the education system, which has to achieve 
certain things, certain behavioural and learning changes in kids, with an employment and poverty alleviation 
policy for a certain social group [the teachers]. And we didn’t achieve that. We formulated it, we documented 
it, we tried to push it, but that didn’t happen, and it didn’t happen during the administration of the first four 
ministers to whom I had the opportunity to show my documents, and it’s not happening now.   
 
125: (2) In education dictatorships bring good luck. The flourishing periods in education are Odria, Velasco 
[both military dictators]... 
128: (Int.) Flourishing in the sense that things moved forward? 
129: 2  Sure. Models were built, things were built, things were changed, standards were raised.  
 
135: (2) I think that the next time, and this is contradictory with what I was saying before that we have to learn, 
because what we have to learn is that we mustn’t dismiss anyone, we have to listen, we have to see what is 
going on in the scenario before making decisions, and we have to recover the things that are worthwhile. 
136: (Int.) And you think that wasn’t done? 
137: (2) I think that in the change... we didn’t do that because there wasn’t anything to recover. Those who 
came after us... it was dismantling for the sake of dismantling, dismantling against the government’s interests, 
because they’ve substituted the education development plan centred in rural education  because that was the 
next stage, with an emphasis in native identities, bilingual education, ecological education  for nothing. What 
are the educational issues today? That the teachers don’t go into strike, for one hundred soles.  
 
149: (2) It’s very difficult to take away the pointer that says ‘dictatorship’ to a section of governmental action. 
It’s not true that we didn’t try to sow consensuses. What’s more, we have managed to, and this is documented 
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and you can ask almost anyone, we have managed to get the people from Foro to design our things, and then 
they attacked them and stopped their names from being published. Why? Because they didn’t want to be 
muddled with a pointer that said ‘dictatorial’. So we have dedicated a lot of time. Could that battle be won? I’m 
not sure that it could have been won. Honestly, I’m not. I think we dedicated all the time we could have 
dedicated to that. In my view, dedicating more time to that wouldn’t have rendered much more. I don’t think 
that mistakes have to do with us not making enough efforts to persuade. As I said, we won all discussions... 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
152: (Int.) people whom I explicitly ask about Palermo’s administration say that he didn’t do anything. How is 
it... what happens there? Was his administration, in which there was all the flourishing that you mentioned, so 
closed? 
153: (2)  What happens? Well, that in that moment the WB project began, PLANCAD was done, the 
curriculum was changed... that is, things did happen, but... this is a petty system... but it’s not only here that it 
works like that, it worked like that in Rome... Mario and Sila had the same problems (laughs), that enemies 
reinvent history.  
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
190. (2) The last thing I wanted to say is that enemies defeat you, friends hurt you. And those who sacked us 
were our friends. So recovering from the wounds... recovering from a defeat is much easier than recovering 
from the poisoned wounds that friends inflict on you. 
 
194: (2) There’s this movie, which has become an icon [for us], that we’ve all commented it exists but we 
haven’t managed to document it’s existence, it’s the movie that I remember, in which the…, I don’t know if it’s 
Miterrand in France or the Spanish socialists, or the English socialists, but they’re received at the door by the 
civil servants in their suits. It’s the hippies getting to the Ministry of Education and the ministry’s general 
secretary, who is a civil servant who doesn’t change, received the minister and tells him ‘we’re going to defend 
the ministry from you’. That mythical image, I can’t remember which movie it is from. 
 
 
A clear storyline is presented by the interviewees at the beginning of the narrative, 
which talks about three different moments of policy making during the second half of 
Fujimori’s government: a moment of design, a moment of exuberance and a moment 
of decline. The story they tell focuses mostly on the moment of exuberance and the 
moment of decline, and begins by suggesting that the decline of the nineties’ reforms 
began during Fujimori’s government, and not after elections took place.  
The differentiation in terms of moments is accompanied by another distinction that 
suggests that corruption, and the degradation of policies, took place above, that is, in 
the higher political spheres, and not at the level of the technocracy that was in 
charge of carrying out the reforms. On the other hand, the interviewee’s stress that 
there were things done, that reforms were carried out, in contrast to what is 
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suggested by many critics. These two lines of analysis lead to the development of 
two ideas that are central to the narrative identity presented by the interviewees, that 
is, their identity as technocrats who had nothing to do with the government’s corrupt 
actions ‘above’, and their identity as leaders of an innovative and reformist energy in 
the MED.  
In their account, the disarticulation between the higher power spheres of the 
government and the technocratic policy makers took place with the change of 
minister in 1999, when a new minister entered the MED and changed the emphasis 
on reforms for a concern with supporting the president’s second re-election. This 
point, which coincided with the implementation of many of the proposed reforms, 
opened up an internal front in the MED, against which the ‘technocrats’ had to fight. 
This front added up to the external front of the critics that were part of the wider 
education community, and which opposed many of the proposed reforms –
particularly those related to the new structure of secondary education and the 
introduction of the Bachillerato.  In contrast to the politicians who were concerned 
with electoral matters, the interviewees portray themselves as technocrats 
concerned with the quality of reforms. The destruction above, however, interfered 
with their reformist aims, as they had to engage in defending the reforms from the 
‘long nails of the people who wanted to get their hands’ on public funds. The moment 
of decline is thus one where the politics of the government interfere with the policies 
of the education sector, a moment when support from above was not only lost but 
the space for action was also reduced because of changes in the objectives of the 
education sector (i.e. supporting the re-election). The technocrats loose the support 
from the vertical authority of the government, and in view of the weakness of other 
institutional mechanisms, the reforms loose momentum and decline.  
On a different line of argument, the narrative speaks to the critiques that suggest that 
nothing was done during the time of Fujimori. The interviewees stress their 
contributions and portray themselves as highly innovative, and as having ‘captured 
everyone’s imagination’ with the shift in pedagogical discourse from teaching to 
learning, and on competencies rather than memory and repetition. The 
innovativeness of this discourse is highlighted by contrasts with the situation they 
found at their arrival to the MED, and which is described as a ‘wasteland’ where 
there were no ideas. In this case they seem to be referring to ideas in relation to 
pedagogical changes, rather than those to do with the institutional reform of the 
system (for which, as has been discussed, there had been a series of reform 
proposals). It is interesting to note, in relation to this, how repetition and memory are 
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dismissed as inadequate, but the conquest of everyone’s imagination is later 
described by saying ‘everyone repeats that’. This, and the idea that local leaderships 
were co-opted (literally: neutralized or won over through assimilation into an 
established group) by the new discourse suggests that the new pedagogical 
discourse was imposed from above, by the technocrats, who deemed it innovative 
and adequate, rather than having been discussed with the receivers of the discourse. 
This idea matches criticisms made of the nineties administration, for not having been 
concerned with deliberation of policy options.  
The lack of openness to dialogue on the part of policy makers is explained by 
reference to the attitude of interlocutors in the education community, who are 
described as not wanting to get their hands dirty. The opportunism of critiques is 
highlighted by reference to how people who had participated in the design of the 90’s 
reforms did not allow their names to be published in public documents, and criticised 
the reforms when the change of government took place. In general, it can be said 
that the narrative portrays a tense relation between the technocrats and the broader 
education community. The lack of policy deliberation is explained by saying that 
deliberation was not always possible due to the vested interests of many groups, but 
also because too much time was spent fighting internal political fights.  
The moment of decline goes on until Toledo’s government, in which policy makers 
administer the return to stagnation.  In this process, the enemies reinvent history to 
fit their own views and interests.  
Throughout the narrative the interviewees portray themselves in almost heroic terms, 
as having fought important battles within the MED, for pedagogical matters, and also 
with the corrupt politicians that took over the policy arena at the end of the 
government. Another battle was fought with enemies from outside the MED who 
opposed the reforms. In the end, the battle was lost, and interviewees were 
wounded, not by their enemies, but by their friends, who took them out of the MED 
and then administered the return to stagnation on the basis of an opportunistic 
discourse that stressed that Fujimori’s government had been dictatorial, and 
overlooked other more technical efforts to reform the system.   
In this narrative account, policy is portrayed as a technical process. Policy options 
are seen as the outcome of technical decisions. Politics is seen as interfering with 
the actions of technocrats, and deliberation is understood as imposing views that are 
considered technically adequate, rather than an open conversation among people 
who might see things in different ways.  
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12.2 THE COWBOY 
The following narrative is from an interview with one of the education ministers in 
Alejandro Toledo’s government. 
 
29: Fujimori didn’t have an educational project and said, well, let the WB do what it can, I want to build 
schools. He devoted to build schools and left the discourse to the WB. Now, of course the WB faced two 
other problems, the officials and the teachers, and they developed what I called the ‘helicopter policies’. They 
see a place from above, go down, camp, give out projects and then leave.  
 
50: When the president offered me to be in charge of the MED, I took it as a political job and my first 
reflection was: here, in order to develop an educational reform and for me to take care of what was needed 
and of what experts said was required, the problem has to be dealt with politically; isolate the enemies of a 
democratic education policy and win the largest possible amount of allies. That is, a reasoning in terms of 
political tactic or strategy, if you want to take it like that.  
 
52: Who’s the everyday power in the MED? Patria Roja87. Well, I’ve known Patria Roja for 30 years (laughs). 
When ministers arrive in office they get scared. So, as an old teacher of mine told me, here the figure has 
been inverted, here it’s members of Patria Roja who get scared when they see you. 
 
54: My role is that of a political leader -I had some negotiators, I didn’t negotiate anything, the leader doesn’t 
negotiate, his advisors do- a political leader who had to head an education reform process, and to do it, it 
was necessary to isolate those who opposed it. The first to oppose it were the ones that controlled the 
apparatus at an intermediate level, through the majority control of the union. 
56: I arrived and realised that there were some good things, like that Patria was in a fierce crisis in relation to 
its hegemony in the union, in its control of the union, because its authoritarian style had been outworn, 
particularly during the last stage of the struggle against Fujimori. 
58: The first thing I do is begin negotiating with everyone, and scared-off Patria Roja. They told me ‘we are 
the Ministry’s representatives’. And I said ‘wait a minute, how’s this that you are…’. Meche Cabanillas had 
just promulgated a law recognising the union and I consulted Villaran, who was the Labour Minister, about 
what was required, and he told me that I needed to ask them for a registration roll. I said to them ‘okay, I’ll 
recognise you’ and I think I had to give them one sol for each teacher for the union’s quotation, and they 
wanted a cheque for three or four hundred thousand soles every month. So I said no, this is not the Soviet 
Union, I am a socialist, not a communist. I am not going to organise your union. If you want a union then you 
have to present a registration roll. 
62: To what extent were the negotiations with Patria Roja related to educational issues, and to what extent 
were they cut off from education in the sense that they emphasised… 
                                                
87 The Teacher’s Union is strongly associated with a radical Marxist party, Patria Roja, which is said to 
have control over the Union –as the Union’s leaders are members of the party. 
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63: Patria Roja is a party that has evolved from radical Maoism to absolute clientelism. What they seek is to 
reproduce the clientele ‘ad eternum’, and they live from that. 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
67: I spent the previous year saying these men live from controlling the MED’s apparatus. While they control 
it no one will be able to do an education reform.  
73: I’m telling you about the political design. What happened with that design? That Patria Roja couldn’t go 
on strike. Because they were worried about fighting against me, not here in Lima, I had surrounded them 
nationally, in twenty places. And apart from this I had a group, which I called my portable regional directors, a 
group of ‘compañeros’ [comrades], old militants like me who started to work with me in the MED and whose 
nickname was the ‘explosives deactivation unit’. I sent them wherever there was a fight.   
_________________________________________________________________ 
78: This allowed… it was a strategy. The other strategy was vis a vis the World Bank [WB] and the 
International Development Bank [IDB], which were the other problem. 
79: (Int.) Problem in what sense? 
80: That they had been the kings. 
81: (…) 
82: It was the issue of control over MECEP. So I dissolved MECEP and I sacked the chief of MECEP 
(laughs). One day the guy refused to obey an order of mine… I had been told not to touch MECEP because 
the [World] Bank would have me dismissed immediately, that I wouldn’t last 24 hours if I touched MECEP. 
So, I said, let’s see.  
84: Look, quarrelling is a state of grace for me, I’m happy when I’m quarrelling (laughs). 
85: (…) 
86: They were a group of capable professionals, they had everything from porters, chauffeur, accountant, 
lawyer, all theirs. They were a kind of… I called it the colonial enclave inside of the MED. I called the banks 
and told them, gentlemen, I understand why this MECEP phenomenon has happened, but it has to end. 
Because supposedly one of the aims of the cooperation is to institutionally develop the MED.  
98:(Int.) Did you already come with that reform programme or was it a programme based on an assessment 
of the situation since you entered the MED? 
99: No, it’s a programme based on an evaluation of the situation since I entered the MED. Because I didn’t 
know I was going to be minister until ten days before, or even less, a week. 
104:(Int.) there’s people who criticise your administration for having prioritised, at least apparently, the 
political struggle, political discourse, over technical criteria… 
105: It’s people who have never transformed anything in their lives. In order to make changes you have to 
accomplish both things, it’s a process that walks on two legs.  
107: (Int.) There’s decisions, like that of the closure of Bachillerato and of the changes that were taking place 
in secondary education, that were justified (in teachers workshops for instance) in terms of political criteria, 
saying things like that what was being done during the time of Fujimori had taken place in the context of an 
 188
authoritarian government, which lacked legitimacy, and that you therefore had to close down those things… 
108: That’s a judgement that surprises me. The secondary team was highly qualified, and Gorriti [the team’s 
chief] is a first class man. What I did was, rather, accelerate them. What I found in the technical part of the 
MED was, first of all, little identification with the MED. 
115: And I think, therefore, that this was partly because of groups of friends who entered in the 90’s and 
installed themselves in certain offices. Some of them reacted violently when I entered and I had to fire them. 
With the others I reached an agreement. 
117: I think that sectorial policies need to be done on the basis of a political leadership, I do not believe that 
technique is neutral. I believe that in the world there is competition among diverse interests, and it was 
therefore an outlook that sought to establish a reform programme. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
128: The first cabinet was about ‘let’s do whatever can be done for the country’. I felt I was part of a 
transaction cabinet. I knew that just like I’d been give a ‘white card’ to do the education program, Kuczinski 
[the finance minister] was carrying out an economic policy that I disagreed with, and I told him many times in 
cabinet.  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
130: What precipitated my dismissal from the MED was the type of policy [politics]… the president didn’t 
agree… he didn’t want to fight with Patria Roja. Toledo basically reasoned in the sense that things would be 
quiet, and in order to change you have to step on eggs, or, better, break eggs and step on people’s feet. And 
he doesn’t want to step on anyone’s feet nor break a single egg. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
145: I was aware that I was coming from a minister like Rubio, who changed very few people who were 
basically coming from the autocratic regime. I changed, and for me this was a matter of principle, 
viceministers, the secretary general, and I moved national directors, so that the viceministers could work; and 
regional directors, because if I didn’t change them how could I have developed my political strategy of 
isolating Patria? It was impossible. Now, that this affected the MED’s basic structure? Yes, but it allowed for 
the successes I had.  
147: (Int.) How do you summarise those successes? 
148: Having launched the first education reform programme after 25 years. 
150: (Int.) But it’s interesting, because that almost hasn’t been felt with the change of minister… 
151: The minister, of course, froze it. I can tell you about the specific measures he froze, with which he 
deactivated the programme. It was a programme that had two feet, the pedagogical foot and the participatory 
foot. He deactivated both.  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
155: I mean, I launched a comprehensive reform, with a vision, which no one had done, nor in the 80’s or in 
the 90’s, and which the two who followed haven’t done either, and I don’t know if Sota will dare… Sota has 
taken on some of my programme, and has taken back some of the people that worked with me.  
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160: (Int.)  And Ayzanoa is a person with a political agenda of his own, different from yours? 
161: No, I think that Ayzanoa simply wanted to mark the difference, he wanted to mark the difference and he 
is used by the forces that wanted to go back to stagnation. 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
163: What existed before was the tension between the bureaucratic policies of the WB and teachers and 
officials who got defensive, and Fujimori who built schools of dubious quality. That’s what existed before. 
Rubio took a first step, the Consultation, which, if he hadn’t done I’d probably have had to do it, and I 
launched this reform programme, which sought to establish an open an explicit continuity with the 
Consultation, I said it, and, what is more, I edited the Consultation documents. And Ayzanoa administers the 
return to the stagnation in which we are today.  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
168: The day I left the MED I said ‘I’ll come back with my flags, don’t worry, I’m absolutely sure’ (laughs). 
______________________________________________________________________ 
189: What I’ve heard in terms of critiques to my administration comes, on one hand, from people who have 
lived the World Bank and who are bothered by the fact that I am political, and who believe that an expert will 
be able to produce educational transformations, which seems absolutely false to me. And who say, 
paradoxically, that I moved too fast. And on the other hand, Patria Roja says that there’s no need for a reform 
project or for any education policy, that what is necessary is to accumulate forces for the revolution.  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
192: Look, with the knowledge of the sector I had at that time… I don’t know, I’m pretty satisfied with what I 
did. I don’t know how I could do things differently. I would have liked to have more sympathy from the experts 
outside the MED. 
(...) 
195: Basically the people from Foro Educativo, who looked at me ‘from the balcony’. I worked with some of 
them… 
204: … emergency programmes are a foolish thing, because education is structurally in a state of 
emergency, what we need here is a serious education reform, and a compromise on the part of society and 
political organisations. It’s stupid to introduce an emergency programme if this has always been in a state of 
emergency. It’s not a matter of teachers dedicating a year to literacy, I’m not saying that’s not fundamental, of 
course it is. What I’m saying is that that if we do not begin a political-ideological campaign against the 
influence of Maoism as the ideology that organises what I call an archaic way of thinking among the teachers, 
we can bring ten thousand teachers educated in another planet…!!! 
 
The interview begins with the presentation of two main issues that frame the whole 
narrative account: the existence of enemies of democratic education policies, mainly 
the radical and politicised branch of the teachers Union and the ‘colonial enclave’ of 
international organisations (the World Bank and IDB); and secondly, the idea that 
Fujimori was only concerned with building schools and left policies to the World 
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Bank, which had a project that was not articulated to the national interests. These 
two lines of analysis explain chosen paths of action and are also the basis for 
responding to critiques, as the latter are disqualified for representing the vested 
interests of these two groups (the teacher’s Union and international organisations).   
The narrative bears strong resemblances to Marxist analyses of power and class 
struggle, which appear to have been extrapolated to the analysis of the educational 
situation and the ‘politics’ of policy making. The teachers Union is portrayed as a 
group so concerned with radical revolution, that it ends up being reactionary and 
opposed to any kind of change in policy lines.  It opposes change in principle and is 
dedicated to ‘reproduce the clientele ad eternum’88. On the other hand, imperialistic 
(colonial) forces are seen as represented by international organisations such as the 
World Bank, whose influence, therefore, needs to be neutralised. The use of such 
analytical concepts is explained by the interviewee’s background as a militant of left-
winged parties and as a socialist (as he describes himself). 
The narrative also includes some basic assumptions about the previous government, 
which again frame and help justify chosen options. A central idea in this sense is that 
there was nothing done in terms of serious reforms during the previous government, 
and that Fujimori was only concerned with building schools – a widespread view 
among policy makers from Toledo’s government, as well as among educational 
analysts. Secondly, the interviewee suggests that, given the government’s lack of  
concern with education, international agencies had complete control over the 
definition of policies. Finally, there is an analysis in terms of how the policies of an 
authoritarian government needed to be opposed ‘in principle’, and that both the 
policies and the people who had been behind them had to be removed.   
The interviewee’s narrative identity is based on these assumptions, and builds from 
there to present a positive self-image. Not only does he credit himself for having 
neutralised the enemies of a democratic education policy (i.e. the Teacher’s Union 
and the World Bank) through his aggressive approach, but also for having done the 
first educational reform in more than two decades.   
Moreover, the interviewee presents himself as a politician, and questions existing 
conceptions of policy as mere ‘technique’. The conception of ‘politics’, however, 
deserves some analysis. Politics, and policy, are seen in terms of struggle, and at 
some point the narrative elicits images of war (e.g. neutralising enemies, political 
strategy, quarrelling as a state of grace, returning with ‘our flags’). The political 
                                                
88 These ideas are further developed in Lynch (2003). 
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aspect of policy making is seen in terms of engaging in battles against specific fronts. 
The presence of such metaphors, and the analysis offered in the narrative clearly 
stem from the interviewee’s political background. 
As in other cases, the determination of policy lines on the basis of personal views is 
remarkable. It is the personal understanding of things by the elite policy makers that 
determines the lines of action followed by the MED. The policy lines therefore shift 
and change according to the personal views of the elites that come to power. In this 
sense, it is relevant to note that there is no mention of processes of deliberation and 
discussion in the determination of policies. The narrative is rather, the story of how 
one individual understands the problems of the education sector –which in this case 
have to do more with the political conditions for implementation of reforms, rather 
than with educational or pedagogical issues.  
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12.3 THE VICTIM 
This interviewee was one of the education ministers during Alejandro Toledo’s 
government.  
 
6. (Int.) First of all I’d like you to tell me about how is it that you entered the MED. From what I know you came in 
amidst an important crisis in which Mr. Lynch came out and you had already been in the MED as vice-minister. I’d 
like you to narrate how was the shift from Lynch’s administration to yours. 
7: I’ll start by saying that it would be convenient to talk about the antecedents.  
9: ‘In the first place, I am a friend of Alejandro Toledo [the president], we lived together in Washington’ 
 
13: In the 2001 campaign I did the education policy, the education policy proposal of Peru Posible 
 
 
16: Since my job as a minister began a very strong campaign was triggered. 
17: (Int.) A campaign in what sense? 
18: A campaign against me. 
 
21: Because, one, incontrovertible facts, Lynch’s education policies were not the policies of Peru Posible. They 
were Lynch’s policies. 
 
24: (Int.) In what sense are you an institutionalist? 
25: In the sense that if there is a Union that is approved by law, and which has negotiations with the MED, I cannot 
propitiate the fracture of that Union by promoting the existence of other groups. A minister has to be institutionalist. 
37: (Int.) Would you say this was one of the main contributions of your administration [the Huascaran 
Programme]? 
38: Of course. 1500 teachers, we created the Huascaran portal and the knowledge central. We put computers all 
around the country. That was the difference.  
 
52: (Int.) There’s people who criticise your administration because it generated a rupture in programmes and 
policy orientations which, according to some people, was even stronger than the one experienced during the 
change of government. What do you think about this? 
53: Well, yes, I had to make that rupture. Because I’m not here to continue with a policy that, in the first place, is 
not based on the political policy, on the political proposals of the government.  
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 55. a lot of time was lost. I’m giving you concrete data. IDB 1 had not made any progress. Mr. Laguzi, the expert 
from IDB, came and asked, what happened? Time was winning us. And I therefore had to work at a forced pace. 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
58: I ask, and I told this to Mr. Juan Abugattas on TV (on Cecilia Valenzuela’s programme). Where’s the feasibility 
study for the New Secondary, what are it’s costs, what’s its conversion plan? He couldn’t answer, Mr. Abugattas. 
They prepared an ambush. Cecilia Valenzuela had asked me for an interview in which I would be able to talk 
about my proposals. In the first place, to bother me, they put me in a programme where everyone was saying bad 
things about me. But I have a lot of experience… An the Juan Abugattas came out, there was a polemic, and he 
couldn’t answer.  
 
72: (Int.) How would you explain the fact that Lynch was able to get so much out of Toledo’s government plan? 
73: Well, it’s because in Peru much is about the personality of ministers. … and Lynch had his own political 
project. 
74:  
75: We don’t have a mentality like that of Saxons, simply cold and with more incorporated planning criteria, of 
thinking more about state policies than about government policies. 
76:   
77: (Int.) And how do you think that this affects the success of education policies? 
78: Well, a lot, not only educational ones but also those of other sectors. 
79:  
80: (Int.) And did you take this into account during your administration, or is it something almost inevitable for a 
minister to be carried away by the political game? 
81: No, no, no, if I wanted to put a tag onto my administration it would be ‘institutionalist’ and technical. Totally 
technical. 
94: (Int.) Would you say that in this transition between Lynch’s administration and yours there was an initial 
evaluation of what needed to be done? 
95: You have touched on an issue. Because people say I put a very personalistic mark… 
113: Critics of our administrations now blame us. That’s not right, the problem of education hasn’t begun with 
Ayzanoa, or Malpica or Lynch.  
117: (Int.) The thing is that there have been a lot of expectations in relation to Toledo’s government and to the 
administrations that have been in the MED during this government, and the feeling is that, although they might not 
be responsible for the education crisis, they do seem to have a big responsibility in providing solutions for it, which 
for some reason haven’t taken place, partly due to continuous changes… 
118: To me that seems unfair. On the first place, the product of education cannot be seen in the short term. It is 
always seen in the long term. 
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120: (Int.) Then how can it be said that in the time of Fujimori, with the reforms that took place, nothing had 
happened? 
121: The PISA and UNESCO tests show it. 
 
123: (Int.) But it could be said, using the same terms, that not enough time had gone by… 
124: I don’t think so. Ten years are enough time. 
125:  
126: (Int.) But Fujimori’s reforms begin in 95, with the World Bank and IDB projects… 
127: But it is also that those projects were badly done. 
130: [At the beginning of the Fujimori reforms the interviewee Ayzanoa was called to give his opinions] 
131:  
132: I told them that they had to begin with the teachers. I told them at that time, and they, well, they battled me. 
The row with me is not from now, it is from much earlier. I told them ‘this is going to fail’.  
[In what follows the interviewee talks about the way he dealt with the Teachers Union Strike] 
140: I had to look for solid bases, I am an institutionalist, a man of principles, who acts according to laws.  
142: I am not interested in whether the teachers are from Patria Roja, they are the MED’s representatives, 
accredited by law. And then I get told that there is a co-government, Mr. Trahtemberg said that. He should read 
the 40 points, in no place is a co-government mentioned. In no place.  
144: There was an orchestrated campaign. 
146: Then they said that the [teachers’ assessment] was based on documents. The assessment, in two 
agreements, it is said that it will be in accordance to documentation but also through tests. Then why is Mr. 
Trahtemberg and the people from the National Council for Education saying that it was a co-government. They 
took advantage.  
147: What calls my attention, to be honest, is that all that method of the ‘chicha’ (tabloid) newspapers, of 
slandering, of lying and lying... something still lingers… 
 
149: (Int.) And do you think that [spending too much time on quarrels and ‘campaigns’ like this] has to do with an 
issue that education receives a lot of support in political discourse but maybe not so much in practice? 
150: That’s it. Simply --- when Mr. Fujimori was in power the MED went on really slow, there were no radical 
reforms and they only worked with a varnish, with PLANCAD, PLANCGED, and it was NGOs that won.  
151:  
152: We said no. Firstly, we are going to work seriously in language and maths. Now no one says that it was 
minister Ayzanoa the first to suggest this.  
159: Honouring the truth, it wasn’t possible to go ahead with the implementation of the IDB I and II programmes 
because the MEF did not provide the money that corresponded to the national counterpart.  
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160:  
161: (Int.) So maybe it wasn’t so much a problem of Lynch’s administration, but a coordination problem? 
162: No, not of coordination, but simply that the MEF did not comply with what it had to give. When the tri-monthly 
compromises [with the banks] arrive, the MEF doesn’t pay out all it had to, but just what was available. And with 
this the banks didn’t give out the money. 
178: I stood up to Ernesto Cuadra [from the World Bank] in 92. ‘This is not like this’, I said. (…) But everyone left 
me alone. If they had listened to me in 92 the situation would be different.  
 
207: But [when I entered the Ministry] I found nothing.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
211: (Int.) To finish the interview, I’d like to ask you what taste has your pass through the MED left you, what is 
your balance? 
212: Happy and joyful. I did, and I’m going to give you a copy of this, I did what hadn’t been done during the 
previous administration. 
213:  
214: (…) 
215: I am not a politician, I am a teacher, a technician, an education planner.  
 
 
The narrative is initially framed by two main stories. On one hand, the closeness to 
the president and the involvement in the design of the party politics, which seems to 
be used to confer authority to the arguments offered. On the other, the existence of 
an orchestrated campaign to discredit the interviewee, and which is used by the 
interviewee to discredit criticisms of his administration89. These two storylines help 
the interviewee to narratively construct his identity (Langellier 2001; Riessman 2004) 
as a policy maker, as someone with authority (i.e. closeness to power) and as 
someone who faced criticisms from people with vested interests (i.e. discrediting him 
                                                
89 Some of such criticisms appeared in the media: 
“The applause that educational initiatives received in the time of Nicolas Lynch have turned into 
complaints by experts in educational issues, for what they describe as a gerontocracy without much 
wisdom. 
Apparently, the minister’s main task is to fill posts in the regions by militants of Peru Posible. He is also 
accused of appointing friends and colleagues for political decision posts, whose common trait is having 
over 65 or 70 years, and having graduated from La Cantuta [a teacher training university].   
Ayzanoa has paralysed the rural education project, in which, for the first time, the Peruvian State 
pledged to use national and international funds to benefit children from rural areas during the next ten 
years. This is part of the dismantling of the main initiatives of Lynch’s administration.” (Lauer 2002) 
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and the government) –rather than legitimate criticisms about the quality of his policy 
decisions.  
Throughout the narrative there is constant use of positive self-descriptions (‘I am an 
institutionalist’, ‘I did what wasn’t done before’), which conforms to idea that 
interviewees tend to present and perform a ‘preferred identity’ (Convery 1999)90. In 
this case, the preference is allegedly for following a legalist (institutionalist) approach 
to policies, which contrasts with the ‘innovative’ and ‘radical’ self-descriptions seen in 
the previous two narratives.  
These positive self-descriptions contrast with the negative descriptions offered of the 
previous administration - as being political. The arguments that support such 
criticisms are not always solid and at times are contradictory. Such contradictions 
undermine the coherence of the narrative, and suggest that at least part of what is 
said by the interviewee has been accommodated at the moment and is not part of a 
more articulated view. Apart from the contrasts, the interviewee resorts to changing 
the subject matter when questioned about delicate issues. This can be seen at points 
during the interview when the narrative was contested: the interviewee’s strategy 
was often to divert the conversation into different issues – saying for instance that 
not enough time had gone by as to judge the adequacy of his proposals, when he 
was actually being questioned about the changes he introduced in his predecessor’s 
policies.  
The interviewee’s self-description also includes a positive identification with the 
teachers (‘I am a teacher’), which is the basis for his reluctance to confront the 
Teachers’ Union –which was the case of his predecessor. He also talks about doing 
things according to the law rather than about introducing changes. This contrasts 
with other narratives which focus on the need to radically reform the education 
system, both institutionally and in terms of pedagogical matters.  
The narrative is critical of both the policies of the previous government – which are 
described as ‘badly done’, or by saying that the government ‘did not do anything’ – 
and of those of the previous administration – which are portrayed as being based on 
a political project and as not consistent with the policies proposed by the 
government’s party. The criticisms are not always well sustained, especially when 
considering that according to other interviewees the government’s party did not have 
an articulate set of education policy proposals.  
                                                
90  Convery (1999) suggests that in an interview process ‘The opportunity to tell a story can be eagerly 
exploited [by respondents]… who skilfully and unconsciously employ rhetorical devices to reconstruct 
an identity that will be affirmed’ (p.132). 
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In terms of the interviewee’s identity, these strategies (the framing of the narrative, 
the diversion from issues that contrast with the story that is being told, the negative 
portrayal of other teams and the positive portrayal he offers of himself), help to 
portray him as someone who, knowing what to do, and having the authority and 
commitment to carry on necessary reforms, was under attack by people and groups 
with political and other vested interests.  
The analysis can also reveal a tendency to impose personal views over the policy 
process. This comes through in the interviewee’s emphasis on what he did, as 
compared to previous administrations –particularly by the way in which he dismisses 
the proposals of other teams. The use of the ‘I’ pronoun, to suggest a sense of 
personal authorship of policies, expresses a will to imprint a personal mark over 
policies. This seems to be the main driving interest in the changes introduced during 
this minister’s administration.  
Furthermore, the interviewee has a view of policy making as an ideally technical 
process. He dismisses politics as part of the policy process. This comes through in 
his emphasis on his administration being ‘totally technical’ and of him as an 
‘institutionalist’, as well as in his criticism of the political nature of the preceding 
administration.   
This view, together with a position that shows no willingness to offer justification for 
chosen policy paths – but which, rather, dismisses questions and criticisms as part of 
an ‘orchestrated campaign’ - suggests a lack of willingness to engage in policy 
deliberation. Policy making appears to be the product of unilateral decisions on the 
part of ministerial officials, who make use of the authority conferred – ‘delegated’ in 
O’Donnell’s (1994) terms - to them by the government, but with little disposition 
towards accountability. The technical view of policy making indicates that there is 
little emphasis on gaining political support for policies, and this seems to be at the 
root of the problem of discontinuity.  
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12.4 THE RADICAL? 
The following narrative is from an interview with one of the leaders of the Teacher’s 
Union: 
 
7: What happened in the times of Fujimori is that, in the terrain of education, this dictatorial government had very 
specific objectives. What he wanted, not from his own initiative, but fundamentally from the World Bank’s and the 
IMF’s recommendations, what he sought was to privatize education, on the one hand, and on the other, naturally, 
finish with the teaching profession, make it weaker in other words. And this was insinuated in various ways. At 
first in a more impudent and open way, even through legal instruments.   
 
8: And then, logically, [came] the makeup to make this more digestible, that parents, the community, businesses, 
councils, could participate in the administration and in all that had to do with education. In 1992, however, this 
norm was derogated... or not even derogated, it wasn’t approved in congress because there was a huge protest 
headed by our Union, the parents and some democratic sectors in the country, that had a political presence in the 
parliament.... 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
13: What we see is this: that there’s two moments in Fujimori’s government. One first moment, as I told you, it 
was open, uncontrolled, no? Without any interest, even with legal norms. No? He had the certainty that the 
people was going to support him, and that the teachers would have to accept, but this wasn’t so. So he goes 
back, but doesn’t forget about his privatising plan. Rather, he uses a different strategy, a more perverse but more 
subtle strategy. And through not so grandiose norms, not so open ones, but more specific norms – among them 
things to with the curriculum, the teacher’s training, the training of headteachers, etc. etc., but all of them with the 
support of the World Bank. So this is a new strategy, more subtle, more hidden, no? It’s not laws being published, 
but decrees. 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
16: They were privatising strategies because in essence what they sought was that. That is, although it wasn’t 
going to be the large-scale privatisation, transferring educational institutions to the private sector, they were 
looking for some lesser versions of that, for instance, that the educational administration shouldn’t necessarily be 
in the hands of the state, you see? He promoted that. 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
19: We oppose this because there’s a reason and a basis for our opposition. The central issue is that the state is 
the one that has to direct, no? Education, in this specific case. The state cannot abdicate its responsibilities to 
transfer them to other institutions.  
———————————————————————————————————————— 
21. (Int.) So it’s an opposition almost in principle? 
22. In principle, that’s it. Because, look, the new law of education says, in effect, that private businesses should 
also contributed to the aims of national development. The question is whether [these businesses] will have 
enough time to dedicate.... to contribute to the improvement of our country’s development. I don’t think so. They 
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don’t. 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
22: So the State is the one that has to direct, because education, health and infrastructure are central issues for 
the State, that the private sector will definitely not do. The State is the one that’s called to contribute to the 
country’s development with its policies. So for us, this role is one where the State directs, which is not limited to 
education policies, but has to do fundamentally with economic policies. During Fujimori’s [government] the State 
takes on a mostly subsidiary role. So here’s where our discrepancy, our distaste, lies, it’s here where the 
contradiction is. 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
24: (Int.) So more than an opposition to concrete elements of Fujimori’s education reform is an opposition to the 
basic conception.... 
25: Of what the public school is, for instance. 
26: (Int.) Of what’s the State and public schooling? 
27: Naturally. For us the State has a central role, a directing role in the field of education. That is why we haven’t 
questioned, for instance, the fact that teachers were trained during the time of Fujimori. What we have question is 
that they didn’t do it well. [...] the MED left [things] in the hands of NGO’s. NGO’s that were created only for that 
purpose...  
———————————————————————————————————————— 
32: (Int.) Would you be willing to consider some more balanced versions of the state that are being promoted 
nowadays... where it’s not a matter of having a merely subsidiary state, but nor is it a matter of having an entirely 
provider state...? 
33: No. 
35: No because that also lends itself for the State to abdicate its responsibility. And you know what, without being 
eminently Statist, because maybe you’re going to think that that’s what I am, but... the great examples in terms of 
education which have allowed for the existence of great projects, have been promoted by the State. Whether we 
like it or not, no? With this I’m not saying, for instance, that we should end with private schooling, no, I’m not an 
extreme enemy of private schooling. Private schools are there because the public school is in decline. If public 
schools are improved, private schools will automatically disappear. So... for me things are clear: while the State 
evades its responsibility, that space will undoubtedly be filled by the private sector.  
———————————————————————————————————————— 
39: (Int.) And what’s your position in relation to the arguments that are used to justify this more subsidiary role of 
the State, which suggests that the Peruvian Sate doesn’t have enough resources to comply with that providing 
role, and therefore has to resort to the private sector.... 
40: In that argument the truth is not being said. If we begin from the point of view of the economy, of the budget, 
and there’s no money, there’s no budget to improve educational quality – because that’s the central argument 
that is used to open the door to the private sector – then let’s make efforts, from the state, from the government, 
to really prioritize education policies in the budget. Why is it that we don’t do that?  
———————————————————————————————————————— 
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43: Why do I talk about complacency and complicity? Because officials are not concerned with improving the 
really low quality administration. But I am certain that the scarce funds that the Sate has for education are lost 
because of that. Because there’s not an adequate uses of those resources, no? So, to use the technical term, 
they don’t know how to optimise the scant resources we have.  
———————————————————————————————————————— 
49: This government – so that you understand me well and don’t get confused – we qualify it, we catalogue is, we 
characterise it as a continuation of the Neo Liberal model. There might be some nuances, which I recognise, I’m 
not saying this one’s exactly the same as Fujimori’s in educational matters, not at all, that would be crazy. At least 
this government has characterised itself for saying things as they are... what Fujimori hid.  
———————————————————————————————————————— 
49: So there are some nuances there that make them different, but in essence, in essence, the World Bank and 
the IMF, the general policies of this government, are aimed, also in the field of education, don’t forget it, to 
privatization. I see that very clearly.  
———————————————————————————————————————— 
52: Well, it’s very relative, it’s very weak to say that there’s effectively a democratisation in the field of education. 
What has existed, at some point, is, let’s say, an opening to listen to our thought and to that of other sectors, like 
the parents, universities, I don’t know. But in essence the current education policy privileges the government’s 
decisions, no? That can be seen in various concrete events.   
———————————————————————————————————————— 
52: Although the transition government, when Marcial Rubio was minister, allowed us to participate in the 
elaboration of a project for directing the contest for naming teachers, where that commission gathered our points 
of view, Mr. Lynch gets in during Toledo’s government and he simply didn’t listen to us at all. So where’s the 
democratisation process, no? 
There’s no sustained or clear policy in terms of a democratisation process. 
———————————————————————————————————————— 
53: I’m not opposed to assessment, although the media, probably because of vested interests, portray us as a 
Union that is opposed to assessment, that’s a lie. We are conscious that assessment is something inherent to our 
profession, and we cannot oppose assessment. But they want to expose us to a kind of assessment that is 
explicitly prepared to sanction, to punish, to fire [teachers]. That’s a different thing.  
———————————————————————————————————————— 
53: There haven’t been any efforts, in spite of the existence of the National Council for Education - were, 
incidentally, our Union doesn’t have a representative – up to now we don’t have a great policy, which is the 
national education project, which should precisely point to our North, in order to tell us what kind of education we 
want in Peru in the next ten years for instance.  
———————————————————————————————————————— 
60: I can tell, it’s because on the side of the government there doesn’t exist this responsibility and this decision, a 
political will of wanting to do things in social sectors as important as education, health and infrastructure. That 
policy doesn’t exist. It doesn’t. There are other vested interests.  
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———————————————————————————————————————— 
63: At some point it could have been said that there was a reticent attitude on our part, that was probably true at 
some point. But that was years ago. When we questioned Velasco’s reform, for instance, it was for a lot of 
reasons, because that reform, being highly important, contrary to the Neo Liberal reform, at that time they made 
the same usual mistake, which was to exclude us teachers, and to consider us only as mere instruments for the 
application of the reform. But not this time, we’ve had the best disposition.  
For instance, we have a proposal for the national education project. And I don’t mean that our proposal is the 
best, that it’s the solution, or the key that education requires. I don’t want to be so pedantic in this terrain. 
However, it’s a proposal that should be discussed with other actors.  
But in the end, when the budget, for instance, is discussed, the ugly duckling of the budget is the education 
sector, isn’t it? Because the finance minister, I don’t know whom he is listening to, I have the impression that he 
doesn’t listen to president Toledo, but that he listens to the recommendations of international organisations like 
the World Bank and the IMF, and that’s what prevails in the end.  
———————————————————————————————————————— 
68: (Int.) It’s interesting because sometimes it would seem that this is a debate between groups that have 
theoretical conceptions of the role of the state, that are almost irreconcilable, and until that opposition is not 
solved, it will be difficult that the different groups agree on one proposal, no? 
69: But even in their view of the role of the State, it has always been said, for instance, that the State doesn’t 
intervene in the economy, in production, etc. that it should limit itself to social sectors, but not even that. This is 
different to the privatization of public enterprises, of electricity, which, incidentally, has been privatised. We’re only 
talking about education. Well, at least they should be consistent with their fundamental conception... but not even 
that.  
———————————————————————————————————————— 
72: there’s people and sectors that are interested in confronting us, the teachers, our Union, with public opinion 
and with the parents. On the basis of expressions such as that we do not contribute to education, and that we’re 
guilty of the terrible quality of education in our country, and that we’re a Union that is frozen in time, and that, as 
Lynch says, that we have an arcaic way of thinking.   
(...) 
75: [Lynch] is not from the left anymore, he has sold himself to the Neo Liberal model, no? 
 
 
 
In this case, the narrative identity performed by the interviewee presents a strong 
identification with a particular discourse on the role of the State which leads to the 
identification of specific negative forces that the Teacher’s Union has to oppose. The 
narrative contrasts with the previous ones partly because of the focus of the 
interview itself, which was not specifically set on the interviewee’s experiences – as 
he was not a policy maker - but rather on his views about the policy process and his 
 202
understanding of the ways in which education policy making has been led during the 
period under study. Still, the interview has been considered relevant for this analysis 
as it offers a point of comparison with the previous ones and gives some indications 
as to the problems faced in the broader dialogue about education policies.  
Two main issues can be distinguished in the narrative. The first is a reading that 
identifies a strong Neo Liberal influence in education policies and associates it with 
the pressures and presence of international agencies. In this reading, the general 
trends in economic policies since the early nineties are seen to set the direction of 
policies in the field of education. Furthermore, although the reading recognises 
certain differences between Fujimori’s and Toledo’s government, the prevalence of a 
Neo Liberal influence is strongly distinguished in both. The description of 
neoliberalism highlights its conception of the state as having a subsidiary role in the 
economy and society. In education, this is allegedly leading to increasing 
privatisation of public education services and an open attempt to disempower the 
teachers by promoting school-based and more localised decision-making.  
The second main issue that can be identified in the narrative, and which is more 
specifically related to the identity of the Teacher’s Union – as represented by one of 
its main leaders- is the depiction of the Union as a flexible, non-radical and open 
organisation. In this case, the interviewee seems to be talking to certain not-so-
ghostly audiences which in his view insist on the radical stance of the Union as a 
way of discrediting its participation in the democratic dialogue on education policies.  
The reading of the reality of education policy is highly articulated and has a clearly 
identifiable theory. The latter is particularly evident when the interviewee is 
questioned about the Union’s position in relation to the role of the state, which is the 
source of major discrepancies with governments. The conception that emerges from 
this is that of a monolithic central state which is opposed to any form of non-
hierarchichal decision-making and provision, even if it stems from a discourse on the 
need to democratise both education and policy-making, as has been the case in 
recent years. And although this is not entirely clear in the narrative, it seems that the 
ideal provider-state is one controlled by the Union itself – the last statement which 
described minister Lynch as having sold himself to the Neo Liberal model is 
illustrative of this, as it suggests that any confrontational attitude towards the Union, 
even coming from a self-declared socialist will be associated with the prevalence of 
vilified Neo Liberal forces.  
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Looking at the narrative in more detail, the non-negotiable nature of most of the 
interviewee’s positions in relation to the role of the State in education contrasts with 
the image of a Union as open to dialogue that the interviewee is trying to convey, 
comes through especially when compared to the nature of education policies 
promoted in recent years. First of all, as was shown in the chronology it is difficult to 
identify a unity in the reforms, which is precisely what discontinuity points to. The 
presence of a Neo Liberal agenda was much clearer during the first years of 
Fujimori’s government, but policies coherent with this line were later abandoned or at 
least complemented with a strong emphasis on educational processes that does not 
entirely to fit the Neo Liberal agenda. The prevalence of Neo Liberal education 
policies has been even less during Toledo’s government, in which the emphasis of 
policies has rather been on democratising decision-making and educational 
processes, and in which there have been important moves towards incrementing the 
national budget for education.  
In view of the contrast between existing policies and the narrative discourse 
presented above, it might be relevant to remember that ‘the introduction of Neo 
Liberal economic policies does not necessarily bring about Neo Liberal education 
policies’ (Narodowski and Nores 2003), especially when Neo Liberal policies are 
conceived as the introduction of market mechanisms in the educational arena. As 
Narodowski and Nores (2003) suggest in their analysis of policies elsewhere in the 
Latin American region, it is ‘important to avoid reducing the existing complexities to 
labels such as neoliberalism (...) [which] diminish not only the possibilities for 
generating viable alternatives, but also limits the extent of the analysis’ (p.150). The 
interviewee in this case, seems to be falling into a reductionism that expresses a 
closed attitude that glosses over a variety of initiatives under highly ideologised 
conceptions. 
This critical reading notwithstanding, the narrative is especially interesting as it gives 
an idea of the positions from which the dialogue about education policy is 
approached by such an important organisation as the Teacher’s Union, which, as 
seen in the chronology, has the capacity to block policies and even jeopardise 
governmental stability - as was the case during the 2002 strike which led to the first 
of the cabinet reshufflings in Toledo’s government. The Union’s rigid position has led 
some to qualify the organisation as being conservative and reactionary (Lynch 2003), 
as it opposes any kind of changes in education and the institutional matrix for policy 
making – any changes, that is, which might challenge the Union’s clientelistic power 
structure and control of the system of decision-making by giving more autonomy to 
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communities and schools.  This is an image that questions the allegedly radical (i.e. 
pro-change) nature of the Teachers Union’s positions.  
 
 
12.5 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The individual analysis of the narratives has focused on the identities performed by 
each of the interviewees and how this reflects their understanding and approach to 
policy making. In all cases it was possible to identify a strong tension between the 
individuals who narrate their experience and ‘others’ who are contested in order to 
construct their identity. These ‘others’ range from members of the opposition, the 
dictatorial government of Fujimori, the education community, groups with vested 
interests that carry out orchestrated campaigns, international agencies, etc. Such 
tensions and contrasts are at the core of the narratives, and those ‘others’ stand as 
the ‘ghostly audiences’ (Langellier 2001) to which the narratives speak. 
Contestation appears to be a fundamental aim of the narratives. It is the basis for the 
articulation of more positive self-identities on the part of the policy makers, who 
portray themselves as victims or heroes in the battle against the ghosts or, rather, 
onetime enemies that ‘blocked’ their actions. In the first case the interviewees 
portrayed themselves as technocrats fighting against the stagnation of the 
bureaucracy and the corruption of the government and the political system; at the 
same time, they performed an identity as highly innovative and creative policy 
makers. In the second case the confrontation with the narratives’ ‘others’ is even 
more explicit, and the interviewee portrays himself as a bold and daring individual 
who had the nerve to face and fight those groups that were opposed to a 
‘democratic’ education policy. In the fourth case, the narrative positions the 
interviewee as a victim who, having had access to power (closeness to the 
president) and knowledge of how to do things, had to face an orchestrated campaign 
that was the product of vested interests from political groups wanting to undermine 
the government’s legitimacy. The final narrative speaks about an institutional identity, 
that of the Teacher’s Union, which stands as a fundamental interlocutor in the policy 
process. Although at one level the interviewee is trying to convey an image of 
flexibility and openness, the narrative reveals very fixed conceptions of the state and 
its role in national development, as well as a rigid attitude towards dialogue in policy 
making. 
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The tension and contrasts between policy makers and those ‘others’ who appear in 
the narratives are at the basis of problems in policy deliberation, as radical stances 
make it difficult to sustain a more deliberative attitude in policy making. Identities 
appear to be hard-wired and non-negotiable, so deliberation is difficult. Policy 
makers, each in their own particular way seem to own the truth, a truth that is non-
negotiable. In this context, deliberation is merely a step for convincing others or 
winning consent for the application of policies, rather than an ongoing process 
involving the thorough discussion of alternatives and desired courses of action, 
which, should also include considerations about things that have already been done 
by previous administrations and how to improve them. But in each case policy 
makers seem to be reinventing the education policy arena, putting the stress on 
things that in their view are necessary, without the least concern for continuity or for 
guaranteeing some degree of institutional learning that might grant improvements in 
the long term. 
This can be partly explained by reference to the institutional matrix within which 
policy makers operate. As policy making careers do not exist as such, and as there 
is a tendency to short term administrations, each individual seems concerned with 
imprinting a mark on the policy process: the long term is too far and inaccessible as 
to grant any personal rewards. But while such an institutional matrix generates such 
constraints, it is also loose enough to provide policy makers with a strong degree of 
autonomy. There are little formal and informal demands for policy makers to account 
for their actions, to take responsibility for the course of policies, and they can thus 
redefine policy directions continuously.  
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PART V - CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the opening pages of this work, discontinuity was presented as a severe problem 
in Peruvian education policies. It was suggested that constant changes in 
discourses, programmes and policy making teams were some of the central factors 
contributing to the stagnation of Peruvian education. The research questions aimed 
to understand the sources of discontinuity, as well as its overall meaning. With this in 
mind, the notion of discontinuity, which, as suggested initially, appeared as a taken 
for granted (or obvious) element of policy making, and which in the case of Peru 
acquired deep and worrying levels, has been then destabilised in various ways. The 
explorations of the subject have followed two complementary lines of analysis: one 
that focused on issues of state development and the role of education, and one that 
focused on the process of policy making in education.  
A discussion of various perspectives on the state suggested the need to analyse 
state capacities in relation to historical developments. The issues of state autonomy 
and legitimacy appeared as fundamental elements in this analysis. This perspective 
was then used to analyse developments in the Peruvian state. It was shown how 
post-colonial state development took place without a deep modification of the social 
structure, which maintained the strong inequalities on which colonial domination was 
based, merely replacing it with what has been described as a form of internal 
colonialism. The operation of the state in this context was partly geared to maintain 
such inequalities, responding to the demands of a small but powerful minority. This 
limited a more homogeneous spread of civil rights and inhibited the formation of a 
stronger middle class capable of exerting pressure over the state for better 
deliverance of policies.  
Not being articulated to a more egalitarian process of state development, public 
education has played a paradoxical role. While at one level it is undeniably linked to 
the extension of civil rights, it appears to do this in a way that reproduces existing 
social inequalities – an idea that comes across in the notion that public education in 
Peru is an ‘education for the poor’.  In this sense, the Peruvian case reinforces the 
view that the problems faced by education systems can be read in terms of the 
contradictions found at the core of the state, which has to comply with opposing 
demands (Dale 1989). In the case of the Peruvian state – which shares similar traits 
to other states in the region and in other parts of the post-colonial world – such 
contradictions situate public education in a paradoxical position, as both an enhancer 
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and limiter of the possibilities of more egalitarian social conditions. The extension of 
civil rights that comes through the massification of education is curtailed by the low 
quality of public education, which keeps a vast majority of the population in 
conditions of exclusion.  
This reading frames the analysis of discontinuity. The latter can be understood as a 
problem that has to do both with the weakness of the Peruvian state, and with the 
role that public education has played in its development. Policy discontinuity has to 
do with the limitations of a state that has developed without a fundamental 
articulation between its institutions and the society in which it operates – a situation 
that limits both its legitimacy and its autonomy, and weakens its executive capacities. 
This can be explained by the lack of a more articulated development of state and 
society, where state institutions have come to existence through a process of 
importation or imposition from above (see Kobrin 1999; Touraine 1998), rather than 
as a consequence of, or together with, social changes. The development of a 
modern state in Peru (in terms of its institutions and functions) has not been matched 
by social developments – i.e. by a more homogeneous spread of civil rights 
(O'Donnell 1998). This, as was discussed, creates a fundamental distance between 
the paradigmatic and syntagmatic dimensions of social action which, in this case, 
translate into a looseness of formal constraints on policy making. The weak 
articulation between state and society means also that there is limited pressure on 
the state for the effective application of social policies, such as those of education.  
To sum up these ideas, it can be said that both the lack of articulation between public 
education and state development, and the weakness of the institutional apparatus of 
the state, stem from the same problem of unequal state and society development. In 
this context, the problem of discontinuity can be understood partly as a problem of 
the role that public education has played (historically) in the development of the 
Peruvian state, and partly as a problem of the institutional apparatus of the state and 
its incapacity to deliver social policies. The latter is both a problem of the process 
machinery of the state, and one of the cultures of policy making that have emerged 
in it and help reproduce its dynamics. It is also a problem that appears to be 
exacerbated in a context permeated by a neo-liberal political economy, in which the 
state stands in an ambiguous position in terms of its responsibilities in relation to the 
improvement of social conditions and of the openness to deliberation in policy 
making (Lauder 1997)91. 
                                                
91 Lauder (1997) has a strong argument that shows that the ‘neo-liberal political economy licenses an 
authoritarian approach to politics’ (p.282) – an idea supported by the interview data presented in 
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Such problems link back to the role of education in Peruvian state development, as 
discontinuity – which prevails in other policy sectors – appears to be higher in 
education due both to the long term (and therefore apparently less pressing) rhythms 
in which changes take place in education, and to the lack of articulation of public 
education to national development. Of course, this latter idea is not overtly 
discussed, and is rather contradicted in political discourses which locate education 
as one of the country’s main priorities, as otherwise serious questions of 
discrimination could be raised. In this sense the question of discontinuity opens up to 
similar issues to those highlighted by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(2003) in charge of investigating the acts of political violence that took place during 
the eighties and early nineties, and which portrayed an alarming picture of Peru as a 
country in which those in the most privileged socio-economic positions systematically 
turn their backs on the most needed. The idea that public education in Peru is an 
‘education for the poor’ suggests that the public education system is geared to 
exclude and to maintain existing social inequalities.  
In this context, the application of education policies often falls into a vacuum, which 
is partly to account for the high levels of discontinuity. If public education is an 
education for those who are excluded, for those who do not matter, for the country's 
‘imaginary citizens’ (Lopez 1997), then inaction in this sector is of little consequence 
for the country. Of course I am not saying that this should be so, not only because of 
the ethical issues it raises, but also because keeping vast majorities of the population 
in conditions of exclusion has consequences for the country’s possibilities of social 
and economic development. The problem is that changing this would require some 
fundamental structural changes in the constitution of Peruvian society – for instance, 
in terms of the development of a class of users of public education capable of 
exerting pressure over the state for better delivery of social policies. Discontinuity, 
then, speaks not only of state incapacities or weaknesses (i.e. in terms of its 
institutions), but also of structural problems in the relations between state and society 
in Peru, and more specifically between the state and education.  
These are the theoretical considerations that have framed, guided and evolved 
throughout the research. They have been extensively explored in Part III, where a 
discussion of various approaches to theorising the state led to a position in which 
considering specific paths to state development became a pressing need. This 
                                                                                                                                        
previous pages, where the period in which a neo-liberal economic programme was strongest coincided 
with a technocratic approach to policy-making that was far from democratic practices.   
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perspective was then used to analyse the characteristics of the Peruvian state, which 
were later linked to the role of public education.  
Having set the ground for understanding the structural problems that explain policy 
discontinuity, the final chapter in Part III moved on to a more detailed consideration 
of policy making processes. The idea here was to set up a theoretical ground for 
understanding the ‘cultures of policy making’ that were then presented in Part IV. 
This chapter also set the basis for some final considerations about policy making that 
help the analysis of discontinuity by focusing on more specific aspects of the problem 
which have to do with the operation of the policy making apparatus and the political 
system. Discontinuity in this context, speaks of a largely undemocratic approach to 
policy making, which is far from any process of giving reasons and inviting responses 
(Barnett 2003). As a consequence of the loose institutional framework in which they 
operate, policy makers can appropriate decision making spaces almost absolutely, 
defining and redefining policy directions at will, often in accordance to merely 
idiosyncratic criteria.  
In relation to these issues, the first part of the analysis of the interview data focused 
on the institutional context of policy making. The limits of the bureaucracy appeared 
as a central element, as a lack of public service career and of clear mechanisms for 
entering, leaving or being promoted in the public sector give way to the imposition of 
more clientelistic criteria. The bureaucracy then appeared as one of pacts or 
temporary alliances, but not as a system capable of structuring and sustaining 
policies over time. This, moreover, seriously limits the possibilities of institutional 
learning, as institutional experience and memory are constantly wiped out. 
Bureaucratic limitations were matched by the limitations imposed by an intricate legal 
system, which often limits the possibilities of applying policies in more efficient ways, 
and promotes efforts to by-pass the law. 
These problems are further deepened by the lack of a better articulated set of 
policies in the public sector, which hinders coordination and the application of 
policies. This lack of articulation has to do with the weaknesses of the Peruvian party 
political system, which is dominated by independent movements and seems 
incapable of coming up with coherent government proposals that could guide the 
actions of policy makers as well as the coordination between different sectors of 
public administration. In education this lack of directionality is even deeper, largely, it 
was suggested, because of the ambiguous role that public education plays in 
national development.   
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In this context, international funding agencies were seen to play an ambiguous role. 
In view of the local incapacity to come up with more coherent policy directions – 
partly because of the discontinuities in policy making teams – there is a tendency to 
appropriate the proposals of such agencies. The latter, however, tend to fall into a 
vacuum and miss the possibility of becoming articulated with long term policies. 
Furthermore, international agencies, by focusing on specific areas and programmes 
tend to overlook problems at the level of policy and reform management, and their 
efforts are thus often lost amidst prevailing discontinuities.  
As was seen through the data analysis, especially in the narrative analysis of 
interviews, policy makers speak as if they had total ownership of the spaces of 
political representation. Constrained by only weak formal institutional mechanisms, 
and bound rather by the more informal clientelistic and feudal patterns of 
relationship, they colonise the spaces of policy making in education as long as they 
are in positions of power. In this sense, their discourses can be seen as ‘expressions 
of identity’, rather than ‘mediums for the re-making of identities’ (Barnett 2003:20), 
that is for the permanent reformulation of what needs to be done in the policy arena 
as to better satisfy social needs and demands. To some extent the problem seems 
one of creating better institutions to bind policy makers and hold them to account for 
their actions. This would also require the development of more horizontal forms of 
accountability (O'Donnell 2002; 1999) as to create a ‘culture’ of policy making tied to 
both formal and informal binding mechanisms.  
Speaking about binding actions and decisions is not, of course, to be equated with 
the determination of uncontestable policies and policy aims. It refers rather to the 
opening of decision making processes to a space of permanent 
conversation/deliberation about the direction of policies. A kind of public sphere, to 
use Habermas’ term, but one that is not defined by the presence of unchangeable 
policies, but rather marked by the presence of permanent conflict and contestation, 
as well as by a relationship of accountability between policy makers and the public 
for whom they are supposed to act. In this context, ‘deliberative speech is not the 
property of any individual or collective subject (as it indeed appeared to  be in the 
policy narratives), but is the subject-less medium for the contingent articulation of 
political subjectivity’ (Barnett 2003:21). This is a process which, on the other hand, is 
neither to be equated with an agonistic politics of permanent change, but which is 
tied to the more pragmatic aim of delivering policies and wellbeing.   
Deliberation as the fundamental element of policy making is thus tied to a conception 
of representation that is quite far from notions of consensus building that seem to 
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permeate new proposals for education policy making based on strong participatory 
mechanisms (i.e. the new law of education), and which are based on a conception of 
identity as presence, that is, as something that is definite, speakable and permanent. 
Contrary to these views, the conception of policy making advanced here assumes 
that ‘practices of deliberation, debate, and representation are not understood as 
expressions of identity or will, but as a medium for the remaking of identities’ (Barnett 
2003). In this sense, deliberative processes in policy making, should be related to the 
aim of developing better policies by enhancing relations between the state and 
citizens. Of course consensus building has a role to play in all this, as a minimal 
guiding framework and agreements are fundamental to direct policies. But rather 
than a rational consensus in which differences are homogenised, it is one that is 
open to contestation and reformulation. 
Such an approach to policy making contrasts markedly with what was discussed in 
the narrative analysis of policy discourses, which showed how policy makers operate 
on the basis of non-negotiable identities, that are constructed in opposition to the 
also definite identities of ‘others’ such as ‘the opposition’, ‘the critics’, ‘the education 
community’. This reveals a lack of disposition towards dialogue that is opposed to 
notions of deliberation as one of the fundamentals of democratic government 
(Barnett 2003) – the latter being a form of politics that ‘takes the form of a call that 
anticipates a response from the people whose identity is invoked in the descriptive 
register, a response that takes the form of subsequent authorisation and calling to 
account’ (Barnett 2003). This view of democracy as a form of deliberative politics 
entails a process of permanent translation that leads to the ‘articulation of promises, 
giving reasons, and a willingness to talk and listen’ (Barnett 2003:63). It contrasts 
markedly to the cultures of policy making examined in the data analysis section, 
where, in spite of the difference between the policy makers narratives, each narrative 
suggested an image of the policy process in which individuals appropriate the space 
for policy making and reject the need to both give reasons and invite responses.  
Policy discontinuity thus signals a form of indetermination (of what needs to be done 
in education) that is profoundly undemocratic, as it implies no commitment to binding 
decisions, no responsibility for social needs and no commitment to account. Rather 
than the indetermination that comes from the exposure of ideas and decisions to 
public scrutiny, it is one that stems from a political system in which the links between 
policy makers and citizens are very weak (Suma Ciudadana 2003), and where the 
former are only loosely compelled to assume responsibility for their actions.  
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*** 
‘Politics is frequently associated today with self-seeking 
behaviour, hypocrisy and ‘public relations’ activity geared to 
selling policy packages. The problem with this view is that, 
while it is quite understandable, the difficulties of the modern 
world will not be solved by surrendering politics, but only by 
the development and transformation of ‘politics’ in ways that 
enable us more effectively to shape and organize human life’ 
(Held 1987) 
 
Having reached the end of this long text, I should hope that the reader will have 
found that my work is, by and large, coherent with what I now take as my 
assumptions about the possibility of empiricism, evidence, etc. Throughout the text, 
however, the reader might have perceived the existence of what I have called a 
ghost, an underlying assumption or a series of them, which could be linked to a 
shadow of empiricism in my work. This is a ghost that I am aware of. Any other slips I 
will have to blame on a blind-eye to the persistence of this and other ghosts and to 
the situatedness of my knowledge, which, however much I reflect upon, I will never 
be able to overcome (see Rose 1997). 
The ghost I am talking about is that of ‘finding order’, of ‘doing things right’ in the 
education policy arena. It is a kind of Apolinean principle (in the Nietzchean sense), 
that keeps imposing itself over my commitment to ‘the flow of ideas’, or to the 
impossibility of defining things in definite ways, which stems from my closeness to 
post-structuralist views. I think that, using Derrida’s term, here lies the aporia on 
which my research hinges – the moment of perplexity, impossibility and 
undecidability, the moment of doubt which is inherent in any real decision. It might be 
an aporia that, as a ghost, haunts all of us who, having assumed the impossibility of 
an uninterpreted relation to the world, still propose to do certain things, in certain 
ways, guided not by “Truth”, but by some kind of normative (but at the same time 
contestable, provisional, negotiable) notion of the ‘good life’.  
To some extent, my willingness to compromise or engage in some sort of search for 
orderliness – in policy making in this case –  has to do with a move away from what 
in many cases resembles the ‘intellectual comfort’ that philosopher Paul Ricoueur 
criticised in some of his fellow French intellectuals, who were often caught in 
positions of permanent confrontation or denunciation, without daring to move 
towards a much necessary re-symbolisation of the political realm (Ricoeur June 
2005).  
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In my case, this aporia translates into a certain desire or commitment that can be 
perceived at many points in the text, that things should change in the Peruvian 
education policy arena, that they should move in a certain direction (towards being 
more democratic for instance). This direction is that of orderliness, of a system in 
which policy makers should be more constrained or committed to give reasons for 
their actions and invite responses from other actors, a system where people cannot 
do whatever they want, whenever they want, where actors can engage in a 
permanent dialogue but also agree on the need to come up with binding decisions 
(Barnett 2003).  
So, while acknowledging that any new discourse, any decision, consensus or 
settlement over something will inaugurate a new series of power relations, of 
normalising discourses with potentially excluding consequences, my thoughts on 
education policy aporetically move towards the need for decision, for settlement, for 
some kind of orderliness, albeit of a non-foundational or totalising character. With 
this aporia I am willing to live. 
My position comes not only from an understanding about the impossibility to 
overcome the aporia that is involved in the move from ‘undecidability to decision’ 
(Critchley 1999a), or from the move away from the ‘intellectual comfort’ of permanent 
denunciation, but also from a more personal experience. Coming from a country like 
Peru, I think it is almost impossible to look at the political system – if it can be called 
a system at all – without developing some kind of commitment to some form of 
orderliness, even if this imposes a new set of power relations. The search, of course, 
is not for some kind of perfect order, but rather a move away from the complete 
chaos and disorderliness in which our political system is often caught. It is a move 
away from the prevalence of things like corruption, authoritarian forms of 
government, or the less legally condemnable, but not less pervasive, everyday 
abuses of power. In this case, it is a move away from a form of policy making that is 
full of incoherence and authoritarianism, where policy makers use their power to do 
things in order to impose their will and their views, in a way that leads to a permanent 
redefinition of things and which leaves many fundamental problems of social and 
educational equity untouched. The aporia on which my research hinges is therefore 
closely linked to the experiences that I described in the opening chapters and which 
constitute the source of my motivation to carry out this study. This is my experience 
working in Peru, in the public sector and as a researcher in education, but also my 
more fundamental everyday experience as a Peruvian citizen who does not want to 
‘surrender politics’. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
 
? BIRF – International Reconstruction and Promotion Bank  
? Foro Educativo – civil society organization that gathers educational experts 
and aims to contribute to the discussion education policies  
? GTZ – German International Development Office 
? IDB – InterAmerican Development Bank 
? IMF – International Monetary Fund 
? Huascaran Programme – Programme for providing technologies and 
connecting schools developed during the government of Alejandro Toledo. 
? MECEP – Programme for the Improvement of Educational Quality in Peru 
? MED – Ministry of Education of Peru 
? MEF – Ministry of Finance 
? PATRIA ROJA – Extreme leftist political party which holds strong links with 
the Teacher’s Union 
? Peru Posible – President Alejandro Toledo’s political party  
? PLANCAD – Teacher training programme during the time of President 
? Sendero Luminoso – Peruvian terrorist movement  
? SUTEP – Peruvian Teachers’ Union 
? PLANCGED – School management training programme during the time of 
President Fujimori 
? UNDP – United Nations Development Programme 
? WB – World Bank 
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WHO’S WHO IN THE INTERVIEWS 
 
? Domingo Palermo Education minister during the government of Fujimori 
? Absalon Vasquez – former advisor and minister of Fujimori’s government who 
led a faction of the party (therefore the term ‘absalonism’) 
? Ignacio Garcia Escudero – Education minister during the government of 
Fujimori 
? Lynch - Education minister during the government of Alejandro Toledo 
? Galli – Garcia Escudero’s vice minister 
? Hugo Diaz – National education expert and member of Foro Educativo  
? Alberto Fujimori – Peruvian president between 1990 and 2001 
? Alejandro Toledo – Peruvian president between 2001 and 2006 
? Gorriti (Jose Carlos) – Head of the Secondary and Technical Education 
Office 
? Pedro Pablo Kuczinski – Finance minister of Toledo’s government 
? Marcial Rubio – Minister of Education during the transition government 
between Fujimori and Toledo 
? Gerardo Ayzanoa – Education minister during the government of Alejandro 
Toledo 
? Carlos Malpica - Education minister during the government of Alejandro 
Toledo 
? Javier Sota - Education minister during the government of Alejandro Toledo 
? Juan Abugattas – vice-minister during Nicolas Lynch’s administration 
? Cecilia Valenzuela – conductor of a political television programme 
? Leon Trahtemberg – National education expert, member of the National 
Council for Education 
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